This chapter contains section titled: Some Personal Prefatory Remarks Introduction: Wittgenstein's Chief Contribution? The Reception of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics in His Own Lifetime The Post 1956 Reaction.

In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...) its aim is to reduce mathematics to operations. This paper illustrates Wittgenstein’s approach by examining his discussion of irrational numbers. (shrink)

pt. 1. The proposition and its sense.--pt. 2. On logic and mathematics.

Intellectual diary of a thinker of the school of Logical Positivism showing the day-by-day development of his philosophical ideas.

When in May 1930, the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, had to decide whether to renew Wittgenstein's research grant, it turned to Bertrand Russell for an assessment of the work Wittgenstein had been doing over the past year. His verdict: "The theories contained in this new work . . . are novel, very original and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who likes simplicity, I should like to think that they are not, but (...) from what I have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have an opportunity to work them out, since, when completed, they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy." "[ Philosophical Remarks ] contains the seeds of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind and of mathematics. Principally, he here discusses the role of indispensable in language, criticizing Russell's The Analysis of Mind . He modifies the Tractatus 's picture theory of meaning by stressing that the connection between the proposition and reality is not found in the picture itself. He analyzes generality in and out of mathematics, and the notions of proof and experiment. He formulates a pain/private-language argument and discusses both behaviorism and the verifiability principle. The work is difficult but important, and it belongs in every philosophy collection."--Robert Hoffman, Philosophy "Any serious student of Wittgenstein's work will want to study his Philosophical Remarks as a transitional book between his two great masterpieces. The Remarks is thus indispensible for anyone who seeks a complete understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy."--Leonard Linsky, American Philosophical Association. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Introduction 1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey: Hans-Johann Glock. 2. Wittgenstein's Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices: Katherine Morris. 3. Gordon Baker's Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein: P. M. S. Hacker. 4. The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Therapy, Nachlass: Alois Pichler. 5. Ways of Reading Wittgenstein: Observations on Certain Uses of the Word 'Metaphysics': Joachim Schulte. 6. Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker: Hilary Putnam. 7. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism: A. W. Moore. (...) 8. Simples and the Idea of Analysis in the Tractatus: Marie McGinn. 9. Words, Waxing and Waning: Ethics in/and/of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Stephen Mulhall. 10. The Uses of Wittgenstein's Beetle: Philosophical Investigations §293 and Its Interpreters: David G. Stern. 11. Bourgeois, Bolshevist or Anarchist?: The Reception of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics: Ray Monk. 12. Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism: Alice Crary. (shrink)

This book provides an accessible, critical introduction to the three main approaches that dominated work in the philosophy of mathematics during the twentieth century: logicism, intuitionism and formalism.

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

We will discuss a mathematical proof found in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, a constructive version of Euler’s proof of the infinity of prime numbers. Although it does not amount to much, this proof allows us to see that Wittgenstein had at least some mathematical skills. At the very last, the proof shows that Wittgenstein was concerned with mathematical practice and it also gives further evidence in support of the claim that, after all, he held a constructivist stance, at least during the transitional (...) period of his thought (1929-33). (shrink)

It is controversial whether Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is of critical importance for mathematical proofs, or is only concerned with the adequate philosophical interpretation of mathematics. Wittgenstein's remarks on the infinity of prime numbers provide a helpful example which will be used to clarify this question. His antiplatonistic view of mathematics contradicts the widespread understanding of proofs as logical derivations from a set of axioms or assumptions. Wittgenstein's critique of traditional proofs of the infinity of prime numbers, specifically those of (...) Euler and Euclid, not only offers philosophical insight but also suggests substantive improvements. A careful examination of his comments leads to a deeper understanding of what proves the infinity of primes. (shrink)