Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   911 citations  
  • Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
    Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? This volume contains fifteen state (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Epistemic Justification.Ernest Sosa - 2003 - Wiley.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   468 citations  
  • Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View.Raimo Tuomela - 2007 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   144 citations  
  • Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
    Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   489 citations  
  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   496 citations  
  • Social knowing: The social sense of 'scientific knowledge'.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):23-56.
    There is a social or collective sense of ‘knowledge’, as used, for example, in the phrase ‘the growth of scientific knowledge’. In this paper I show that social knowledge does not supervene on facts about what individuals know, nor even what they believe or intend, or any combination of these or other mental states. Instead I develop the idea that social knowing is an analogue to individual knowing, where the analogy focuses on the functional role of social and individual knowing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • (3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   909 citations  
  • Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    " In a book that seeks to shift the ground of debate within theory of knowledge, William P. Alston finds that the century-lo.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • (1 other version)Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective.Christian List - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2004 - Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
    Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition . This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Two kinds of consciousness.Tyler Burge - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   762 citations  
  • Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1886 citations  
  • Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   843 citations  
  • The difference between cause and condition.Alex Broadbent - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):355-364.
    Commonly we distinguish the strike of a match, as a cause of the match lighting, from the presence of oxygen, as a mere condition. In this paper I propose an account of this phenomenon, which I call causal selection. I suggest some reasons for taking causal selection seriously, and indicate some shortcomings of the popular contrastive approach. Chief among these is the lack of an account of contrast choice. I propose that contrast choice is often just the counterfactual scenario in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Group knowledge analyzed.Raimo Tuomela - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):109-127.
    The main task of the present paper is to investigate the nature of collective knowledge and discuss what kind of justificatory aspects are involved in it to discuss it from collective belief. The central kind of collective knowledge investigated is normatively binding knowledge attributed to a social group. A distinction is made between natural knowledge and constitutive knowledge related to social (especially institutional) matters. In the case of the latter kind of knowledge, in contrast to the former kind, justification and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
    Most traditional epistemologists see trust and knowledge as deeply antithetical: we cannot know by trusting in the opinions of others; knowledge must be based on evidence, not mere trust. I argue that this is badly mistaken. Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know. Trust is thus often more epistemically basic than empirical evidence or logical argument, for the evidence and the argument are available only through trust. Finally, since the reliability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   266 citations  
  • Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
    find myself believing all sorts 0f things for which I d0 not possess evidence: that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, that my car keeps stalling because the carburetor needs LO be rebuilt, that mass media threaten democracy, that slums cause emotional disorders, that my irregular heart beat is premature ventricular contraction, that students} grades are not correlated with success in the ncmacadcmic world, that nuclear power plants are not safe (enough) . . . The list 0f things I believe, though (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   344 citations  
  • The epistemic features of group belief.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):161-175.
    Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - New York: Hutchinson & Co.
    This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1699 citations  
  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   981 citations  
  • Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
    The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1678 citations  
  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   679 citations  
  • The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1–25.
    This chapter contains sections titled: ‘Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)’ ‘Knowledge is Well Supported’ ‘Knowledge is Absolute’ ‘Knowing Includes not being Gettiered’ ‘Knowledge‐that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge‐how’ The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge Prima Facie Core Problems.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • I—The Presidential Address*: The Standard of Morals.D. D. Raphael - 1975 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1):1-12.
    D. D. Raphael; I—The Presidential Address*: The Standard of Morals, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 1–12E, https.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2394 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   651 citations  
  • (1 other version)Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition[REVIEW]Darryl Bruce - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):165-169.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   384 citations  
  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   978 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1192 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):486-492.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   554 citations  
  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   554 citations  
  • The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. In this highly original book Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge.Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) - 2011 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and _How to Know_ does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edward Hutchins - 1995 - Critica 27 (81):101-105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   777 citations  
  • When is True Belief Knowledge?Richard Foley - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 161-195.
    Knowledge how to do things, or know-how, is intimately related to action. Yet know-how is also a genuine cognitive achievement. An adequate account must handle these points. Negatively, we advance arguments against theories that focus narrowly on abilities or propositional knowledge. Positively, we develop an alternative approach. The central idea is that know-how involves grasping a conception of a method for acting (or set of such methods)—where a method for phi-ing is a sequence of act-types the execution of which is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • The Evolution of Cooperation.Robert M. Axelrod - 1984 - Basic Books.
    The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   959 citations  
  • Social objects.Anthony Quinton - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):1-27.
    Anthony Quinton; I*—The Presidential Address: Social Objects, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 1–28, https://doi.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   293 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Hutchins examines a set of phenomena that have fallen between the established disciplines of psychology and anthropology, bringing to light a new set of relationships between culture and cognition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   707 citations  
  • Seeing and Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):121-124.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   239 citations  
  • Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   633 citations  
  • On Reflection.Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Hilary Kornblith presents a new account of mental reflection, and its importance for knowledge, reasoning, freedom, and normativity. He argues that reflection cannot solve the philosophical problems it has traditionally been thought to, and offers a more realistic, demystified view of its nature which draws on dual process approaches to cognition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • The generality problem for reliabilism. E. Conee & R. Feldman - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   215 citations