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  1. Freedom evolves.Daniel Clement Dennett - 2003 - New York: Viking Press.
    Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems (...)
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  • An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
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  • The unhelpfulness of determinism. [REVIEW]Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.
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  • Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible (...)
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  • On the possibility of rational free action.Randolph Clarke - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.
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  • The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.
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  • Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...)
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  • The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism.Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-155.
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  • The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.
    The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation that (...)
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  • Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2010 - MIT Press, Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
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  • Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific (...)
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  • Libertarianism.Robert Kane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):35-44.
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  • Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent (...)
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  • The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Robert Kane provides a critical overview of debates about free will of the past half century, relating this recent inquiry to the broader history of the free will issue and to vital currents of twentieth century thought. Kane also defends a traditional libertarian or incompatibilist view of free will, employing arguments that are both new to philosophy and that respond to contemporary developments in physics and biology, neuro science, and the cognitive and behavioral sciences.
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  • Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
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  • Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency.Randolph Clarke - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 356--385.
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  • Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
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  • Review of Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will[REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (11):581-584.
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  • Libertarianism.Robert Kane - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 35 - 44.
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  • Hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
    I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing (...)
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  • Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
    My primary objective is to motivate the concern that leading libertarian views of free action seem unable to account for an agent’s behavior in a way that reveals an explanatorily apt connection between the agent’s prior reasons and the intentional behavior to be explained. I argue that it is this lack of a suitable reasons explanation of purportedly free decisions that underpins the objection that agents who act with the pertinent sort of libertarian freedom cannot be morally responsible for what (...)
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  • Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.<sup>1</sup> That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of (...)
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  • A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will.John Lemos - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility and just desert is libertarian free will. It is a source of great controversy whether such a libertarian view is coherent and whether we should believe that we have such free will. This book explains and defends Robert Kane¿s conception of libertarian free will while departing from it in certain key respects. It is argued that a suitably modified Kanean model of free (...)
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  • Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.
    Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
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  • Response to Kane, Fischer, and Vargas.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth.Robert Kane - 2001 - In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele.Robert Kane - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121.
    This paper responds to three critical essays on my book, The Significance of Free Will(Oxford, 1996) by Randolph Clarke, Istiyaque Haji and Alfred Mele (which essays appear in this issue and an earlier issue of this journal). This response first explains crucial features of the theory of free will of the book, including the notion of ultimate responsibility.The paper then answers objections of Haji and Mele that the occurrence of undetermined choices would be matters of luck or chance, and so (...)
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  • Introduction: The contours of contemporary free will debates.Robert H. Kane - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Kane - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
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  • Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
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  • Four Views on Free Will.John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane & Derk Pereboom Y. Manuel Vargas - 2007 - Critica 39 (117):96-109.
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  • Living Without Free Will by Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW]Carl Ginet - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):305-309.
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  • A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will.John Lemos - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):231-246.
    : This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can (...)
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  • An essay on free will.Peter van Inwagen & A. Phillips Griffiths - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):557-558.
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  • Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
    Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up (...)
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  • Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas.Robert Kane - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
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