- Racionalidad para los humanos.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - 2021 - Análisis Filosófico 41 (1):67-89.details
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Virtue Perspectivism, Normativity, and the Unity of Knowledge.Modesto Gómez Alonso - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 3 (75):117-130.details
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Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4989-5007.details
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Agent-Awareness in Reflective Knowledge.Sharon Mason - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):239-255.details
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Epistemic Reactive Attitudes.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):353-366.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy.Michael Hannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4147-4168.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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On envattment - disjunctivism, skeptical scenarios and rationality.Giovanni Rolla - 2016 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (134):525-544.details
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Metaemotional Intentionality.Scott Alexander Howard - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).details
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique.Matthew Boyle - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):527-555.details
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A Case for Epistemic Agency.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):449-474.details
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A puzzle about normativity.Giovanni Rolla - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (3):323.details
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There’s No Justice: Why Pursuit of a Virtue is Not the Solution to Epistemic Injustice.Benjamin R. Sherman - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (3):229-250.details
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What ‘Extended Me’ knows.Andy Clark - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3757-3775.details
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Reflection On: On Reflection.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):55-69.details
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Values, Agency, and Welfare.Jason R. Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):187-214.details
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Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.details
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Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge.Timothy Perrine - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):351-360.details
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JFGI: From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism.Kourken Michaelian - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.details
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Epistemic Injustice Expanded: A Feminist, Animal Studies Approach.Rebecca Dayna Tuvel - unknowndetails
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Homeostatic epistemology : reliability, coherence and coordination in a Bayesian virtue epistemology.Susannah Kate Devitt - 2013 - Dissertation, details
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On Epistemic Agency.Kristoffer Hans Ahlstrom - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherstdetails
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is Good Thinking? Comments on Mona Simion's Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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On the Epistemic Value of Reflection.Pranav Ambardekar - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-43.details
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Reflective Naturalism.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 203 (13):1-21.details
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject.Spencer Paulson - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-18.details
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"I'm, Like, a Very Smart Person" On Self-Licensing and Perils of Reflection.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Bounded Reflectivism and Epistemic Identity.Nick Byrd - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (1):53-69.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Rethinking Thinking About Thinking: Against a Pedagogical Imperative to Cultivate Metacognitive Skills.Lauren R. Alpert - 2021 - Dissertation, City College of New York (Cuny)details
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The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency.David Jenkins - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (3):413-428.details
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Reasoning and its limits.David Jenkins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9479-9495.details
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A Defense of Modest Ideal Observer Theory: The Case of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):489-510.details
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Security, Local Community, and the Democratic Political Culture in Africa.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2021 - In Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso Adeshina Afolayan (ed.), Pathways to Alternative Epistemologies in Africa. Springer Verlag. pp. 111-122.details
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Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Putting Reasons in their Place.José Ángel Gascón - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (4):587-604.details
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The Epistemic Status of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3251-3270.details
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Why No True Reliabilist Should Endorse Reliabilism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey S. Dunn - 2020 - Episteme (1):1-18.details
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The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection.Andreas Stephens & Trond Arild Tjöstheim - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-24.details
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Hume's general point of view: A two‐stage approach.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):431-453.details
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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