A radically dualist view of the relationship between God and the universe is apt to make the problem of Divine intervention more difficult than under other metaphysical conceptions. We need to find a closer relationship than this if the causal picture is to work. We could try saying that God is realized by the universe, without being reducible to the universe. He has no further substance over and above that of the universe, but he is not simply identical to the (...) universe. I am not sure I know what this idea of realization comes to for the case of God and the universe, but it least it promises to make it feasible for God to be enmeshed in the natural causal order, without collapsing into it. It is not so much that God intervenes as supervenes, to use the jargon. On this picture, there is a mega- universe that includes both the physical universe and God, with the two locked somehow together. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Colin McGinn’s claim that the mind is not miraculous but merely mysterious, and that this mystery is due to the limits of our cognitive faculties. To adequately present the flow and unity of McGinn’s overall argument, I offer an extended and uninterrupted précis of his case, followed by a critique. I will argue that McGinn’s argument is unsuccessful if it is intended to persuade non-naturalists, but nevertheless may be a plausible position (...) for a naturalist, qua naturalist, to take on the mind. (shrink)

This is a brief essay discussing Colin McGinn's theory of human cognition. Mcginn believes that the more profound Metaphysical problems such as the mind-body problem, are unsolvable due to the limitations of our cognitive abilities. I argue that the solutions to these problems lies not in the strength of our cognitive abilities but rather in how we apply these abilities.

Anyone who has been around analytic philosophy the past 20 years knows that consciousness is in. These days much effort is spent playing whack-a-dualist. It seems that anyone who is anyone has written a book on the metaphysics of mind. Colin McGinn's new book marks a refreshing departure from this trend. Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning discusses the role imagination plays in the way we represent the world; the role it plays in dreams and some mental illnesses; and the (...) fundamental role it plays in belief and meaning. (shrink)

In Truth by Analysis (2012), Colin McGinn aims to breathe new life into conceptual analysis. Sadly, he fails to defend conceptual analysis, either in principle or by example.

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least (...) on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

I try to distinguish McGinn's separation of evil from mere wrong from his aesthetic theory of morality. I argue that the combination is dangeroous.

In his The Meaning of Disgust, Colin McGinn employs elements of the phenomenological theory of disgust advanced by Aurel Kolnai in 1929. Kolnai’s treatment of what he calls “material” disgust and of its primary elicitors—putrefying organic matter, bodily wastes and secretions, sticky contaminants, vermin—anticipates more recent scientific treatments of this emotion as a mode of protective recoil. While Nina Strohminger charges McGinn with neglecting such scientific studies, we here attempt to show how Kolnai goes beyond experimental findings (...) in his careful description of the phenomenological differences between disgust and other emotions of forceful disapproval. (shrink)

‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged (...) that standard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can. (shrink)

La position mystérienne en philosophie de l’esprit est minoritaire. Notamment défendue par Noam Chomsky et Colin McGinn, ces derniers prétendent que nos capacités cognitives et conceptuelles sont insuffisantes afin d’offrir une réponse satisfaisante à la question suivante : comment de notre cerveau peut émerger la conscience? En présentant la généalogie partielle du problème corps-esprit que dresse Chomsky, nous nous intéresserons à l’argument central de McGinn prétendant que nous avons de bonnes raisons de croire que nous n’éluciderons jamais (...) le problème de la conscience. L’objectif sera de considérer son argument d’un point de vue critique afinde déterminer s’il est concluant. (shrink)

A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, (...) Wittgenstein and Sartre) he draws an excessively sharp, qualitative distinction between imagination and perception, and because of his flawed, empirically ungrounded conception of hallucination. His arguments in defense of these views are rebutted in detail, and the traditional, passive, Cartesian view of visual perception, upon which several of them implicitly rely, is criticized in the light of findings from recent cognitive science and neuroscience. It is also argued that the apparent intuitiveness of the passive view of visual perception is a result of mere historical contingency. An understanding of perception (informed by modern visual science) as an inherently active process enables us to unify our accounts of perception, mental imagery, dreaming, hallucination, creativity, and other aspects of imagination within a single coherent theoretical framework. (shrink)

It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of (...) imagability -- an observation basis -- for physical causal explanation that cannot be met for either of these problems. Acausal descriptions may be possible but not the causal analyses that provide the greatest explanatory satisfaction, a psychological phenomenon that seems tied to the strength of the underlying observation basis but is affected by other factors as well. (shrink)

In this article I reject the argument of Colin McGinn ("Must I Be Morally Perfect?", 1992) that ordinary morality requires that each of us be morally perfect. McGinn's definition of moral perfection –– according to which I am morally perfect if I never do anything that is supererogatory, but always do what is obligatory, and always avoid doing what is impermissible –– should be rejected, because it is open to the objection that I am morally perfect if (...) I always do what is optional but bad to do (what is suberogatory), in addition to always doing what is obligatory and always avoiding what is impermissible. Moral perfection may be defined as always doing what is obligatory, and always doing what is optional but good to do (supererogatory), and never doing what is impermissible, and never doing what is optional but bad to do [suberogatory]. Since ordinary morality does not require this, ordinary morality does not require moral perfection. (shrink)

Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos (...) racionalistas parecen ser incoherentes. (3) Los racionalistas no explican cómo es posible que tengamos un autoconocimiento autoritativo. Como alternativa a las teorías racionalistas, ofrezco una explicación de la autoridad de la primera persona inspirada en una observación de Evans. (shrink)

În filosofia științei și filosofia minții, limitarea cognitivă afirmă că mințile umane sunt incapabile să rezolve constituțional anumite probleme filosofice perene. Owen Flanagan numește această poziție naturalism anti-constructiv sau noul misterianism, iar avocatul principal al ipotezei, Colin McGinn, o numește naturalism transcedental, deoarece recunoaște posibilitatea că soluțiile s-ar putea încadra în modul de abordare a unei ființe inteligente non-umane. Potrivit lui McGinn, astfel de întrebări filosofice includ problema minte-corp, identitatea de sine, fundamentele sensului, voința liberă și cunoașterea, (...) atât a priori cât și empiric. (shrink)

Cunoașterea și informațiile (abordate în ansamblu sau în componentele lor distincte) sunt o preocupare majoră pentru tehnologia informației, sisteme de informații, știința informației și activitatea de informații în general. Procesul obţinerii, prelucrării şi analizei informaţiilor este o preocupare majoră pentru societatea actuală. În acest scop se folosesc procedee şi tehnici specifice pentru culegerea sau generarea de informaţii, prelucrarea acestora prin analiză şi sinteză, generarea de predicţii şi strategii, transmisia şi prezentarea informaţiilor factorilor de decizie, şi stocarea lor. Analiza informațiilor poate (...) fi caracterizată ca o intreprindere epistemologică, care urmărește să dezvolte o înțelegere clară a produselor cunoașterii. Perspectiva lui Polanyi despre cunoaștere servește unor considerații epistemologice fundamentale privind cunoașterea ca produs. Conceptul acesta de cunoaștere personală contribuie la o înțelegere mai profundă a cunoașterii. Perspectiva inversează ierarhia tradițională epistemologică. Cea mai mare provocare ar putea fi aceea de a convinge analiștii, conducerea și clienții lor de avantajele metodelor analitice structurale. O introducere treptată și naturală a acestor metode în fluxul obișnuit de procese și produse de informații ar putea fi mai eficientă decât realinierea la scară largă a gândirii. "Spațiul" activităților de informații s-a extins de la guverne ca actori statali la actori non-statali precum ONG-uri, instituții transnaționale și corporații, firme private și grupuri de interese și presiuni reprezentând comunități, concepte și ideologii diverse. Procesul de luare a deciziilor a devenit dispersat și granular. Actuala "democratizare" a serviciilor de informații are un impact major asupra colectării și analizei informațiilor, și a procesului decizional, determinând serviciile de informații să devină mai transparente, să ia în considerație dezbaterile publice a acțiunilor lor și să fie nevoite, uneori, să le justifice public. Un domeniu de care pot beneficia serviciile de informații este cel al managementului cunoașterii, implicat într-o dezbatere riguroasă asupra conceptelor, teoriilor și abordărilor cunoașterii și utilizării acestora. Noua paradigmă a serviciilor de informații impune schimbări majore la nivel organizațional și de pregătire a profesioniștilor pentru a înțelege și adopta noile concepte și tehnologii. -/- CUPRINS -/- Introducere 1 Cunoaștere - Definirea cunoașterii în filozofie - Comunicarea cunoașterii - Cunoașterea situată - Cunoașterea parțială - Cunoașterea științifică - 1.1 Ontologia - - Prezentare generală - - - Unele întrebări fundamentale - - - Concepte - - - Tipuri - - Istorie - - - Originile - - - - Parmenide și monismul - - - - Pluralismul ontologic - - - - Platon - - Ontologia în știință - - Alte subiecte ontologice - - - Formațiuni ontologice - - - Certitudine ontologică și epistemologică - - - Corpul și mediul, care pun la îndoială semnificația ființei - - - Ontologie și limbă - - - Ontologie și geografia umană - - - Realitate și actualitate - 1.2 Epistemologia - - Context și semnificație - - Cunoașterea - - - Cunoașterea că, cunoașterea cum și cunoașterea directă - - - Credință - - - Adevăr - - - Justificare - - - Problema lui Gettier - - - Externalism și internalism - - - Problema valorii - 1.3 Metodologii - - Prezentare generală - - - Procesul - - - - Formularea unei întrebări - - - - Ipoteza - - - - Predicția - - - - Testarea - - - - Analiza - - - Alte componente - - - - Replicarea - - - - Examinarea externă - - - - Înregistrarea și partajarea datelor - - Investigații științifice - - - Proprietățile cercetării științifice - - - Credințe și prejudecăți - - Elementele metodelor științifice idealizate - - Elemente ale metodei științifice - - - Caracterizări - - - Incertitudine - - - Definire - - - Dezvoltarea ipotezelor - - - Predicții din ipoteze - - - Experimente - - - Evaluare și îmbunătățire - - - Confirmarea - - Modele de cercetare științifică - - - Modelul clasic - - - Modelul ipotetico-deductiv - - - Modelul pragmatic - - Știința sistemelor complexe - 1.4 Hermeneutica - - Etimologie - - Hermeneutica filosofică - - - Hermeneutica modernă - - - - Schleiermacher (1768-1834) - - - - Dilthey (1833-1911) - - - - Heidegger (1889-1976) - - - - Gadamer (1900-2002) și colab. - - - - Noua hermeneutică - - - - Hermeneutica marxistă - - - - Hermeneutica obiectivă - 1.5 Filosofia limbajului - - Subiecte și sub-domenii majore - - - Compoziție și părți - - - Natura sensului - - - Referință - - - Mintea și limba - - - - Înnăscut și învățat - - - - Limba și gândul - - - Interacțiunea socială și limba - - Limbajul și filozofia continentală - - Probleme în filosofia limbajului - - - Imprecizia - - - Problema universalului și a compoziției - - - Natura limbajului - - - Abordări formale versus informale - - - Traducere și interpretare - 1.6 Logica - - Concepte - - Forma logică - 1.7 Filosofia logicii - - Adevăr - - - Purtătorii de adevăr - - - Adevăruri analitice, adevăr logic, valabilitate, consecință logică și implicare - 1.8 Declarații - - Declarația ca o entitate abstractă - 1.9 Dileme - - Utilizarea dilemei în logică - 1.10 Limitările cognitive - - Colin McGinn - - Friedrich Hayek - - John Tyndall - - Noam Chomsky - - Fenomene și obiecte și evenimente care nu se pot simți (numene) - - Noi misterieni - 1.11 Managementul cunoașterii - - Cercetare - - - Dimensiuni - - - Strategii - - - Motivații - 1.12 Ingineria cunoașterii - 1.13 Cunoașterea tacită în activitatea de informații 2 Date - Date, informații, cunoaștere și înțelepciune - În alte domenii - Memoria - - Procese - Înregistrări - 2.1 Referințe - - Etimologie și semnificații - - Semantică - - - Sens - - - Referent absent - - - Semnul lingvistic - - Informatică - - Biblioteci și știința informației - - Psihologie - - Școala - - Lege - - Artă - 2.2 Simboluri - - Etimologie - - Definiții - - Simbolurile și semiotica - - Psihanaliza, retorica și arhetipuri - - Paul Tillich - - Rolul contextului în simbolism - - - Semnificația istorică - - - Context - - Acțiuni simbolice - 2.3 Baze de date - - Baze de date guvernamentale - - - Uniunea Europeană - - Baze de date naționale ADN - 2.4 Metadate - - Definiție - - Identificarea - - - Exemplu - 2.5 Statistici - - Domeniu - - - Statistica matematică - - - Prezentare generală 3 Informații - Abordarea teoriei informației - Ca intrare senzorială - Ca reprezentare și complexitate - Informația ca mesaj - Informația ca determinant al transformărilor - Utilizarea studiului informațiilor - Informații mediate tehnologic - Informații sub forma unor fișiere - Semiotica - 3.1 Teoria informației - - Domeniul de studiu - - Evoluție - - Cantități de informații - - - Entropia unei surse de informații - - - Entropia comună - - - Entropia condițională (echivocă) - - - Informații reciproce (transinformații) - - - Divergența Kullback-Leibler (câștigul de informații) - - - Alte cantități - - Teoria codificării - - - Teoria surselor - - - - Rata - - - Capacitatea canalului - - - - Capacitatea anumitor modele de canale - - Aplicații în alte domenii - - - Utilizări în intelligence și aplicații de secretizare - - - Generarea numerelor pseudoaleatorii - - - Explorarea seismică - - - Semiotica - - - Aplicații diverse - - Unități de informație - - Unități primare - - Unități derivate din biți - - - Octet (byte) - - - Nibble - - - Cuvânt, bloc și pagină - - Exemple de valori - 3.2 Tehnologia informației - - Procesarea datelor - - - Stocarea datelor - - - Regăsirea datelor - - - Transmisia de date - - - Manipularea datelor - - Perspectiva - - - Perspectiva academică - - - Perspectiva etică - 3.3 Confidențialitatea informațiilor - - Tipuri de informații - - - Internet - - - Televiziunea prin cablu - - - Informații medicale - - - Informații financiare - - - Localizarea - - - Informații politice - - - Informații educaționale - - Legalitatea - 3.4 Informații sensibile - - Informații non sensibile - - - Informații publice - - - Informații de rutină în afaceri - - Tipuri de informații sensibile - - - Informații comerciale confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Protecția legală împotriva divulgării neautorizate - - - Informații personale și private - - - Informații de afaceri confidențiale - - - Informații clasificate - - Informații sensibile digitale - 3.5 Informații clasificate - - Clasificări guvernamentale - - Nivele de clasificare - - - Top Secret (TS) - - - Secret - - - Confidențial - - - Resticționat - - - Neclasificat - - Permisul de acces - - Informații compartimentate - - Informații nucleare - - Internațional - - - Clasificările NATO - - - Organizații internaționale - - - Clasificări echivalente în diferite țări - - Clasificarea corporativă - - Protocolul luminii de trafic - 3.6 Tipuri de informații clasificate 4 Activitatea de informații - 4.1 Istoria activității de informații - 4.2 Știința informației - - Fundamente - - - Domeniu de aplicare și abordări - - - Definiții ale științei informației - - - Filozofia informației - - - Ontologie - - Extragerea informațiilor - - Vectori de cercetare și aplicații - - - Accesul la informații - - - Arhitectura informațiilor - - - Managementul informațiilor - - - Extragerea informațiilor - - - Societatea informațională - - - Reprezentarea cunoașterii și raționamentul - 4.3 Ontologia activității de informații - 4.4 Economia informațională - - Valoarea informațiilor - - Informațiile, mecanismul prețurilor și organizațiile - - Asimetria informațională - - - Semnalizare - - - Screening - - Bunuri informaționale - - - Împachetarea - 4.5 Economia informațiilor industriale - 4.6 Managementul informațiilor - - Aspecte teoretice - - - Teorii comportamentale și organizaționale - - - Teoria economică - - Managementul informațiilor strategice - - - Alinierea tehnologiilor și strategiilor de afacere cu managementul informațiilor - - - Un model de portofoliu contemporan pentru informații - - - Competențe pentru gestionarea calității informațiilor - - - Rezumat - - Operaționalizarea managementului informațiilor - - - Gestionarea schimbării necesare - - - Opera timpurie a lui Galbraith - - - Organizații matriceale - - Informații în sursă deschisă - - - Surse deschise pentru informații - - - Definiții pentru OSINT - - - Informații competitive - - - OSINT în afaceri - 4.7 Ciclul de informații - 4.8 Managementul ciclului de informații - - Prezentare generală - - - Definirea intelligence - - - Managementul ciclului de informații - - - Planificarea și prezentarea generală a direcției - - Cerințe - - - Naționale / strategice - - - Militare / operaționale - - Arhitectura intelligence - - - Bugetarea - - - Factori politici - - - Echilibrarea aplicării legii și securitatea națională - - - Public versus privat - - Planificarea colectărilor - - - CCIRM - - Emiterea de ordine și cereri - - - Prioritizare - - Alte subiecte - - - Folosirea politică greșită - - - Intelligence clandestină față de acțiunea sub acoperire - - - - Coordonarea acțiunii HUMINT și a acțiunii sub acoperire - - - - Riscuri și resurse comune - - Eșecurile din ciclul intelligence - - Alte cicluri - - - Bucla Boyd OODA - 4.9 Informațiile în afaceri (Business intelligence) - - Componente - - Istorie - - Depozitarea datelor - - Comparație cu inteligența competitivă - - Comparație cu cercetarea analitică de afaceri - - Aplicații într-o întreprindere - - Prioritizarea proiectelor - - Factori de succes în implementare - - - Suportul afacerii - - - Nevoile afacerii - - - Cantitatea și calitatea datelor disponibile - - Aspect utilizator - - Date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Date nestructurate vs. date semistructurate - - - Probleme cu date semistructurate sau nestructurate - - - Utilizarea de metadate - 4.10 Informații competitive - - Dezvoltare istorică - - Tendințe recente - - Domenii similare - - Etica - - Externalizarea - 4.11 Analogii cu alte discipline - - Știința - - Arheologia - - Afaceri - - Medicina 5 Comunitatea - 5.1 Sisteme informaționale - - Prezentare generală - - Tipuri de sisteme informaționale - 5.2 Comunicarea - - Comunicare nonverbală - - Comunicare verbală - - Comunicarea scrisă și dezvoltarea sa istorică - - Comunicare de afaceri - - Comunicare familială - - Comunicarea interpersonală - - Proiectarea comunicării - - Revoluția comunicării informațiilor - - Consultanța - 5.3 Societatea informațională - - Ce este? - - Creșterea informației în societate - - Dezvoltarea modelului societății informaționale - - - Tranziția economică - - Procesarea informațiilor sociale - 5.4 Guvernarea electronică - - Definirea e-guvernării - - Indicele ONU de dezvoltare a e-guvernării - - Exemple de e-guvernare și e-guvernanță - 5.5 Servicii secrete - - Relația dintre serviciile aceleiași țări - 5.6 Epistemologia activității de informații - 5.7 Comunități epistemice - 5.8 Comunități epistemice în UE - - Conceptul comunităților epistemice și limitele sale - - Agenția Europeană de Apărare - - Centrul UE de analiză a informațiilor - - Concluzie 6 Contrainformații - 6.1 Istoria spionajului - - Istoria timpurie - - Europa timpurie modernă - - Secolul al 18-lea - - - Franța - - - Marea Britanie - - - Spionaj industrial - - - Revoluția americană, 1775-1783 - - - Revoluția franceză și războaiele napoleoniene, 1793-1815 - - Secolul al 19-lea - - - Războiul civil american 1861-1865 - - - Informații militare - - - - Austria - - - - Marea Britanie - - - - Franța - - - - Germania - - - - Italia - - - - Rusia - - - Informații navale - - - Contraspionaj - - Secolul 20 - - - Agenții de informații civile - - - Primul Razboi Mondial - - - - Decodarea - - - Revoluția rusă - - - Perioada interbelică - - - - Germania nazistă - - - Al doilea razboi mondial - - - - MI6 în Marea Britanie - - - - MAGIC: SUA sparge codul japonez - - - - OSS în Statele Unite - - - - Contraspionaj - - - Războiul rece - - - Războiul post-rece - - - - Războiul din Irak 2003 - - - - Antiterorism - - - - - Israel - 6.2 Spionajul - - Țintele spionajului - - Metode și terminologie - - - Tehnologii și tehnici - 6.3 Contraspionaj - - Operațiunile de contraspionaj defensive - - - Contra-HUMINT - - - Motivații pentru divulgarea informațiilor și operațiunilor - - Teoria contraspionajului ofensiv - 6.4 Securitatea - - Clasificarea securității - - Concepte de securitate - - Managementul securității în organizații - 6.5 Terorism - - Lupta UE împotriva terorismului - - - Strategia UE - - - - Prevenirea - - - - Protecția - - - - Urmărirea - - - - Răspunsul - 6.6 O teorie a contrainformațiilor - - Definiții concurente - - Serviciile de informații - - - Factorii care determină comportamentul serviciilor de informații - - Contrainformații aplicate - - - Asistență politică - - - Suport operațional - - - Evidențierea documentelor - - Operațiuni de contrainformații - - Contraspionaj - - Domenii de studiu 7 Culegerea de informații - 7.1 Extragerea cunoașterii - - Privire de ansamblu - - Extragerea din surse structurate în RDF - - - Maparea din tabele/vizionări RDB în entități/atribute/valori RDF - - - Mapări complexe ale bazelor de date relaționale RDF - - - XML - - Extracția din surse naturale de limbaj - - - Extracție de informații (EI) tradițională - - - Extracția de informații bazată pe ontologie (EIBO) - - - Învățarea ontologiei - - - Adnotare semantică - - - Instrumente - - Descoperirea de cunoștințe - 7.2 Colectarea de informații umane - - Surse - - Operații de bază HUMINT - - - Pregătirea ofițerilor pentru lucrul în culturi - - - Diferențierea de bază pe tip de subiect - - - Selectarea surselor potențiale - - - Identificare - - - Tipuri de interviuri - - - - Informarea (debriefing) - - - - Interogare - - - Planificarea interviului inițial - - - - Caracteristicile interogatorului (anchetatorilor)â - - - - Sprijinirea nevoilor - - - - Atitudini ale subiectului - - - Planificarea interviurilor suplimentare - - Principii de interogare - - - Raport de construcție - - - Utilizarea înregistratoarelor - - - Lucrul cu interpreți - - Surse recrutate / de încredere - - - Spionaj - - Analiza relațiilor dintre subiecții HUMINT - 7.3 Investigații - - Surse clasice - - - Deducția - - - Inducția - - - Abducția - - Investigații criminale - 7.4 Profilarea infractorilor - 7.5 Informația asimetrică - - Modele de informații asimetrice - - Selecția adversă - - - Semnalizare (Signaling) - - - Investigare (Screening) - - Aplicarea asimetriei de informații în domeniul cercetării - - Surse de asimetrie informațională - - Efectul blogurilor asupra asimetriei informaționale - - Efectul inteligenței artificiale asupra asimetriei informaționale - 7.6 Proiectarea mecanismului - - Intuiția - - Proiectarea - - - Mecanismul - - - Principiul revelației - - - Gradul de implementare - 7.7 Raportul circular - - Exemple specifice - 7.8 Liberul acces la informații 8 Supravegherea - Tipuri - - Calculator - - Telefoane - 8.1 Camere de supraveghere - 8.2 Camere IP - - Standarde - - Avantaje ale camerelor IP - - Dezavantaje potențiale - 8.3 Camere web - - Probleme de intimitate - - Efecte asupra societății moderne - - Utilizări ale camerelor web - - - Monitorizare video pentru îngrijirea copiilor - - - Comerț - - - Apeluri video și videoconferințe - - - Video de securitate - - - Clipuri video și fotografii - - - Dispozitive de control al intrărilor - - Tehnologia camerelor web - 8.4 Supravegherea în IR - - Applicații - - Specificații - - Cum funcționează supravegherea în IR - 8.5 Supravegherea în masă - - Supravegherea în masă în Uniunea Europeană - - - INDECT - - - HIDE - 8.6 Supravegherea aeriană - 8.7 Supravegherea calculatoarelor - - Emanații - - Policeware - 8.8 Interceptarea convorbirilor telefonice - - Aspecte legale - - Supravegherea electronică a telefoanelor - 8.9 Identificarea automată și captura de date (AIDC) - 8.10 Captarea datelor din documente tipărite - - Cele mai cunoscute tipuri de aplicații - - - ABBYY - - - Accusoft - - - AnyDoc Software - - - Cvision Technologies - - - Expervision - - - I.R.I.S. Group - - - LEADTOOLS - - - Nuance Communications - - - PSIGEN Software - 8.11 Ingineria securității - - Calificări - - Atitudini privind securitatea - - Practici de bază - - Subdomenii - 8.12 Securitatea calculatoarelor - - Securitate prin proiectare - 8.13 Biometria - - Sisteme biometrice adaptive - - Direcții noi de dezvoltare - - - Accesul în rețele publice - - Supravegherea biometrică - - Funcționalitatea biometrică 9 Analiza informațiilor - Prezentare generală - Metoda analitică - - Stabilirea obiectivelor pentru o analiză de informații - - - Fii îndrăzneț și cinstit - - - Acord privind conținutul - - - Orientarea spre clienți - - - Orientarea spre colegi - - Organizând ceea ce aveți - Natura analizei - - Tipuri de raționament - - - Inducție: căutarea cauzalității - - - Deducția: aplicarea generalului - - - Intuiția instruită - - - Metoda științifică - - Metode de analiză - - - Analiza oportunităților - - - Analiza cuiului de siguranță - - - Analiza ipotezelor concurente - - - Analogie - Procesul analitic - - Definirea problemei - - Generarea de ipoteze - - Determinarea nevoilor de informații și colectarea de informații - - Evaluarea surselor - - Evaluarea ipotezelor (teste) - - Producția și ambalarea - - Evaluarea colegială - - Feedback de la client și evaluarea producției - Nu uitați niciodată utilizatorul final - 9.1 Conceptualizarea funcțiilor analizei de informații - 9.2 Metodologii în analiza informațiilor - 9.3 Euristica în analiza de informații - - Puterea de expertiză - - Paradoxul de expertiză - - Sarcinile analiștilor de informații - - Pro și contra echipelor - - Tehnologii - - Metodologii analitice - - Euristica - 9.4 Raționamentul inductiv - - Raționamentul inductiv vs. raționamentul deductiv - - Critici - - - Prejudecăți - - Tipuri de raționament inductiv - - - Generalizare - - - Silogismul statistic - - - Inducția simplă - - - Argumentul din analogie - - - Inferența cauzală - - - Predicția - - Inferența bayesiană - - Inferența inductivă - 9.5 Evaluarea informațiilor - - Procesul de evaluare a informațiilor - - Ciclul informațiilor centrice specifice - - Evaluarea informațiilor criminale - - - Utilizarea de Armata SUA - - - Procesul CRIMINT - - Analiza informațiilor criminale - 9.6 Abordarea orientată spre țintă a ciclului de informații - - Analiza orientată pe țintă - - - Procesul de intelligence - - Crearea modelului - - - Modele în intelligence - - - Surse de informații de intelligence - - - Popularea modelului - - Analiza organizațională - - Aplicarea abordării centrate pe țintă în intelligence - - Critici - 9.7 Analiza ipotezelor competitive - - Proces - - Puncte forte - - Puncte slabe - - - Analiza structurată a ipotezelor concurente - - - Alte abordări ale formalismului - 9.8 Analiza indicatorilor - - Istorie - - Elemente de analiză a indicatorilor - - - Tehnici analitice structurate - - - Cerință - - - Categorii - - - Factori - - - Scenarii - - - Indicatori - - Proces - - Beneficii - - Puncte slabe - - Tehnici analitice structurate înrudite - 9.9 Cuvinte de probabilitate estimativă - - Istorie - - - Informații - - - - Eșecuri de politică și de informații legate de CPE - - Reformele metodologiei - - - Cuantificarea fiabilității sursei și a încrederii analitice - - - Analiza stocastică - - - Standardizare - - - - Experiența Mercyhurst cu CPE standardizate - 9.10 Predicții - - Predicții informale pe bază de ipoteze - - Sondaje de opinie - - Statistici - - Supranaturalul (profeții) - - Predicția în știință - - Finanțe 10 Media și rețele sociale - Studiul - Istoria - Nivele de analiză a rețelelor sociale - - Nivel micro - - Nivel mediu - - Nivel macro - Legături teoretice - - Teorii importate - - Teorii specifice - Decalaje structurale - Clustere de cercetare - - Comunicare - - Comunitate - - Rețele complexe - - Rețele criminale - - Difuzarea inovațiilor - - Demografie - - Sociologia economică - - Sănătate - - Ecologie umană - - Limba și lingvistica - - Rețele literare - - Studii organizatorice - - Capitalul social - - Poziția și beneficiile rețelei - - Media socială - Servicii în rețele sociale - - Impactul social - - Caracteristici tipice - - Caracteristici suplimentare - 10.1 Media socială - - Clasificarea mediei sociale - - - Viralitate - - Bloguri - - Comunicarea prin calculator - - Defăimarea - - Jurnalism - - - Mass media - - Facebook - - Twitter - - YouTube - 10.2 Știri - - Caracteristici - - - Noutatea - - - Marfă - - - Tonul - - - Valoarea de noutate a știrii - - Media de știri - - - Ziare - - - Televiziunea - - - Internet - 10.3 Psihologia mulțimilor - 10.4 Manipularea prin media - - Contexte - - - Activism - - - Publicitate - - - Farsa - - - Propaganda - - - Război psihologic - - - Relații publice - - Tehnici - - - Marketingul motoarelor de căutare - - Profesioniști în conformitate - - - Tehnici - 10.5 Psihologia rețelelor sociale - - Neuroplasticitatea - 10.6 Analiza rețelelor sociale 11 Etica - Definirea eticii - 11.1 Relativismul moral - - Variații - - - Descriptiv - - - - Meta-etic - - - - Normativ - 11.2 Utilitarism - - Etimologie - - Fundal istoric - - - Filozofia chineză - - - Filosofia occidentală - 11.3 Dileme etice - - Exemple de dileme etice - - Răspunsuri la argumente - - Dileme morale - - - Exemple - - - Conceptul - - - Probleme - 11.4 Codul de conduită FBI - 11.5 Meta-etica - - Întrebări meta-etice - - Teoriile semantice - - - Centralism și non-centralism - 11.6 Filosofia dreptului - - Jurisprudență analitică - - Jurisprudența normativă - - Abordări filosofice ale problemelor juridice Încheiere Resurse Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

I examined the proposition that there are psychological limits on what scientific problems can be solved, and that these limits may be based on a failure to be able to produce imagable, observation-based models for any possible solution, a position suggested by philosopher Colin McGinn in an argument attempting to prove that the mind-body problem is unsolvable. I examined another likely candidate for an unsolvable problem -- the ultimate origin of the universe (i.e., what might have preceded the (...) Big Bang or any other starting point; why there should be something rather than nothing) -- by exploring the reasoning of physicists about this problem and measuring visual imagery frequency and vividness, with the expectation that those who most believed the problem unsolvable would be more frequent/vivid imagers and therefore more affected by the apparent impossibility of producing an imagable solution. Eight physicists were interviewed and imagery frequency and vividness measurements performed using Cohen & Saslona's IDQ-IHS and Marks's VVIQ, respectively. All subjects considered the problem unsolvable within today's physics and all but one thought the problem still meaningful, though none were optimistic about a solution. The one subject who dismissed the problem had the lowest imagery frequency score, and there was also a significant rank order correlation (r = 0.83, p < .02) between degree of belief in problem unsolvability (extended to include viewing the problem as meaningful and not already solved) and a composite imagery frequency/vividness score, though the sample was too small to control for some possible confounding factors. (shrink)

In this chapter, mixed with moral psychology and ethics, I explore the topic of manipulation by analyzing “Orange Is The New Black” season two antagonist, Yvonne “Vee” Parker. I claim that Vee is a master manipulator. I begin by laying out several definitions and features of manipulation. Definitions include covert influence, non-rational influence, the effect of non-rational influence, and intentionally making someone or altering a situation to make someone succumb to weaknesses. Features include trust, deception, emotion, false belief, and vulnerability. (...) I argue that although philosophers (Anne Barnhill, Robert Noggle, and Colin McGinn) are divided on what manipulation is because not all definitions and features fit all cases, I claim that Vee’s actions fit them all. I then attempt to explore what is bad and possibly good about manipulation. I examine if excellence alone is what makes manipulation good or should we take into consideration the autonomy denied the listener, the vices employed, and the bad consequences that arise from manipulation. I conclude with offering up suggestions on how one can guard themselves against manipulators. (shrink)

Are science and religion compatible when it comes to understanding cosmology (the origin of the universe), biology (the origin of life and of the human species), ethics, and the human mind (minds, brains, souls, and free will)? Do science and religion occupy non-overlapping magisteria? Is Intelligent Design a scientific theory? How do the various faith traditions view the relationship between science and religion? What, if any, are the limits of scientific explanation? What are the most important open questions, problems, or (...) challenges confronting the relationship between science and religion, and what are the prospects for progress? These and other questions are explored in Science and Religion: 5 Questions--a collection of thirty-three interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the world's most influential and prominent philosophers, scientists, theologians, apologists, and atheists. Contributions by Simon Blackburn, Susan Blackmore, Sean Carroll, William Lane Craig, William Dembski, Daniel C. Dennett, George F.R. Ellis, Owen Flanagan, Owen Gingerich, Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, John F. Haught, Muzaffar Iqbal, Lawrence Krauss, Colin McGinn, Alister McGrath, Mary Midgley, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Timothy O'Connor, Massimo Pigliucci, John Polkinghorne, James Randi, Alex Rosenberg, Michael Ruse, Robert John Russell, John Searle, Michael Shermer, Victor J. Stenger, Robert Thurman, Michael Tooley, Charles Townes, Peter van Inwagen, Keith Ward, Rabbi David Wolpe. (shrink)

A “self-effacing” property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn (2000) has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others—too many even to constitute a set.

Mysterianism has become a popular stance in philosophy of consciousness and other philosophical subdisciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that mysterianism is not justified, mainly because its inclination to epistemic defeatism and the misunderstanding of the division of epistemic labour. In the first part, I will present the history of mysterianism in the 19th and 20th century philosophy. Then, in the second part, I will point out how epistemic defeatism is founded in the unwarranted philosophical futurology. The (...) third part will deal with the division of labour in society, language and knowledge. Because of the division of epistemic labour, the understanding is distributed among numerous agents without possibility of individual comprehension. Finally, I will coin the term “ignorance illusion” that plays the central role in the mysterians’ worldview. (shrink)

The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it (...) fails; in part three I suggest why commentators might have been motivated to offer it; and in part four I claim that two commentators who have offered it also imply otherwise. (shrink)

Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.

The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglected element in contemporary theories of justice. This has left several crucial questions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as why some particular agents are responsible for realizing justice, how their contribution towards realizing justice should be understood, and what role agents such as activists and community leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the landscape of these (...) kinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should distinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizing justice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not responsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it, and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committed to realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporate agents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...) actual intellectual awareness of oneself in such apperception. I then defend this interpretation from a variety of objections. (shrink)

Recent research has begun to investigate sensory processing in relation to nonclinical variation in traits associated with the autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We propose that existing accounts of autistic perception can be augmented by considering a role for individual differences in top-down expectations for the precision of sensory input, related to the processing of state-dependent levels of uncertainty. We therefore examined ASD-like traits in relation to the rubber-hand illusion: an experimental paradigm that typically elicits crossmodal integration of visual, tactile, and (...) proprioceptive information in an unusual illusory context. Individuals with higher ASD-like traits showed reduced effects of the rubber-hand illusion on perceived arm position and reach-to-grasp movements, compared to individuals with lower ASD-like traits. These differences occurred despite both groups reporting the typical subjective experience of the illusion concerning visuotactile integration and ownership for the rubber hand. Together these results suggest that the integration of proprioceptive information with cues for arm position derived from the illusory context differs between individuals partly in relation to traits associated with ASD. We suggest that the observed differences in sensory integration can be best explained in terms of differing expectations regarding the precision of sensory estimates in contexts that suggest uncertainty. (shrink)

Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color. Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish (1623–73) disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that (i) it is impossible to (...) conceive of colorless bodies, (ii) the very possibility of color experience requires that bodies are sensuously colored, and (iii) the attribution of sensuous colors to bodies provides the best explanation of color constancy. Although some passages might suggest that Cavendish endorses a reductive account of sensuous color, according to which sensuous color reduces to a body's microscopic surface texture (or some other mechanistically respectable property), I argue that she accepts a nonreductive account, on which sensuous color is not thus reducible. (shrink)

Despite widespread recognition of an emergent politics of data in our midst, we strikingly lack a political theory of data. We readily acknowledge the presence of data across our political lives, but we often do not know how to conceptualize the politics of all those data points—the forms of power they constitute and the kinds of political subjects they implicate. Recent work in numerous academic disciplines is evidence of the first steps toward a political theory of data. This article maps (...) some limits of this emergent literature with an eye to enriching its theoretical range. The literature on data politics, both within political theory and elsewhere, has thus far focused almost exclusively on the algorithm. This article locates a further dimension of data politics in the work of formatting technology or, more simply, formats. Formats are simultaneously conceptual and technical in the ways they define what can even count as data, and by extension who can count as data and how they can count. A focus on formats is of theoretical value because it provides a bridge between work on the conceptual contours of categories and the technology-centric literature on algorithms that tends to ignore the more conceptual dimensions of data technology. The political insight enabled by format theory is shown in the context of an extended interrogation of the politics of racialized redlining. (shrink)

On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of that reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion (...) to sentient beings and that a more metaphysically refined version of the traditional reading can accommodate both Schopenhauer's moral ranking of characters and allow for some level of distinction in compassion. I then turn to four further questions for the traditional reading: what the relation is between the feeling of compassionate pain and the recognition of metaphysical unity, how cognitions mediate compassion, whether compassion is limited to the present, and how the feeling of compassion relates to Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. I conclude by explaining how, in a reductive vein, the traditional reading can also allow for compassion to have normative content. (shrink)

Wittgenstein held that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment’s representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not (...) include entities which are logically suited for combination. This second judgment complex will not represent any of its terms as combined, for entities that are logically uncombinable are unrepresentable as combined. Russell’s theory does not, however, explain how the original judgment differs from the complex arrived at by the substitution of constituents such that the former but not the latter represents certain of its terms as combined. (shrink)

Contrary to political and philosophical consensus, we argue that the threats posed by climate change justify population engineering, the intentional manipulation of the size and structure of human populations. Specifically, we defend three types of policies aimed at reducing fertility rates: choice enhancement, preference adjustment, and incentivization. While few object to the first type of policy, the latter two are generally rejected because of their potential for coercion or morally objectionable manipulation. We argue that forms of each policy type are (...) pragmatically and morally justified tools for preventing the harms of global climate change. (shrink)

Do the senses represent causation? Many commentators read Nicolas Malebranche as anticipating David Hume’s negative answer to this question. I disagree with this assessment. When a yellow billiard ball strikes a red billiard ball, Malebranche holds that we see the yellow ball as causing the red ball to move. Given Malebranche’s occasionalism, he insists that the visual experience of causal interaction is illusory. Nevertheless, Malebranche holds that the senses represent finite things as causally efficacious. This experience of creaturely causality explains (...) why Aristotelian philosophers and others struggle to recognize occasionalism’s truth. (shrink)

In this chapter, Colin Marshall argues that Schopenhauer’s views about the foundations of morality pose important challenges for five tenets of contemporary metaethics. After presenting these challenges, Marshall explores the potential viability of contemporary Schopenhauerian approaches to metaethics that would leave aside his radical metaphysical monism.

This article compares three models for conceptualizing the political and ethical challenges of contemporary genetics, genomics, and postgenomics. The three analytical approaches are referred to as the state-politics model, the biopolitical model, and the infopolitical model. Each of these models is valuable for different purposes. But comparing these models in terms of their influence in contemporary discussions, the first is by far the dominant approach, the second is gaining in importance, and the third is almost entirely neglected. The widespread neglect (...) of the infopolitical dimensions of genetic sciences focused by the third model is puzzling in light of the fact that genetics, genomics, and postgenomics are all pre-eminent information sciences. The infopolitical model thus aims to bring into clearer view the specific political and ethical problems engendered by this informational nature of the genetic sciences. This model offers a way of understanding how ethically-salient and politically-fraught conceptual assumptions can be embedded in informational architectures such as algorithms and the formats (or data structures) upon which they rely. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes several key themes in Kant’s views about modality. We begin with the pre-critical Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, in which Kant distinguishes between formal and material elements of possibility, claims that all possibility requires an actual ground, and argues for the existence of a single necessary being. We then briefly consider how Kant’s views change in his mature period, especially concerning the role of form and thought in defining modality. (...) Kant’s mature views, however, present two difficult interpretive puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether Kant has a generally reductive view of modality. While Kant’s views on logical modality, the role of actuality in grounding possibility, and the relation of modality to cognition all suggest reduction, we argue that the categorial status of modal concepts and the difficulty in even identifying amodal grounds for modal facts all suggest a non-reductive view. The second puzzle concerns whether Kant accepts modal facts or properties at the noumenal level. While Kant’s appeal to noumenal necessary connections, the contingency of noumenal willing, and the idea of a necessary noumenal being suggest that he endorses noumenal modality, his claims that modal concepts express only relations to the faculty of cognition and his claim that modal concepts arise from our distinctive psychological structures, we argue, suggest that he rejects noumenal modality. We conclude by considering potential solutions to these puzzles. (shrink)

The forceful impact of Michel Foucault’s work in the humanities and social sciences is apparent from the sheer abundance of its uses, appropriations, and refigurations. This article calls for greater self-conscious reflexivity about the relationship between our uses of Foucault and the opportunities afforded by his work. We argue for a clearer distinction between analytics and concepts in Foucault-inspired work. In so doing we draw on key moments of methodological self-reflection in Foucault’s Collège de France lectures and elsewhere. This distinction (...) helps identify different ways that Foucault might be put to productive use today as well as what can go wrong therein, a concern we develop with reference to Giorgio Agamben’s post-Foucaultian contributions to political theory. We are eager to open up a possibility that has been infrequently explored despite Foucault’s contemporary influence—-the idea that critique in and through Foucault is empirical critique. This idea can help facilitate a gain in reflexivity in the broader landscapes of contemporary theory, inquiry, and critique. (shrink)

According to strong metaphysical readings of Kant, Kant believes there are noumenal substances and causes. Proponents of these readings have shown that these readings can be reconciled with Kant’s claims about the limitations of human cognition. An important new challenge to such readings, however, has been proposed by Markus Kohl, focusing on Kant’s occasional statements about the divine or intuitive intellect. According to Kohl, how an intuitive intellect represents is a decisive measure for how noumena are for Kant, but an (...) intuitive intellect would not represent using metaphysical categories like those of substance and causation. I argue that Kohl’s argument does not succeed, since it overlooks the possibility that the intuitive intellect only indirectly represents certain noumenal facts. In addition, in response to a secondary argument Kohl suggests, I argue that Kant’s apparently anti-metaphysical statements about the content of the categories can be read as merely describing the constitution of the categories, instead of what they represent. Thus, while Kohl advances the debate by raising an under-appreciated question, his argument against the strong metaphysical reading is unsound. (shrink)

The linguistic turn is a central aspect of Richard Rorty’s philosophy, informing his early critiques of foundationalism in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and subsequent critiques of authoritarianism in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. It is argued that we should interpret the linguistic turn as a methodological suggestion for how philosophy can take a non-foundational perspective on normativity. It is then argued that although Rorty did not succeed in explicating normativity without foundations (or authority without authoritarianism), we should take seriously (...) the ambition motivating his project. But taking that ambition seriously may require reconsidering the linguistic turn. (shrink)

Investigation of neural and cognitive processes underlying individual variation in moral preferences is underway, with notable similarities emerging between moral- and risk-based decision-making. Here we specifically assessed moral distributive justice preferences and non-moral financial gambling preferences in the same individuals, and report an association between these seemingly disparate forms of decision-making. Moreover, we find this association between distributive justice and risky decision-making exists primarily when the latter is assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task. These findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies (...) of brain function during moral and risky decision-making. This research also constitutes the first replication of a novel experimental measure of distributive justice decision-making, for which individual variation in performance was found. Further examination of decision-making processes across different contexts may lead to an improved understanding of the factors affecting moral behaviour. (shrink)

A variety of interpreters have argued that Kant construes the animality of human beings as ‘transformed’, in some sense, through the possession of rationality. I argue that this interpretation admits of multiple readings and that it is either wrong, or doesn't result in the conclusion for which its proponents argue. I also explain the sense in which rationality nevertheless significantly differentiates human beings from other animals.

The epistemic position of an agent often depends on their position in a larger network of other agents who provide them with information. In general, agents are better off if they have diverse and independent sources. Sullivan et al. [19] developed a method for quantitatively characterizing the epistemic position of individuals in a network that takes into account both diversity and independence; and presented a proof-of-concept, closed-source implementation on a small graph derived from Twitter data [19]. This paper reports on (...) an open-source reimplementation of their algorithm in Python, optimized to be usable on much larger networks. In addition to the algorithm and package, we also show the ability to scale up our package to large synthetic social network graph profiling, and finally demonstrate its utility in analyzing real-world empirical evidence of ‘echo chambers’ on online social media, as well as evidence of interdisciplinary diversity in an academic communications network. (shrink)

Henry More argues that materialism cannot account for cases where a single subject or perceiver has multiple perceptions simultaneously. Since we clearly do have multiple perceptions at the same time--for example, when we see, hear, and smell simultaneously--More concludes that we are not wholly material. In response to More's argument, Margaret Cavendish adopts a two-fold strategy. First, she argues that there is no general obstacle to mental unification in her version of materialism. Second, Cavendish appeals to the mind or rational (...) matter--terms she often uses interchangeably—to explain the integration of sensory input from multiple senses. When the mind integrates perceptions across modalities, the different parts of rational matter share their knowledge so that they all come to perceive alike. When rational parts successfully communicate their knowledge, each part knows what all the others know. They pool their knowledge; they perceive alike. Thus, when someone hears, sees, and tastes, each part of her mind hears, sees, and tastes alike, in parallel and in unison. The Cavendishian mind, in short, approximates simplicity by achieving uniformity or homogeneity of perceptions across its parts. (shrink)

This book offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, drawing inspiration from a wide range of philosophers, including John Locke, Arthur Schopenhauer, Iris Murdoch, Nel Noddings, and David Lewis. The core claim is compassion is our capacity to perceive other creatures' pains, pleasures, and desires. Non-compassionate people are therefore perceptually lacking, regardless of how much factual knowledge they might have. Marshall argues that people who do have this form of compassion thereby fit a familiar paradigm of moral goodness. His argument (...) involves the identification of an epistemic good which Marshall dubs "being in touch". To be in touch with some property of a thing requires experiencing it in a way that reveals that property - that is, experiencing it as it is in itself. Only compassion, Marshall argues, lets us be in touch with others' motivational mental properties. -/- This conclusion about compassion has two important metaethical consequences. First, it generates an answer to the question ";Why be moral?", which has been a central philosophical concern since Plato. Second, it provides the keystone for a novel form of moral realism. This form of moral realism has a distinctive set of virtues: it is anti-relativist, naturalist, and able to identify a necessary connection between moral representation and motivation. The view also implies that there is an epistemic asymmetry between virtuous and vicious agents, according to which only morally good people can fully face reality. (shrink)

Robustly realistic metaphysical readings of Kant’s mature views have become popular in recent years, largely because of the apparent coherence of applying unschematized categories like that of causation to things in themselves. There is, however, an overlooked problem that arises even for robust realist readings that privilege unschematized categories. The problem is that Kant provides all the elements for what is now called a ‘debunking explanation’ of metaphysical representations of things in themselves. His account of the categories as arising from (...) mere forms of judgment, and being applied primarily for the unity of consciousness, is detached from the issue of whether there are causes among things in themselves. This detachment seems to imply that it would be a huge coincidence if unschematized categories corresponded to any such causes. After making this argument, using the category of causation as my central case, I consider three potential responses: that Kant’s account implicitly appeals to things in themselves’ causation, that Kant has a separate account of non-coincidental representation, and that Kant’s account is merely incomplete in a way that poses no debunking threat. None of these responses, I argue, are successful, so I conclude that either robustly realistic metaphysical readings are mistaken, or there is internal incoherence in Kant’s views. (shrink)

In 'On the nature of truth and falsehood' Russell offers both a multiple relation theory of judgment and a correspondence theory of truth. It has been a prevailing understanding of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s multiple relation idea but endorses the correspondence theory. Ramsey took the opposite view. In his 'Facts and Propositions', Ramsey endorses Russell’s multiple relation idea, rejects the correspondence theory, and then asserts that these moves are both due to Wittgenstein. This chapter will argue that Ramsey’s (...) ascriptions are both correct. The extent of the agreement between Ramsey and Wittgenstein will be argued, moreover, to count definitively against standard understandings of Ramsey as a redundancy theorist of truth. Wittgenstein is no correspondence theorist and Ramsey is no redundancy theorist; rather, both philosophers offer identity theories of truth. (shrink)

Search in an environment with an uncertain distribution of resources involves a trade-off between exploitation of past discoveries and further exploration. This extends to information foraging, where a knowledge-seeker shifts between reading in depth and studying new domains. To study this decision-making process, we examine the reading choices made by one of the most celebrated scientists of the modern era: Charles Darwin. From the full-text of books listed in his chronologically-organized reading journals, we generate topic models to quantify his local (...) (text-to-text) and global (text-to-past) reading decisions using Kullback-Liebler Divergence, a cognitively-validated, information-theoretic measure of relative surprise. Rather than a pattern of surprise-minimization, corresponding to a pure exploitation strategy, Darwin’s behavior shifts from early exploitation to later exploration, seeking unusually high levels of cognitive surprise relative to previous eras. These shifts, detected by an unsupervised Bayesian model, correlate with major intellectual epochs of his career as identified both by qualitative scholarship and Darwin’s own self-commentary. Our methods allow us to compare his consumption of texts with their publication order. We find Darwin’s consumption more exploratory than the culture’s production, suggesting that underneath gradual societal changes are the explorations of individual synthesis and discovery. Our quantitative methods advance the study of cognitive search through a framework for testing interactions between individual and collective behavior and between short- and long-term consumption choices. This novel application of topic modeling to characterize individual reading complements widespread studies of collective scientific behavior. (shrink)