- (3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why Be Rational&quest.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
Instrumental desires, instrumental rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):93-109.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
|
|
The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):86-106.details
|
|
Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33 (sup1):231-262.details
|
|
(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
|
|
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
|
|
Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
|
|
The scope of rational requirements.John Brunero - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49.details
|
|
Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Baker - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
|
|
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
|
|
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time.John Broome - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
|
|
Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
|
|
(1 other version)Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.details
|
|
(1 other version)Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment.Jacob Ross - unknowndetails
|
|
(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
The Humean theory of motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.details
|
|
(1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
|
|
What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
|
|
A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
|
|
Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.details
|
|
The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
|
|
Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.details
|
|
Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.details
|
|
Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence.John Brunero - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1 -23.details
|
|
Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational.Julia Staffel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):463-468.details
|
|
What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
|
|
(1 other version)The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
|
|
A Preface Paradox for Intention.Simon Goldstein - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.details
|
|