- The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Reid on single and double vision: Mechanics and morals.James van Cleve - 2008 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):1-20.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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Moore's refutation of idealism.C. J. Ducasse - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co.. pp. 225-251.details
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Thomas Reid: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition.Derek R. Brookes (ed.) - 1997 - University Park, Pa.: Edinburgh University Press.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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(2 other versions)Why there isn't a ready-made world.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.details
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(2 other versions)Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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On not seeing double.David C. Blumenfeld - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (July):264-266.details
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(1 other version)Visual qualia and visual content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.details
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Representation and explanation.David Papineau - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.details
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Between instrumentalism and brain-writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
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Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism.Michael Tye - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Layered perceptual representation.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.details
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(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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Truth and Content in Sensory Experience.Angela Mendelovici - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 318–338.details
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Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects).Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer.details
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(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.details
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Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.details
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Reply to Philip Woodward’s Review of The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1261-1267.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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(2 other versions)Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds.Mark Johnston - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233-268.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation.Walter Ott - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.details
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Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation.Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):57-92.details
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(1 other version)In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of mind: the key thinkers. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 209-235.details
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Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
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Do Things Look Flat?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):589-599.details
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Experience as representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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(1 other version)Text-book of Psychology. Titchener - 1910 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 69:95-96.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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