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Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
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Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.details
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Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):613-637.details
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Local and global deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2753-2770.details
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Epistemic isomorphism.Sayid R. Bnefsi - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (4):543-554.details
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Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books.Michael Rescorla - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):511-538.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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The Value of Normative Information.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
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Changes in attitude.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169.details
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On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.details
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Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):435-460.details
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Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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XIII—Dutch Book and Accuracy Theorems.Anna Mahtani - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):309-327.details
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The problem of perception and the no-miracles principle.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11065-11080.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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Bayesian Recalibration: A Generalization.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscriptdetails
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Sleeping Beauty's evidence.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
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Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):657-676.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?Ryan Doody - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173.details
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On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.details
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Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):511-534.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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Deference and description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.details
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Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.details
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A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-probabilist.Leszek Wronski - manuscriptdetails
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For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details
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Reflecting on finite additivity.Leendert Huisman - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1785-1797.details
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Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-78.details
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X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.details
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Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2014 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.details
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Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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