- Superconditioning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):811-833.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Systematicity and Skepticism.Aaron Segal - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1):1-18.details
|
|
Rationalist Resistance to Disagreement-Motivated Religious Skepticism.John Pittard - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 180-216.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
|
|
Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
|
|
Evidence and truth.Roger White - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1049-1057.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
Stalnaker on sleeping beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.details
|
|
For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
|
|
Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle.Brett Topey - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):478-488.details
|
|
Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.Jack Spencer - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):511-539.details
|
|
X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.details
|
|
Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?Kieran Setiya - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):205-222.details
|
|
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
|
|
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
|
|
Reversibility or Disagreement.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):43-84.details
|
|
Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
|
|
Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books.Michael Rescorla - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):511-538.details
|
|
On the proper formulation of conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):1935-1965.details
|
|
A dutch book theorem and converse dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):705-735.details
|
|
A Dutch Book Theorem and Converse Dutch Book Theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - unknowndetails
|
|
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
|
|
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism.John Pittard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5009-5038.details
|
|
On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.details
|
|
Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false.Richard Pettigrew - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):309-324.details
|
|
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
|
|
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
|
|
Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
|
|
Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):657-676.details
|
|
XIII—Dutch Book and Accuracy Theorems.Anna Mahtani - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):309-327.details
|
|
Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.details
|
|
Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments.Anna Mahtani - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.details
|
|
Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.details
|
|
Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.details
|
|
A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
|
|
People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details
|
|
Radically Insensitive Theists.Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):169-188.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
In Defense of Reflection.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):413-433.details
|
|
Generalized Learning and Conditional Expectation.Simon M. Huttegger & Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):868-883.details
|
|
Reflecting on finite additivity.Leendert Huisman - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1785-1797.details
|
|
Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.details
|
|