This article argues that Iris Murdoch, who was supervised by John Wisdom during her 1947–48 fellowship at Newnham College Cambridge, went on to practice philosophy in a recognizably Wisdomian manner in her earliest paper, “Thinking and Language” (1951). To do so, I first describe how Wisdom understood philosophical perplexity and paradox. One task that linguistic philosophers should take up is to investigate the concrete cases that give paradoxical philosophical statements their sense and to sift the truth they (...) contain from the distortion. I then show how this vision informed his critical reception of Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind as well as his own investigation of the Hidden Stream Paradox. Finally, I trace a similar approach to Murdoch's discussions of a paradox I call the Coarse Net Paradox. Recognizing Murdoch's intellectual inheritance from Wisdom enables us to see a thus‐far overlooked connection between Murdoch and the tradition of linguistic philosophy. (shrink)

Leading digital platform providers such as Google and Uber construct marketplaces in which algorithms set prices. The efficiency-maximising free market credentials of this approach are touted by the companies involved and by legislators, policy makers and marketers. They have also taken root in the public imagination. In this article we challenge this understanding of algorithmically constructed marketplaces. We do so by returning to Hayek’s (1945) classic defence of the price mechanism, and by arguing that algorithmically-mediated price mechanisms do not, and (...) probably cannot, accumulate and signal that same kinds of knowledge that Hayek felt were essential to effective market governance. Indeed, we argue that algorithmically-constructed marketplaces are closer to, though distinct from, the central planning model that Hayek critiqued. Regardless of how you feel about Hayek’s argument, this has important consequences for how we respond to the rise of algorithmic governance tools in both markets and elsewhere. (shrink)

We think we have lots of substantial knowledge about the future. But contemporary wisdom has it that indeterminism prevails in such a way that just about any proposition about the future has a non-zero objective chance of being false.2, 3 What should one do about this? One, pessimistic, reaction is scepticism about knowledge of the future. We think this should be something of a last resort, especially since this scepticism is likely to infect alleged knowledge of the present and (...) past. One anti-sceptical strategy is to pin our hopes on determinism, conceding that knowledge of the future is unavailable in an indeterministic world. This is not satisfying either: we would rather not be hostage to empirical fortune in the way that this strategy recommends. A final strategy, one that we shall explore in this paper, is one of reconciliation: knowledge of a proposition is compatible with a subject’s belief having a non-zero objective chance of error.4 Following Williamson, we are interested in tying knowledge to the presence or absence of error in close cases, and so we shall explore the connections between knowledge and objective chance within such a framework. We don’t want to get tangled up here in complications involved in attempting to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge in terms of safety. Instead, we will assume the following rough and ready necessary condition: a subject knows P only if she could not easily have falsely believed P.5 Assuming that easiness is to be spelt.. (shrink)

This chapter treats Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping as part of his wider project of demonstrating the sovereignty of practical intelligence over all other forms of intelligence. In contrast to the standard picture of human beings as essentially rational, individual agents, Dreyfus argued powerfully on phenomenological and empirical grounds that humans are fundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied. These commitments are present throughout Dreyfus’ philosophical writings, from his critique of Artificial Intelligence research in the 1970s and 1980s to his rejection (...) of John McDowell’s conceptualism in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. The present chapter articulates Dreyfus’ proposal for a contentless, non-mentalistic form of intentionality by contrasting his position with that of his U.C. Berkeley colleague John Searle and defending it as a plausible alternative to the so-called “Standard Story” of intentional action as the effect of an agent’s mental states. (shrink)

Both professors and institutions of higher education benefit from a vision of academic life that is grounded more firmly in myth than in history. According to the myth created by that traditional vision, scholars pursue research wherever their drive to knowledge takes them, and colleges and universities transmit the fruits of that research to contemporary and future generations as the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Yet the economic and social forces operating on colleges and universities as institutions, as well (...) as on the interests of faculty members within them, are making the myth embodied in the traditional ideal of the academy more and more difficult to sustain. Questions about what an institution of higher education ought to be, about what professors ought to do, and about what relations professors ought to have to the institutions which employ them are being raised and pushed to the fore. These are not theoretical questions, but practical questions of immediate import that must be answered relatively quickly -- and wisely -- if institutions of higher education and professors are not to find themselves inextricably in the grip of forces they cannot change. The myth of disinterested academic research-however beautiful -- and however beneficial -- is under siege. (shrink)

In 1921, John Wisdom (1904–1993) became a member of Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, where he read philosophy and attended lectures by G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and J. E. McTaggart. He received his BA in 1924, after which he worked for five years at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. From 1929 to 1934, Wisdom was a Lecturer in the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of St Andrews and a colleague of G. F. Stout. (...) After the publication of his book Interpretation and Analysis (1931) and five articles on “Logical Constructions” in Mind (1931–3), Wisdom became a Lecturer in Moral Sciences in Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College. This gave him the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Since nothing by Wittgenstein but Tractatus appeared in print for decades, Wisdom’s publications of these years were—mistakenly—read as portents of the new ideas of Wittgenstein himself. The publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in 1953 brought with it, among other things, the fall of Wisdom’s popularity. (shrink)

The article aims at demonstrating that, by his teaching on human person and his action, St. John Paul II (also known as Karol Wojtyła) implicitly contributed to a resolution of the most serious problem of contemporary philosophy, which consists in separating wisdom from love and substituting wisdom with understanding or knowledge. The author concludes that John Paul II makes a persuasive contribution to recover philosophy as the love of wisdom by (1) identifying truth in the (...) area of freedom, self-fulfillment and conscience, and (2) appealing to man’s honesty and happiness. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to draw an outline of John Buridan’s views about the intellectual virtues and to foster debate on Buridan’s commentary on the _Nicomachean Ethics_ (QNE). In order to do that, my first goal was to make some parts of Buridan’s _Ethics_ commentary more accessible to readers by providing a working edition of the Latin text accompanied by its English translation. Each quæstio is followed by a brief exegetical examination which clarifies Buridan’s reasoning and arguments. (...) The second part of this work, being of a synthetical nature, provides a more systematic account of each of the five intellectual virtues Buridan discusses, namely craft, understanding, knowledge, prudence and wisdom. The analyses provided rely on the QNE and other works of the Buridanian corpus, which are then compared and contrasted with views held by some of his forerunners, contemporaries, and successors. (shrink)

This chapter presents a historical study of how science has developed and of how philosophical theories of many sorts – philosophy of science, theory of the understanding, and philosophical theology – both enable and constrain certain lines of development in scientific practice. Its topic is change in the legitimacy or acceptability of scientific explanation that invokes purposes, or ends; specifically in the argument from design, in the natural science field of physico-theology, around the start of the eighteenth century. ... The (...) context that produced physico-theology was clearly religious and political. It is unsurprising that a large body of Protestant intellectuals well-placed in a relatively peaceful society with a strong tradition of open speech, would develop links between science and critical discussion of both divinity and the Bible. There were also bounds to the discussion, as Newton, who chose to sit on the sidelines, knew well. Many others on Europe’s continent lived much more intimately with religious division as well as the reminder, in 1633, of Galileo’s failure to arrange a peaceable arrangement between science and religion. These aspects of the rise of physico-theology have not been the focus of this chapter, which has surveyed the philosophical and social origins found in the English context. Science, philosophy of science and other English philosophical currents – most particularly the theory of ideas and understanding that we are familiar with in its later development by John Locke – were formative for a field that might alternatively have been called ‘empirical natural theology.’ Prior shifts in religious sensibility that emptied the Book of Nature of much of its content also prepared the ground. Other philosophical and theological currents not discussed here – most notably theories of divine agency and predestination – and other philosophical trends – the rise of Spinoza’s challenge to such natural theology on the continent – also had both shaping and limiting influences upon the field. Finally, philosophers, including natural philosophers, did much more to promote physico-theology than just write about it: Boyle in particular provided a very important launch pad for the further development of an already healthy tradition of natural theology with his named lectureship, which drew the interest of others in the Royal Society, most notably Isaac Newton, and which spawned two of the most influential physico-theological tracts shortly before and shortly after the turn of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

The study aims to clarify some actual contents that we think should be noted in the study of Dewey‟s educational philosophy. The study begins with Dewey‟s criticism of traditional education, which served as the basis for his progressive educational views. The article then analyzes the learnercentric educational process and teacher‟s qualities from a progressive viewpoint. Progressive education‟s ultimate aim is to achieve democracy in education. That, in our opinion, is the prominent reason that the influence of Dewey‟s educational philosophy continues (...) to have a bearing on the education systems of the United States, many European countries, and Asia. The article concludes with John Dewey‟s contributions to educational development to demonstrate that his progressive educational views still have directional value and provide meaningful guidance for educational innovation in many countries. (shrink)

J. H. Newman is known as a convert, an educator and a theologian, however, the twenty thousand letters he wrote testify to another aspect of his personality: A good friend. Friendship was not an abstract ideal for him, it was love given and received. Throughout his life he cultivated committed and generous relationships, sharing his heart, time, wisdom and financial resources with his friends. In today’s world where intimacy, friendship, commitment and generosity are often seen with suspicion, the way (...) Newman lived friendship, while cultivating a deep intellectual life in the celibate state of a clergyman, can be very enlightening. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the intedermination in compositive processes. In particular on John Cage. The art and the thought of Cage were a response to the growing complexity of the world through a practice and a reflection that focuses heavily on the concept of emptiness, understood as technical decentralization of: the author of the musical structure and the individual and of the same identification of sounds. This complexity results from a network of independent nodes, subjects, activities and institutions (...) that interact in no particular order. You can no longer assume the existence of an ultimate subject for whose wisdom assumes all sense. There is no longer any author. Events happen randomly. Relinquishing control is one of the main themes running through the compositional work of Cage. (shrink)

Short paper about debate on cognitive meaning of religious use of language in early analytic philosophy of religion. Published in Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Janusz Salamon, Cracow: WAM, 2016.

In trying to answer the question What is analytic philosophy? I shall follow two methodological principles. (i) The first was suggested by Peter Hacker and reads: ‘Any characterisation of “analytic philosophy” which excludes Moore, Russell and the later Wittgenstein, as well as the leading figures of post War analytic philosophy [for us these are John Wisdom, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett], must surely be rejected.’ (Hacker 1996a, p. 247) The correct definition of analytic philosophy must cohere with the (...) philosophy of its generally recognized founding fathers. (ii) Any characterisation of ‘analytic philosophy’ which was massively represented in the history of philosophy in the past, must be rejected too. To be sure, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later also Ryle, Austin and their friends, were doing a type of philosophy which they consciously understood as new—it was intrinsically New Philosophy. The problem was only that this newness was difficult to identify and define. (shrink)

Susan Stebbing wrote only once on Wittgenstein, in her paper ‘Logical Positivism and Analysis’ (1933). The paper was unusually critical of Wittgenstein. It put the Cambridge analytic philosophy of Moore and Russell in a sharp opposition to the positivist philosophy of the Vienna Circle, in which Stebbing included Wittgenstein. Whereas the positivists were interested in analysing language, the Cambridge realists were analysing facts. To be more explicit, the analytic philosophers were engaged in directional analysis, which seeks to illuminate (to elucidate) (...) the multiplicity of the analysed facts. In contrast, positivists aimed at a final analysis that proves that there are simples. Stebbing’s sympathies were clearly on the side of the Cambridge realists. The important implication of Stebbing’s paper was that it urged Wittgenstein to change the style of his philosophy, abandoning those points which allegedly connected him with the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

Très souvent, on compte sur la science pour nous sauver. Le rapport qu'on établit avec elle peut donner à penser que la science parlerait ainsi de choses, validerait quelque chose comme des évidences immédiates. La connaissance scientifique est inférentielle. Si elle a un objet, ce qu'en rigueur de termes la philosophie n'a pas, elle doit néanmoins se mettre à distance de lui pour se faire science. Elle valide ainsi des schèmes abstraits, qui ne sont scientifiques que dans cette mesure. Nous (...) prendrons la mesure du fait que pour nous aider à retrouver le concret, l'intuition est meilleure guide que la science, et puis nous convoquerons certaines idées de l'algébriste et métaphysicien Alfred North Whitehead dont l'actualité ne cesse d'étonner, lorsqu'il inverse l'accès direct au réel, à l'envers de la vulgate reçue concernant les rapports entre science et religion. (shrink)

The rise and legacy of world religions out of that period centered roughly around 500-600 BCE, what John Stuart-Glennie termed in 1873 the moral revolution, and Karl Jaspers later, in 1949, called the axial age, has been marked by heightened ideas of transcendence. Yet ironically, the world itself, in the literal sense of the actual earth, took on a diminished role as a central element of religious sensibility in the world religions, particularly in the Abrahamic religions. Given the issue (...) today of ecological unsustainability, including massive die-offs of wildlife and ever-increasing global human population and consumption, the legacy of those world religions face the question I consider here: Can religion transcend the earth in the long run? With the Axial Age/Moral Revolution, comes the possibility of transcendence of the world per se. The moral revolution/Axial Age represented significant changes in civilization, to be sure, but it can also be taken, as I do, as a second phase in the radical shift to anthropocentric mind already begun with the advent of agriculturally based civilization. The axial ideal of transcendence connects to a larger ideal, manifest not only in the legacies of the world religions but in contemporary science and technology, of a philosophy of escape from the earth. I show how ideas of axial transcendence, celebrated by scholars such as Jaspers and Bellah, nevertheless involve an unacknowledged tragic cost, the forgetting of the earth and its lessons and limits as central to what I have termed elsewhere, “sustainable wisdom.” . (shrink)

In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that free speech possesses value because listening is valuable: it can advance one’s own thinking and action. However, listening becomes difficult when one finds the views of a speaker to be wrong, repellant, or even simply naïve. Everyday wisdom would have it that such cases present the greatest opportunities for growth. Is there substance to this claim? In particular, is there radical political value to be found in listening to others at (...) the very times one is most disinclined to do so? I contend that there is. This paper explores the political potential of what I call “radical listening.” What characterizes radical listening? How can it serve politically transformative purposes? To what extent are the powers of radical listening strategic, and to what extent is it valuablefor more conceptual reasons? Under what circumstances is it appropriate? What are the limits to, and dangers of, radical listening? (shrink)

The 20th century was a bloody one, full of armed clashes which destroyed Europe, withered an entire generation’s hope of European-level peace. After the Versailles Treaty, the famous economist John Maynard Keynes uttered this prophecy: ”With such a peace treaty, you’ll be at war again within 20 years”. John Maxwell Coetzee, an important South-African novelist, called the 20th century “Satan’s century”. A tough statement yet extremely true unfortunately. Besides war, the past one hundred years also witnessed terrible totalitarian (...) regimes occur, such as the Nazi and fascism. The hardness of those regimes at least equaled the suffering caused by the world wars. One wouldn’t be wrong to call such regimes state terrorism: a leader suppressing his own citizens just to satisfy his own fantasy. The hugeness of their deeds goes beyond human imagination according to the number of victims. A classical word of wisdom describes terrorism as follows: ”It kills a few, but terrifies more”. (shrink)

Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock’s framework for defeat is now part of the received wisdom in analytic epistemology. Recently, however, cracks have appeared in the consensus, particularly on the understanding of undercutting defeat. While not questioning the existence of undercutting defeat, Scott Sturgeon argues that undercutting defeat operates differently from rebutting. Unlike the latter, undercutting defeat, Sturgeon claims, occurs only in conjunction with certain higher-order contributions, i.e., with beliefs about the basis on which one (...) does or would believe. Sturgeon concludes that Pollock misconceives undercutting defeat. I argue that in the case of defeat of inferential justification, undercutting defeat is a genuine phenomenon and takes roughly the shape Pollock suggests, not needing help from higher-order beliefs or justifications. However, I agree with Sturgeon that for noninferential justification the Pollockian account is in trouble. I try to explain why there should be this difference. This difference in defeaters has important implications for epistemology. In a final section, I use the defeat-related difference between inferential and noninferential justification to argue that there is less noninferential perceptual or testimonial justification than is commonly thought. (shrink)

In a transcendent gathering beyond the confines of time and space, philosopher Socrates finds himself engaged in profound dialogues with some of history's most influential thinkers. These dialogues span five days and delve into a wide array of philosophical topics, guided by quantum entanglement. This unique assembly unearths the timeless questions surrounding knowledge, reality, causation, and the interface between philosophy and science. The first day witnesses Socrates conversing with Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume, delving into (...) the essence of knowledge. Their discourse navigates through Plato's Theory of Forms, Aristotle's empirical approach, Descartes' emphasis on the role of the mind, Locke's ideas on the role of experience, and Hume's skepticism regarding causation. The day culminates in Kant's synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. On the second day, these thinkers explore the nature of reality and the distinction between ontology and mental reality. Quantum physicist Richard Conn Henry joins them, bringing fresh insights on quantum perspectives. They contemplate the implications of quantum causation and how it challenges traditional notions of cause and effect. The third day centers on the relationship between philosophy and science, highlighting the significance of imagination and empirical evidence. Philosopher Thomas Kuhn introduces the concept of paradigms, sparking intriguing discussions. The fourth day extends this discourse, emphasizing the role of imagination and empirical evidence in philosophy and science. It touches on atomic theory, Max Planck, Niels Bohr, and the fascinating world of sub-particles. The final day reflects on the differences between philosophy and science, with philosopher Karl Popper adding his perspective. The dialogue culminates in discussions on cosmology, where ancient cosmologists and modern scientists intertwine in an exploration of the cosmos. In these five days, Socrates and his esteemed colleagues delve into the timeless questions that have shaped human understanding for millennia. Their insights shed light on the interplay between ancient wisdom and contemporary knowledge, reminding us that the pursuit of wisdom transcends temporal and spatial boundaries. (shrink)

This chapter critically examines the dominant tradition in formal education as an indirect driver of biocultural homogenization while revealing that there is an alternative tradition that fosters biocultural conservation. The dominant tradition, originating in the Seventeenth Century scientific revolution effected by René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Isaac Newton, John Locke and allied thinkers, privileges science, seen as facilitating the technological domination of the world in the service of economic growth, as the only genuine knowledge. This is at the foundation of (...) a globalized, homogenizing culture that reduces everything and everyone to instruments of the globalized economy. The alternative, now recognized as the Radical Enlightenment, has its roots in the Renaissance. Represented by thinkers such as Giordano Bruno, Giambattista Vico, Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, it challenges such dogmatic scientism and upholds the value of diverse cultures, past and present. It offers an alternative tradition and model of education fostering imagination, understanding and appreciation of diversity in the quest for wisdom. It is a model of education which engenders respect for and appreciation of the value of different cultures, including indigenous wisdom with very different attitudes to nature, thereby developing the capacity to reflect on, question, criticize and overcome the homogenizing imperialism of mainstream modernist culture. (shrink)

In Tulving’s initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations, and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural, and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research program has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the ‘common system’ view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there (...) are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this under-noticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations, and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism. (shrink)

It is generally unquestioned that human subjects research review boards should assess the ethical acceptability of protocols. It says so right on the tin, after all: they are explicitly called research ethics committees in the UK. But it is precisely those sorts of unchallenged assumptions that should, from time to time, be assessed and critiqued, in case they are in fact unfounded. John Stuart Mill's objection to suppressers of dissent is instructive here: “If the opinion is right, they are (...) deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error”.1 Andrew Moore and Andrew Donnelly's compelling article, “The job of ‘ethics committees’”, is just this sort of challenge to conventional wisdom, a rejection of the notion that review boards should be considering ethical matters at all.2 If true, we should be substantially reforming our research ethics policies. And if false, rebuttals would help strengthen and ground the otherwise unquestioned assumption of the role of ethics committees. As it happens, I will argue that their critiques fall into the second category. While mistaken, they present a valuable opportunity to clarify the role of ethics committees and their relationship to relevant codes. In particular, I will defend a hybrid account where codes have strict primacy, but leave significant room for review boards …. (shrink)

Abstract Human by nature are social beings. They tend to connect and relate with one another in spite of the individual differences they possess. As to the famous quote of an English poet John Donne, “No man is an island.” Man should necessarily relate with one another in order to thrive. But bearing in mind the individual differences of human beings, we cannot exclude the possibility of chaos, disorder, and discordance. That is why in a diverse society, man needs (...) a moral guide in order to achieve a harmonious social life. Man needs to resort to ethical views and principles in order to enrich their nature as social beings. Throughout the history of philosophy, there were various ethical views being introduced by different philosophers. One of the great traditions that offered major contribution in the field of ethics was the Chinese or Oriental tradition. The most notable philosopher in Chinese thought was Confucius. In this paper, the researcher will investigate the concept of Virtue in the light of the Confucian Ren, Yi, Li, Zhi, and Xin. These are considered to be the five constant virtues of Confucianism. Ren is the virtue of benevolence and humanity; Yi is that of honesty and uprightness; Zhi is knowledge and wisdom; Xin is faithfulness and integrity; and Li is propriety, good manners, and worship. The researcher will try to discuss each concept in order to have a better outlook on Confucian ethics. These virtues serve as the basis in developing a harmonious society and good government. The main question of this paper is: What is Confucius’ view on the five constant virtues? This paper only limits to the book of Confucius entitled, “The Analects” which is also supplemented by different secondary sources. The first part of this paper will discuss the background of Confucius and the five constant virtues in general. The second part of the paper will be an exposition of the five constant virtues. Then, the third part of the paper will be a brief discussion on the notion of gentleman – the end of the five constant virtues. The last part is the conclusion of the paper. (shrink)

Although current educational priorities tend to avoid strong moral positions, one of the world's most venerable yet persistently influential moral traditions not only lays out a number of major moral principles but also incorporates them into its pedagogy. Confucius teaches us about the importance of seeking knowledge, learning how to learn, applying ancient wisdom to contemporary situations, valuing virtue over material gain, following the Golden Rule, and living by our principles. He also has ways of assessing his own students' (...) progress in these matters. Confucius' pedagogy is an interesting model to consider and contrast with contemporary models. This chapter introduces these principles and assessments from the Analects and draws out some comparisons to and contrasts with two alternative theories in western moral thought, Augustine and John Dewey. -/- The accepted version of the paper is included here. Pagination does not match the published version. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

In the last chapter of The Public and its Problems John Dewey outlines the alleged fallacy of "the democratic creed". According to him the fallacy is described as conflating emancipation with the capacity to rule, i.e. the capacity to make policy decisions. His point is that the power to make decisions does not entail a capacity to make good choices. Capable are those in the know, the experts who are "intellectually qualified". The answer to the fallacy is to propose (...) epistocracy: The rule of experts – as Walter Lippman had come close to arguing. But Dewey tries to refute the argument for epistocracy. He rehearses the old platonic wisdom that the harmonious state... (shrink)

Contemporary moral theorists are increasingly attentive to the ways human beings actually make sense of their moral experience and compose meaningful lives. Martha Nussbaum's re-introduction of Aristotelian practical wisdom and Alasdair MacIntyre's emphasis on narrativity are good examples of a shift in focus away from tedious polemics about the single "right thing to do" in a situation. But recent theorists have tended to lack a highly articulated philosophical framework--especially a full-blooded theory of moral belief and deliberation--that would enable us (...) better to wend our way along the trails they have blazed. We are born, MacIntyre proclaims, with a social past, a tradition into which we grow. Yet MacIntyre advances a new moral vision independent of recent philosophical traditions that might accommodate and direct his own insights and inquiries. Classical American pragmatism, especially as developed by John Dewey, provides a framework that can clarify and extend the achievements of contemporary moral theory. I contend that a thoroughgoing reconstruction of our moral vision would profit immensely from looking back to Dewey's theory of moral understanding. I propose here to articulate the center of vision of this theory by developing a Deweyan conception of deliberation as imaginative dramatic rehearsal. (shrink)

The relation between body and mind is one of the oldest riddles that has puzzled mankind. That material and mental events may interact is accepted even by the law: our mental capacity to concentrate on the task can be seriously reduced by drugs. Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical events, upon the mind of the recipient of the (...) letter. This is what the authors of this book call the 'interaction of mental and physical events'. We know very little about this interaction; and according to recent philosophical fashions this is explained by the alleged fact that we have brains but no thoughts. The authors of this book stress that they cannot solve the body mind problem; but they hope that they have been able to shed new light on it. Eccles especially with his theory that the brain is a detector and amplifier; a theory that has given rise to important new developments, including new and exciting experiments; and Popper with his highly controversial theory of 'World 3'. They show that certain fashionable solutions which have been offered fail to understand the seriousness of the problems of the emergence of life, or consciousness and of the creativity of our minds. In Part I, Popper discusses the philosophical issue between dualist or even pluralist interaction on the one side, and materialism and parallelism on the other. There is also a historical review of these issues. In Part II, Eccles examines the mind from the neurological standpoint: the structure of the brain and its functional performance under normal as well as abnormal circumstances. The result is a radical and intriguing hypothesis on the interaction between mental events and detailed neurological occurrences in the cerebral cortex. Part III, based on twelve recorded conversations, reflects the exciting exchange between the authors as they attempt to come to terms with their opinions. (shrink)

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...) and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. (shrink)

How can what is of value associated with our human world exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? Or, as we may put it, how can the God-of-Cosmic-Value exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the God-of-Cosmic-Power? This, I argue, is our fundamental problem – fundamental in both intellectual and practical terms. Here, I tackle the practical aspect of the problem. I consider briefly five global problems – climate change, war, population growth, world (...) poverty, habitat destruction and extinction of species – and argue that, in order to solve them it is essential to bring about a revolution in universities round the world so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge. I conclude by indicating recent developments which suggest the revolution may already be underway. (shrink)

Cosmopolis A Review of Cosmopolitics -/- 2015/3-4 -/- Editorial Dominique de Courcelles & Paul Ghils -/- This issue addresses the general concept of “spirituality” as it appears in various cultural contexts and timeframes, through contrasting ideological views. Without necessarily going back to artistic and religious remains of primitive men, which unquestionably show pursuits beyond the biophysical dimension and illustrate practices seeking to unveil the hidden significance of life and death, the following papers deal with a number of interpretations covering a (...) wide field extending from belief to theory, from emotions to concepts, from the wisdom of personal experience to the most sophisticated doctrines. Spirit and spirituality are indeed many-faceted notions. They may refer to the intricate world of the interacting spirits which inhabit living beings in animistic traditions, without excluding a “grand force” linking human beings within a dynamic whole on which their very existence rely . They also bear upon more atomistic and either/or approaches of Western philosophy, which have become embodied in Cartesian dualism against a monotheist background, to the point of freezing the essence of individuals and culminating in the extreme individualism that characterizes our contemporaries. However, this equally refers to the opposite conception of materialism, across times and cultures, from ancient India and Greece (Cārvāka, originally known as Lokāyata, or some Buddhist doctrines for the former, Democritus or Lucretius for the latter) to more contemporary materialistic schools, whether modern or postmodern. -/- The following papers look at the contrasting forms of the philosophy and spirit of the human factor set into a whole, with no artificial disjoint between the psychical and the physical levels, as Wittgenstein put it: “And how can a body have a soul?”. This approach is not unrelated to the notion of anthropocene examined in a recent issue of Cosmopolis, with provides another comprehensive framework open to a spiritual life emerging from the very environment that generated it. -/- *** The first section of this issue was edited by Dominique de Courcelles, director at the National French Research Centre (CNRS), whom we wish to thank for collecting relevant studies relating to the religious and political questions, with a view to focusing on the war of ideas inevitably waged behind images, concepts and perceptions, taking an asymmetrical approach. To the extent that they are mindful of global/local interactions and include representations, opinions and beliefs, such disciplines as philosophy, philology, history and social sciences can provide useful studies accounting for new practices in geopolitics and a fair diplomacy. -/- In her introduction, Dominique de Courcelles first poses the question of how the religious and political spheres interrelate, with their corresponding religious demands and humanistic values. She then suggests that the right question today may be breaking with the philosophy of human rights concerned with the defense of human beings against the hazards of arbitrary politics or the instrumental use of religion, in favour of a fair philosophy of humankind, a new humanism. This would consist in recognizing a common loyalty of all towards one interhuman, not only interstate community, to protect it from both the autonomy demanded by individuals and the instrumental use of minorities. -/- Considering the fact of diversity, so important today in terms of both politics and religion, Abdelhai Azarkan looks at the conditions under which tolerance could obtain the double status of right and duty. He revisits to two philosophers, John Locke and Voltaire, who thought about it from the historical reality of religious wars. The former made tolerance into a right, basing his analysis on the political-legal level, while the latter saw tolerance as a duty, from an analysis based on ethical-political criteria. -/- Mathieu Guidère examines what he calls semantic denominationalism, a term which implies religious attributes and identities, whichever national loyalties or personal belonging they may have at the same time. Since the early 2000s, thie phenomenon has expanded tremendously, compounded by the “war on terror” and the over media-oriented terrorist actions. Denominational expressions act as formal names for ordinary and high-profile players in domestic and foreign policies of democratic states. These systems reveal a receding secularization, while the powerful comeback of religious identities signals the failure of nation-states and the weakening of the humanist spirit. -/- Barbara De Poli retraces the history of a contemporary jihadism claiming its Islamic essence and asserting the truth of genuine coranic principles via the war on infidels, with a view to restoring the Caliphate. After defining the term jihad, she shows that even if this contemporary jiadism is spreading in the Muslim world, it radically departs from Islamic law and the received use of the term jihad, in so far as it is rooted in the early radical thinking of Islamic ideologues in the 20th century, starting with with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This current has been fueled by by international conflicts since the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, in which the so-called Western countries bear a major responsibility. -/- Abderrazak Sayadi starts from the Tunisian experience to ask the question of humanist values and democracy within the relationships between the religious and political spheres. As a historian of religion, he is brought to demystify certain islamic principles and to paying attention to the reform of law, seeing the separation of religion and politics as a precondition to a successful democratic gamble and the establishment of a renewed humanism. -/- Dominique de Courcelles reminds us that getting a better knowledge of narrations and words makes it possible to better understand how logical and rhetorical thinking works for those who wage an asymetriccal war, re-enchanting and mystifying the world to better take control. As soon as 1932, an exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud made it clear that, in order to free man from fatality and war, education understood as culture was fundamental. Such illustrations as the exécution of Oussama ben Laden and the Caliph’s speech in Mossoul show that a premiminary analysis of images and words is essential to a fair diplomacy conducted by people from civil society, whose culture and wisdom allow justice and force to speak together and better resist war. -/- Marcel Boisard thinks that on the day the guns fall silent, exhausted by war, we will not return to the state borders that have prevailed for a century as an outcome of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. It is time to prepare the “day after”, which will be a huge challenge. To this end, a summit of Middle-East nations is urgently needed to globally decide the fate of those peoples. On the condition that we know who the enemy is and accept to name it, to understand the history of the countries, groups and alliances, and to question any false or self-interested sense of certainty. -/- *** In the second section, Paul Schafer provides the author’s experiences to explain how culture, from the artistic to the biological, has the power to to open the doors to spirituality, from the inner self to the global environment. He asks himself whether a relative permanence of spirituality can arise from the specific moments that characterize it. Laurent Ledoux synthesizes the conclusion of a symposium held on 22 January 2015 on the links between philosophy and management, on the basis of the spiritual dimension conceived as “natural” and the answers it may suggest to the issues that face the organizations in a “contemporaniversal” world. Jacques Rifflet makes that question in a secular perspective, based on the wellsprings of personal commitment before it can be caught by any religious creed or scientific theory. In this sense spirituality, in alliance with reason, both inspires human consciousness and illuminates its destiny. Sami Aldeeb asks himself whether Islam can be reconciled with human rights. Caught between the belief in an absolute and final Word descended from the sky, and evidence showing that any religion is the creation of a given culture and a society situated in time and space, the Makkan and … contexts et médinois call for differentiated, if not opposite answers and exegeses. Bernard Carmona provides the outline of a dialogical framework, which is known to be a feature of debates between the various philosophical schools of classical India, exemplified here by the transdisciplinary perspective of debates within a Buddhist context. *** The articles not focused on the previous topic include a study by Landry Signé on China’s strategy, competing with the United States to control African resources. The author deals with the specific case of China’s rapprochement with Southern Sudan since Sudan was broken up. In the last paper, Goran Fejić and Rada Iveković, return to the essential role that women should play, and comments upon the role of some international legal instruments related in particular to the elimination of all forms of discrimination. The perspective is transnational and transethnic and is based on secular criteria, as regards nation-building and more generally society-building. Considering the persistence of widespread violence, whether in times of armed conflict or in times of peace, the question remains whether it is possible to fully implement rights and justice instruments. (shrink)

Quantum computing is of high interest because it promises to perform at least some kinds of computations much faster than classical computers. Arute et al. 2019 (informally, “the Google Quantum Team”) report the results of experiments that purport to demonstrate “quantum supremacy” – the claim that the performance of some quantum computers is better than that of classical computers on some problems. Do these results close the debate over quantum supremacy? We argue that they do not. In the following, we (...) provide an overview of the Google Quantum Team’s experiments, then identify some open questions in the quest to demonstrate quantum supremacy. (shrink)

Prophets and Their Teachings on the Universal Law of Balance in Nature -/- Throughout history, prophets and spiritual teachers from major religions have conveyed divine wisdom about the fundamental principles that govern human life and the natural world. One of the most essential and recurring themes in their teachings is balance—both within the self and in the universe. The idea of balance in nature is not just a scientific or philosophical concept; it is deeply embedded in religious teachings, where (...) it is often associated with justice, harmony, and divine wisdom. -/- This essay explores how the teachings of various prophets and religious figures align with the universal law of balance in nature, emphasizing how their guidance promotes equilibrium in human behavior, society, and the environment. -/- The Concept of Universal Balance in Religious Teachings -/- The universal law of balance in nature suggests that all aspects of existence are governed by equilibrium. When balance is maintained, harmony and sustainability prevail, but when it is disrupted, chaos and suffering follow. This idea is reflected in the teachings of prophets from different traditions, who have warned against excesses and guided humanity toward a balanced way of living. -/- 1. Prophet Muhammad and the Principle of Moderation (Islam) -/- In Islam, Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) emphasized the importance of balance in all aspects of life. The Quran states: -/- “Thus, We have made you a just community that you will be witnesses over the people.” (Quran 2:143) -/- This verse highlights the concept of a “middle path,” where believers are encouraged to avoid extremes in wealth, worship, and personal conduct. -/- Examples of Balance in Islam -/- Balance in Worship and Life Responsibilities: The Prophet discouraged excessive asceticism, saying, “Your body has a right over you, your family has a right over you, and your Lord has a right over you.” This means a person should not neglect their health or family in pursuit of religious devotion. -/- Balance in Economic Justice: Islam encourages wealth accumulation through lawful means but commands the wealthy to share with the poor through Zakat (charity) to prevent economic inequality. -/- Balance in Environmental Stewardship: The Prophet encouraged conservation, advising not to waste water even when performing ablution next to a river. -/- 2. Jesus Christ and the Balance Between Justice and Mercy (Christianity) -/- Jesus Christ (peace be upon him) taught about maintaining balance between justice and compassion. He emphasized love, forgiveness, and righteousness while also upholding moral responsibility. -/- Examples of Balance in Christianity -/- Balance in Judgment: Jesus upheld moral laws but also demonstrated compassion. When a woman was accused of adultery, he said, “Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.” (John 8:7). This shows the balance between enforcing justice and offering mercy. -/- Balance Between Wealth and Spirituality: Jesus taught that wealth should not dominate one’s heart. “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God." (Matthew 19:24). However, he did not reject wealth outright but taught that it must be used for good. -/- Balance in Love and Discipline: Jesus preached love but also emphasized accountability, reminding people that forgiveness does not mean the absence of justice. -/- 3. The Teachings of the Buddha on the Middle Way (Buddhism) -/- Although not considered a prophet in the Abrahamic sense, Siddhartha Gautama, known as the Buddha, emphasized balance through the doctrine of the Middle Way. This principle teaches that neither extreme asceticism nor indulgence leads to enlightenment; rather, a path of moderation brings harmony. -/- Examples of Balance in Buddhism -/- Balance in Desires: Before attaining enlightenment, the Buddha experienced both extreme luxury as a prince and extreme asceticism as a monk. Realizing both were harmful, he taught the Middle Way: living with neither indulgence nor deprivation. -/- Balance in Emotions: Buddhist teachings emphasize equanimity—staying balanced in both joy and suffering. This aligns with the law of nature, where all things are impermanent, and excessive attachment or aversion leads to suffering. -/- 4. Moses and the Laws of Justice and Order (Judaism) -/- Prophet Moses (peace be upon him) delivered divine laws that established balance in society. The Ten Commandments, given to guide human behavior, promote justice, honesty, and moral integrity. -/- Examples of Balance in Judaism -/- Balance in Law and Mercy: The principle of “an eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24) is often misunderstood, but it fundamentally conveys the idea of proportionate justice—a principle that maintains societal balance. -/- Balance in Leadership: Moses was a strong leader but also a humble servant of God, showing that true leadership requires both authority and compassion. -/- Balance in Sabbath Observance: Judaism teaches that work is important, but rest and worship are equally necessary. The Sabbath (Shabbat) is a day of rest to maintain a balance between labor and spiritual rejuvenation. -/- 5. Laozi and the Taoist Concept of Yin and Yang (Taoism) -/- Laozi, the founder of Taoism, introduced the idea of Tao (the Way), which emphasizes balance in nature. His teachings focus on the Yin-Yang principle, where opposite forces (light and dark, strong and weak) are interconnected and necessary for harmony. -/- Examples of Balance in Taoism -/- Balance in Nature: Taoist philosophy teaches that trying to force control over nature disrupts harmony. For example, excessive deforestation leads to climate imbalance. -/- Balance in Leadership: Laozi emphasized wu wei—non-interference—where leaders should guide rather than control. This reflects the balance between action and patience in governance. -/- 6. Hinduism and the Concept of Dharma (Hinduism) -/- Hinduism emphasizes Dharma, which means duty, righteousness, and balance in life. The Bhagavad Gita teaches that every individual has a duty to maintain harmony in their personal and social life. -/- Examples of Balance in Hinduism -/- Balance in Life Stages (Ashramas): Hindu philosophy divides life into four stages—student life, householder life, hermit life, and renunciation—each stage balancing material and spiritual responsibilities. -/- Balance in Karma: The law of karma teaches that actions have consequences, emphasizing that ethical balance must be maintained to achieve spiritual liberation (moksha). -/- Balance in Diet and Health: Ayurveda, the traditional Hindu system of medicine, promotes Sattvic (pure) food and a balanced lifestyle for physical and mental well-being. -/- Modern Implications of the Universal Law of Balance -/- The teachings of these prophets and religious traditions demonstrate that balance is not only a natural law but also a moral and social necessity. -/- 1. Environmental Balance -/- Islamic teachings on conservation: Islam encourages environmental responsibility through teachings on sustainable living. -/- Christian teachings on stewardship: The Bible commands humans to care for God’s creation. -/- Hindu respect for nature: Rivers, mountains, and forests are considered sacred. -/- 2. Social and Economic Balance -/- Confucianism’s Social Harmony: Confucius emphasized that rulers must ensure economic balance by promoting fairness. -/- Islamic Finance: Islamic principles prohibit exploitative interest (riba) to prevent economic imbalance. -/- Buddhist Mindful Economics: Encourages reducing greed and promoting ethical business practices. -/- 3. Inner Balance and Mental Well-being -/- Jainism’s Ahimsa (Non-Violence): Jain teachings emphasize inner peace by avoiding harmful emotions like anger and greed. -/- Christianity’s Peace Teachings: Jesus taught that true peace comes from within, encouraging people to find balance between worldly duties and spiritual fulfillment. -/- Conclusion -/- The universal law of balance in nature is deeply embedded in the teachings of major religious traditions. Whether it is Islam’s call for moderation, Christianity’s balance between justice and mercy, Buddhism’s Middle Way, Hinduism’s Dharma, or Taoism’s Yin and Yang, all these teachings highlight the importance of equilibrium in life. -/- By applying these timeless principles, humanity can create a more just, sustainable, and harmonious world. -/- . (shrink)

We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap arises (...) from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social implications of this gap. (shrink)

Super-Humeans argue that the most parsimonious ontology of the natural world compatible with our best physical theories consists exclusively of particles and the distance relations between them. This paper argues by contrast that Super-Humean reduction goes insufficiently far, by showing there to be a more parsimonious ontology compatible with physics: Ultimate-Humeanism. This novel view posits an ontology consisting solely of the particles and distance relations required for the existence of a single brain. Super-Humeans impose conditions on what counts as an (...) ontology of the natural world to avoid their view slipping into this kind of ontology, but these conditions are arbitrarily imposed and once this is exposed, Super-Humeans face a dilemma. Either they can embrace Ultimate-Humeanism as the minimal ontology of the natural world compatible with physics, or (more likely) they can rethink the methodology that got them there. Overall, this paper argues that Super-Humeanism currently lacks principled motivation, outlines a framework for naturalistic ontological reductions, and exposes the consequences of unchecked adherence to a simplicity-driven methodology. (shrink)

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth‐directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition‐based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life (...) are correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically. (shrink)

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this (...) proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification. (shrink)

A brief reference article on cultural relativism.

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on (...) the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; the antiwork critique—which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life—which I argue gives reasons for concern. (shrink)

Perceptual Confidence is the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. After introducing, clarifying, and motivating Perceptual Confidence, I catalogue some of its more interesting consequences, such as the way it blurs the distinction between veridical and illusory experiences, a distinction that is sometimes said to carry a lot of metaphysical weight. I also explain how Perceptual Confidence fills a hole in our best scientific theories of perception and why it implies that experiences don't have objective accuracy conditions.

The growth of self-tracking and personal surveillance has given rise to the Quantified Self movement. Members of this movement seek to enhance their personal well-being, productivity, and self-actualization through the tracking and gamification of personal data. The technologies that make this possible can also track and gamify aspects of our interpersonal, romantic relationships. Several authors have begun to challenge the ethical and normative implications of this development. In this article, we build upon this work to provide a detailed ethical analysis (...) of the Quantified Relationship. We identify eight core objections to the QR and subject them to critical scrutiny. We argue that although critics raise legitimate concerns, there are ways in which tracking technologies can be used to support and facilitate good relationships. We thus adopt a stance of cautious openness toward this technology and advocate the development of a research agenda for the positive use of QR technologies. (shrink)

During the Transfiguration, the apostles on Tabor, “indeed saw the same grace of the Spirit which would later dwell in them”. The light of grace “illuminates from outside on those who worthily approached it and sent the illumination to the soul through the sensitive eyes; but today, because it is confounded with us and exists in us, it illuminates the soul from inward ”. The opposition between knowledge, which comes from outside - a human and purely symbolic knowledge - and (...) “intellectual” knowledge, which comes from within, Meyendorff says what it already exists at Pseudo-Dionysius: “For it is not from without that God stirs them toward the divine. Rather he does so via the intellect and from within and he willingly enlightens them with a ray that is pure and immaterial”. The assertions of the Calabrian philosopher about an “unique knowledge”, common both to the Christians and the Hellenes and pursuing the same goal, the hesychast theologian opposes the reality of the two knowledge, having two distinct purposes and based on two different instruments of perception: “Palamas admitted the authenticity of natural knowledge, however the latter is opposed to the revealed wisdom, that is why it does not provide, by itself, salvation”. Therefore, in the purified human intellect begins to shine of the Trinity light. Purity also depends on the return of the intellect to itself. In this way, we see how the true knowledge of God is an internal meeting or “inner retrieval” of the whole being of man. As well as in the Syrian mystic, on several occasions we have to make the distinction between the contemplative ways of knowledge: intellection illuminated by grace and spiritual vision without any conceptual or symbolic meaning. For example, Robert Beulay shows that, “The term of ‘intellection’ first of all, is employed by John of Dalyatha to be applied to operations caused by grace”. (shrink)

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 (...) argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate the debate between John McDowell and Michael Friedman on the nature of understanding and relativism. McDowell in his magnum opus Mind and World, has argued in favour of the view that the way we are open to reality is constituted by concepts. According to him, our openness to reality is placed in the space of reasons which is nothing but space of concepts. Friedman in his critical and detail review of (...) McDowell’s book has taken McDowell’s project in his book in particular and in his philosophy in general as the project of not constructing philosophical theories but of exorcising the philosophical traditions. It is indeed so as McDowell himself has acknowledged because he closely follows Wittgensteinian quietism in his approach to various philosophical problems. While explaining how our knowledge and perception of the world among other things are placed in the space of reasons, towards the end of his book, McDowell relates space of reasons to language and tradition. Space of reasons, in his opinion, can be understood, in terms of initiating ourselves into language and inheriting the tradition. He thus says, “…the sort of language into which human beings are first initiated, serves as a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is reason for what.” And this is Gadamer in significant sense. (shrink)

In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.

This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted plate or coin, are part of perceptual experience. If they are part of perceptual experience, then it should be possible to identify these shapes simply by attending appropriately to them. Otherwise, in order to identify perspectival shapes they must first be constructed in the visual imagination. We propose that these accounts of perspectival identification can be tested by (...) measuring the interference between visual and verbal working memory load, respectively, and the identification of perspectival shapes in the appearance of a 3D object. (shrink)