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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Uncommon priors require origin disputes.Robin Hanson - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (4):319-328.details
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Dealing with logical omniscience: Expressiveness and pragmatics.Joseph Y. Halpern & Riccardo Pucella - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (1):220-235.details
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Could KK Be OK?Daniel Greco - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (4):169-197.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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What We Together Do.Derek Parfit - manuscriptdetails
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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.details
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How we can agree to disagree.John Collins - unknowndetails
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