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  1. Keep ‘hoping’ for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox.Alexandru Baltag, Sonja Smets & Jonathan Alexander Zvesper - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):301-333.
    We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements, dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we "simulate" the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as (...)
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  • Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):133.
    Deliberation about what to do in any context requires reasoning about what will or would happen in various alternative situations, including situations that the agent knows will never in fact be realized. In contexts that involve two or more agents who have to take account of each others' deliberation, the counterfactual reasoning may become quite complex. When I deliberate, I have to consider not only what the causal effects would be of alternative choices that I might make, but also what (...)
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  • Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling.Moisés Goldszmidt & Judea Pearl - 1996 - Artificial Intelligence 84 (1-2):57-112.
    This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering on rules (...)
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  • (1 other version)Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States.Wolfgang Spohn - 1988 - In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one step (...)
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  • Reasoning about knowledge.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Vardi - 2003 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Reasoning About Knowledge is the first book to provide a general discussion of approaches to reasoning about knowledge and its applications to distributed ...
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  • Stability, strength and sensitivity: Converting belief into knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
    In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
    The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.
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  • A proposed definition of propositional knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
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  • (1 other version)On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
    This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, of one of (...)
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  • Dynamic Logic.Lenore D. Zuck & David Harel - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1480.
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  • On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):169-199.
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  • Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
    We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...)
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  • Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
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  • Dynamic Logic.David Harel, Dexter Kozen & Jerzy Tiuryn - 2000 - MIT Press.
    This book provides the first comprehensive introduction to Dynamic Logic. Among the many approaches to formal reasoning about programs, Dynamic Logic enjoys the singular advantage of being strongly related to classical logic. Its variants constitute natural generalizations and extensions of classical formalisms. For example, Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) can be described as a blend of three complementary classical ingredients: propositional calculus, modal logic, and the algebra of regular events. In First-Order Dynamic Logic (DL), the propositional calculus is replaced by classical (...)
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  • (1 other version)Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision.Hans P. Van Ditmarsch - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
    In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with (...)
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  • Logics for epistemic programs.Alexandru Baltag & Lawrence S. Moss - 2004 - Synthese 139 (2):165 - 224.
    We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of (...)
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  • Logics of Communication and Change. van Benthem, Johan, van Eijck, Jan & Kooi, Barteld - unknown
    Current dynamic epistemic logics for analyzing effects of informational events often become cumbersome and opaque when common knowledge is added for groups of agents. Still, postconditions involving common knowledge are essential to successful multi-agent communication. We propose new systems that extend the epistemic base language with a new notion of ‘relativized common knowledge’, in such a way that the resulting full dynamic logic of information flow allows for a compositional analysis of all epistemic postconditions via perspicuous ‘reduction axioms’. We also (...)
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  • (1 other version)Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Hans P. Van Ditmarsch - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):229-275.
    In ‘belief revision’ a theory\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. Typically, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document}, one has to give up belief in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} by a process (...)
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  • A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.), Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory. Amsterdam University Press.
    We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The second axiom says that a player is irrational if (...)
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  • Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1):31 - 56.
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  • On the evaluation of solution concepts.Robert Stalnaker - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):49-73.
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  • Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning (...)
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