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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Epistemic Expansions.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains.Alexander R. Pruss - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-29.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1: Introducing Credences.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2022 - Oxford University Press.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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The strength of de Finetti’s coherence theorem.Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11713-11724.details
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On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism.Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):621-630.details
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Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.details
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In Favor of Logarithmic Scoring.Randall G. McCutcheon - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):286-303.details
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Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism.Patrick Maher - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81.details
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Countable Additivity, Idealization, and Conceptual Realism.Yang Liu - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):127-147.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):92-128.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Accurate believers are deductively cogent.Matthew Hewson - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):763-786.details
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Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.details
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