Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science.Nora Hangel & Christopher ChoGlueck - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 98 (C):29-39.
    While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.
    Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Collective Practical Knowledge is a Fragmented Interrogative Capacity.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):180-199.
    What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge-how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to explain both the connection between individual and collective know-how and the possibility of a group knowing how to do something none of its members know, and be applicable to a suitably wide range (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1481-1500.
    Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Group Belief for a Reason.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22.
    In this paper I investigate what it is for a group to believe something for a reason. I defend a non-summative account on which a group can believe that p for a reason even though none of its members believe that p for that reason. By contrast, a summative account would hold that the reason for which a group believes that p is a function of the reason for which its members believe that p. I argue that the proposed non-summative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - 2022 - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
    A group is lying when it makes a statement that it believes to be untrue but wants the addressee(s) to believe. But how can we distinguish statements that the group believes to be untrue from honest group statements based on mistaken beliefs or confusion within the group? I will suggest anarrative constraintfor honest group statements, made up of two components.Narrative coherencerequires that a new group statement should not conflict with group knowledge on the matter, or beliefs of relevant operative subgroups, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):516-531.
    Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability (e.g., Kitcher 1990; Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks 2011; Dunn 2018). The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with optimizing collective reliability. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Kann ich rational und ein Außenseiter sein? Außenseitermeinungen in der Wissenschaft.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (1):71-93.
    The present paper addresses the question of whether outsiders in science can be rational. This question is addressed on three levels: the level of beliefs of outsiders, the level of decisions of out-siders, and the level of assertions of outsiders. It is argued that outsiders can indeed be rational but only within tightly constrained limits.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Duhem on Good Sense and Theory Pursuit: From Virtue to Social Epistemology.Jamie Shaw - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):67-85.
    ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosie between empirically equal rival theories : 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 : 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 : 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam. “Duhemian Good (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Towards a Critical Social Epistemology of Social Media.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    What are the proper epistemic aims of social media sites? A great deal of social media critique presupposes an exceptionalist attitude, according to which social media is either uniquely good, or uniquely bad for our collective knowledge-generating practices. Exceptionalism about social media is troublesome, both because it leads to oversimplistic narratives, and because it prevents us making relevant comparisons to other epistemic systems. The goal of this chapter is to offer an anti-exceptionalist account of the epistemic aims of social media. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know.Jakob Koscholke - 2020 - Episteme 20 (1):1-8.
    Jennifer Lackey has recently presented a new and lucid analysis of the notion ofjustified group belief, i.e. a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a group to justifiedly believe some proposition. In this paper, however, I argue that theanalysansshe proposes is too narrow: one of the conditions she takes to be necessary for justified group belief is not necessary. To substantiate this claim, I present a potential counterexample to Lackey's analysis where a group knows and thus justifiedly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.
    Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that belief on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • “Me” versus “We” in moral dilemmas: Group composition and social influence effects on group utilitarianism.Petru Lucian Curşeu, Oana C. Fodor, Anișoara A. Pavelea & Nicoleta Meslec - 2020 - Business Ethics 29 (4):810-823.
    The paper is one of the first empirical attempts that builds on the moral dilemmas and group rationality literature to explore the way in which group composition with respect to group members’ individual choices in moral dilemmas and social influence processes impact on group moral choices. First individually and then, in small groups, 221 participants were asked to decide on 10 moral dilemmas. Our results show that emergent group level utilitarianism is higher than the average individual utilitarianism, yet, lower than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Towards Collective Self-knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1153-1173.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Group understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6837-6858.
    While social epistemologists have recently begun addressing questions about whether groups can possess beliefs or knowledge, little has yet been said about whether groups can properly be said to possess understanding. Here I want to make some progress on this question by considering two possible accounts of group understanding, modeled on accounts of group belief and knowledge: a deflationary account, according to which a group understands just in case most or all of its members understand, and an inflationary account, according (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge.Chris Dragos - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6259-6279.
    I connect two increasingly popular ideas in social epistemology—group knowledge and epistemic extension—both departures from mainstream epistemological tradition. In doing so, I generate a framework for conceptualizing and organizing contemporary epistemology along several core axes. This, in turn, allows me to delineate a largely unexplored frontier in group epistemology. The bulk of extant work in group epistemology can be dubbed intra-group epistemology: the study of epistemically salient happenings within groups. I delineate and attempt to motivate what I dub inter-group epistemology: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
    One can know how to ride a bicycle, play the cello, or collect experimental data. But who can know how to properly ride a tandem bicycle, perform a symphony, or run a high-energy physics experiment? Reductionist analyses fail to account for these cases strictly in terms of the individual know-how involved. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow from non-reductionism that groups possess this know-how. One must first show that epistemic extension cannot obtain. This is the idea that individuals can possess knowledge even (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What's the Point of Authors?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Who should be the author(s) of an academic paper? This question is becoming increasingly pressing, due to the increasing prevalence and scale of scientific collaboration, and the corresponding diversity of authorship practices in different disciplines and subdisciplines. This paper addresses the conceptual issues underlying authorship, with an eye to ameliorating authorship practices. The first part of the paper distinguishes five roles played by authorship attributions: allocating credit, constructing a speaker, enabling credibility judgements, supporting accountability, and creating an intellectual marketplace. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Representation in Models of Epistemic Democracy.Patrick Grim, Aaron Bramson, Daniel J. Singer, William J. Berger, Jiin Jung & Scott E. Page - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):498-518.
    Epistemic justifications for democracy have been offered in terms of two different aspects of decision-making: voting and deliberation, or ‘votes’ and ‘talk.’ The Condorcet Jury Theorem is appealed to as a justification in terms votes, and the Hong-Page “Diversity Trumps Ability” result is appealed to as a justification in terms of deliberation. Both of these, however, are most plausibly construed as models of direct democracy, with full and direct participation across the population. In this paper, we explore how these results (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Epistemic approaches to deliberative democracy.John B. Min & James K. Wong - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12497.
    This article offers a comprehensive review of the major theoretical issues and findings of the epistemic approaches to deliberative democracy. Section 2 surveys the norms and ideals of deliberative democracy in relation to deliberation's ability to “track the truth.” Section 3 examines the conditions under which deliberative mini‐publics can “track the truth.” Section 4 discusses how “truth‐tracking” deliberative democracy is possible through the division of epistemic labor in a deliberative system.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4033-4058.
    The debate on the epistemology of disagreement has so far focused almost exclusively on cases of disagreement between individual persons. Yet, many social epistemologists agree that at least certain kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs that are open to epistemic evaluation. If so, we should expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of disagreement between group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. However, this raises a number of fundamental questions concerning what it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.
    Various social epistemologists employ what seem to be rather distinct notions of group rationality. In this essay, I offer an account of group rationality that is able to unify the dominant notions present in the literature under a single framework. I argue that if we employ a teleological account of epistemic rationality, and then allow that there are many different epistemic goals that are worth pursuing for various groups and individuals, we can then see how those seemingly divergent understandings of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Group Belief and Justification : Analyzing Collective knowledge.Bergström Jonathan - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Challenging the Majority Rule in Matters of Truth.Bernd Lahno - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):54-72.
    The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
    This essay raises new objections to the two dominant approaches to understanding the justification of group beliefs—_inflationary_ views, where groups are treated as entities that can float freely from the epistemic status of their members’ beliefs, and _deflationary_ views, where justified group belief is understood as nothing more than the aggregation of the justified beliefs of the group's members. If this essay is right, we need to look in an altogether different place for an adequate account of justified group belief. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation).Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.) - 2016 - Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka.
    Ovaj je zbornik nastao kao rezultat istraživanja provedenog unutar istoimenoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta na kojemu su urednici istovremeno bili i glavni istraživači, a ostali autori članovi istraživačke skupine. Kao svjedoci različitih vrsta otklona od prevladavajućeg, uobičajenoga, normalnoga, pozitivnog ili ponašanja koje se karakterizira kao asocijalno, zapitali smo se – što postojeće čini normom, treba li odstupanje od norme nužno smatrati devijacijom i kakvi su poželjni društveni odgovori na odstupanja od normi. Često se smatra ispravnim upravo ono što je prevladavajuće, a ono (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Freedom, recognition and non-domination: a republican theory of (global) justice.Fabian Schuppert (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Springer.
    This book offers an original account of a distinctly republican theory of social and global justice. The book starts by exploring the nature and value of Hegelian recognition theory. It shows the importance of that theory for grounding a normative account of free and autonomous agency. It is this normative account of free agency which provides the groundwork for a republican conception of social and global justice, based on the core-ideas of freedom as non-domination and autonomy as non-alienation. As the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Judgement Aggregation and Distributed Thinking.Kai Spiekermann - 2010 - AI and Society 25 (4):401-412.
    In recent years, judgement aggregation has emerged as an important area of social choice theory. Judgement aggregation is concerned with aggregating sets of individual judgements over logically connected propositions into a set of collective judgements. It has been shown that even seemingly weak conditions on the aggregation function make it impossible to find functions that produce rational collective judgements from all possible rational individual judgements. This implies that the step from individual judgements to collective judgements requires trade-offs between different desiderata, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Epistemology in Group Agency: Six objections in search of the truth. [REVIEW]Fabrizio Cariani - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):255-269.
    List and Pettit's Group Agency is an extremely important book, spearheading a new wave of work on the metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of group agents. In this article, I focus on the epistemological thread in their discussion. After introducing the apparatus they use in analyzing the epistemic performance of groups, I criticize some elements and point to some ways in which the very same apparatus could be redirected to address them.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Group agency and epistemic dependency.Aaron Dewitt - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):235-244.
    Modern epistemic questions have largely been focused around the individual and her ability to acquire knowledge autonomously. More recently epistemologists have begun to look more broadly in providing accounts of knowledge by considering its social context, where the individual depends on others for true beliefs. Hardwig explains the effect of this shift starkly, arguing that to reject epistemic dependency is to deny certain true beliefs widely held throughout society and, more specifically, it is to deny that science and scholarship can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Modelling the truth of scientific beliefs with cultural evolutionary theory.Krist Vaesen & Wybo Houkes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1).
    Evolutionary anthropologists and archaeologists have been considerably successful in modelling the cumulative evolution of culture, of technological skills and knowledge in particular. Recently, one of these models has been introduced in the philosophy of science by De Cruz and De Smedt (Philos Stud 157:411–429, 2012), in an attempt to demonstrate that scientists may collectively come to hold more truth-approximating beliefs, despite the cognitive biases which they individually are known to be subject to. Here we identify a major shortcoming in that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups.Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht - 2013 - Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
    In interdisciplinary research scientists have to share and integrate knowledge between people and across disciplinary boundaries. An important issue for philosophy of science is to understand how scientists who work in these kinds of environments exchange knowledge and develop new concepts and theories across diverging fields. There is a substantial literature within social epistemology that discusses the social aspects of scientific knowledge, but so far few attempts have been made to apply these resources to the analysis of interdisciplinary science. Further, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Recognition-primed group decisions via judgement aggregation.Marija Slavkovik & Guido Boella - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):51-65.
    We introduce a conceptual model for reaching group decisions. Our model extends a well-known, single-agent cognitive model, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model. The RPD model includes a recognition phase and an evaluation phase. Group extensions of the RPD model, applicable to a group of RPD agents, have been considered in the literature, however the proposed models do not formalize how distributed and possibly inconsistent information can be combined in either phase. We show how such information can be utilized by aggregating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique. [REVIEW]Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (3):241-258.
    An influential anti-democratic argument says: ‘(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only—the epistocrats—knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.’ Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • (1 other version)Epistemic Value.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press. pp. 270-287.
    Epistemology is normative. This normativity has been widely recognized for a long time, but it has recently come into direct focus as a central topic of discussion. The result is a recent and large turn towards focusing on epistemic value. I’ll start by describing some of the history and motivations of this recent value turn. Then I’ll categorize the work within the value turn into three strands, and I’ll discuss the main writings in those strands. Finally, I’ll explore some themes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Social Epistemology, Theory of Evidence, and Intelligent Design: Deciding What to Teach.Alvin Goldman - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):1-22.
    Social epistemology is the normative theory of socioepistemic practices. Teaching is a socioepistemic practice, so educational practices belong on the agenda of social epistemology. A current question is whether intelligent design should be taught in biology classes. This paper focuses on the argument from “fairness” or “equal time.” The principal aim of education is knowledge transmission, but evidence renders it doubtful that giving intelligent design equal time would promote knowledge transmission. In making curricular decisions, boards of education should consult the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Aggregation Theory and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others.Franz Dietrich - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 160:463-493.
    I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priority rule to an arbitrary priority order of the propositions, instead of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Two aggregation paradoxes in social decision making: the Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Episteme 2 (2):119-128.
    The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the case (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Decision framing in judgment aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):1-22.
    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility once the agent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • We Believe: Group Belief and the Liturgical use of Creeds.Joshua Cockayne - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3).
    The recitation of creeds in corporate worship is widespread in the Christian tradition. Intuitively, the use of creeds captures the belief not only of the individuals reciting it, but of the Church as a whole. This paper seeks to provide a philosophical analysis of the meaning of the words, ‘We believe…’, in the context of the liturgical recitation of the Creed. Drawing from recent work in group ontology, I explore three recent accounts of group belief and consider the potential of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Group motivation.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):494-510.
    In this paper I discuss a key issue for group moral responsibility, namely whether we can make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. The notion of acting for one reason rather than another is central to standard accounts of individual agency and responsibility; and also determines whether an individual is blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action. Thus if we model group responsibility on individual responsibility, we need to be able to make sense of a group (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vrijednosti u psihijatriji i pojam mentalne bolesti (Eng. Values in psychiatry and the concept of mental illness).Luca Malatesti & Marko Jurjako - 2016 - In Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka. pp. 153-181.
    The crucial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry is to determine under which conditions certain behaviors, mental states, and personality traits should be regarded as symptoms of mental illnesses. Participants in the debate can be placed on a continuum of positions. On the one side of the continuum, there are naturalists who maintain that the concept of mental illness can be explained by relying on the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences, such as biology and neuroscience. On the other side (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Deliberative Exchange, Truth, and Cognitive Division of Labour: A Low-Resolution Modeling Approach.Ulrich Krause & Rainer Hegselmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):130-144.
    This paper develops a formal framework to model a process in which the formation of individual opinions is embedded in a deliberative exchange with others. The paper opts for a low-resolution modeling approach and abstracts away from most of the details of the social-epistemic process. Taking a bird's eye view allows us to analyze the chances for the truth to be found and broadly accepted under conditions of cognitive division of labour combined with a social exchange process. Cognitive division of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Rational Justification and Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):57-96.
    This paper explicates and argues for the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains – i.e. in empirical knowledge or in morals (both ethics and justice) – is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although these social and historical aspects of rational justification are consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. The central thesis is that, to judge fully rationally that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (1 other version)Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
    Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • (1 other version)Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know.Jakob Koscholke - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):15-22.
    Jennifer Lackey has recently presented a new and lucid analysis of the notion ofjustified group belief, i.e. a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a group to justifiedly believe some proposition. In this paper, however, I argue that theanalysansshe proposes is too narrow: one of the conditions she takes to be necessary for justified group belief is not necessary. To substantiate this claim, I present a potential counterexample to Lackey's analysis where a group knows and thus justifiedly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.
    This paper disputes the widespread assumption that beliefs and desires may be attributed as theoretical entities in the service of the explanation and predic- tion of human behavior. The literature contains no clear account of how beliefs and desires might generate actions, and there is good reason to deny that principles of rationality generate a choice on the basis of an agent’s beliefs and desires. An alter- native conception of beliefs and desires is here introduced, according to which an attribution (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Strong epistemic anti-individualism—i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social—is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge—such as juries and committees—operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Group knowledge: a real-world approach.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):813-839.
    In spite of the booming interest in social epistemology, explicit analyses of group knowledge remain rare. Most existing accounts are based on theories of joint intentionality. I argue that this approach, though not without merit or useful applications, is inadequate both when it comes to accounting for actual group knowledge attributions and for purposes of meliorative social epistemology. As an alternative, I outline a liberal, de-intellectualized account, which allows for the complex distribution of epistemic states typical of most real-world collectives, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations