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In defence of non-conceptual content

Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126 (2008)

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  1. Nonconceptual Content and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson - 1998 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the (...)
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  • Demonstrative Concepts and Experience.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):397-420.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Peacocke Christopher - 1992 - MIT Press.
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
    Covering the work of Frege, Russell, and more recent work on singular reference, this important book examines the concepts of perceptually-based demonstrative identification, thought about oneself, and recognition-based demonstrative identification.
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  • Crane on Concepts and Experiential Content.D. McFarland - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):54-58.
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  • Nonconceptual Content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  • Crane on Concepts and Experiential Content.Duncan McFarland - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):54-58.
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  • Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...
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  • Beliefs and Subdoxastic States.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.
    It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.
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  • Concepts, Experience, and Inference.Alan Millar - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):495-505.
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  • Against Intellectualism.Alva Noë - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.
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  • Beastly Experience. [REVIEW]Arthur W. Collins - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):375-380.
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  • Mental Content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - Blackwell.
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  • Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content.David W. Hamlyn - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which (...)
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  • Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area.
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  • The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of (...)
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  • The Connectionist Construction of Concepts.Adrian Cussins - 1990 - In Margaret A. Boden (ed.), The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is " _conceptualist_: " psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.
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  • What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:339-352.
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  • Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):419-29.
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  • The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • Beastly ExperienceMind and World.Arthur W. Collins & John McDowell - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):375.
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  • Against Intellectualism.Alva NoË - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.
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  • Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...)
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  • Peacocke's Argument Against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content.José Luis Bermúdez - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):402-418.
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  • Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
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  • Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states (...)
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  • The Validity of Transcendental Arguments.Charles Taylor - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:151 - 165.
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  • Review: Beastly Experience. [REVIEW]Arthur W. Collins - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):375 - 380.
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  • Tacit Knowledge and Subdoxastic States.Martin Davies - 1989 - In A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.
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