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  1. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - Hutchinson.
    This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.
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  • Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - Harper Torchbooks.
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  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.
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  • On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
    This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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  • Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
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  • Reasons and Knowledge.David Shatz - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (9):542-554.
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  • Reasons and Knowledge.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1983 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1):139-142.
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  • Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.
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  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Harvard University Press.
    In this book Saul Kripke brings his powerful philosophical intelligence to bear on Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of following a rule.
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  • On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
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  • Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
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  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Brian Loar - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):273-280.
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  • On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Daniel M. Mittag - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):543 - 559.
    Korcz argues that deontological considerations support this view. According to him, our practice of praising and blaming people for the epistemic appropriateness of their beliefs provides us with good reason to think that meta-beliefs can establish basing relations independently of any causal relation. Korcz writes.
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  • The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, (...)
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  • The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):525-550.
    The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, (...)
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  • Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
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  • How to Be an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
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  • The Epistemic Regress Problem.Andrew D. Cling - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.
    The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconceptualized sensations, contextually immunized propositions, endless regresses, and holistic coherence all require either additional reasons or an external condition on support that is arbitrary (...)
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  • The Trouble with Infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.
    One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is (...)
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  • Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
    What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.
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  • Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are tweaked. Then, (...)
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  • Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning". After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  • When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718-729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
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  • Reasons and Knowledge.Marshall Swain - 1981 - Cornell University Press.
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  • Reasons and Knowledge.Marshall Swain - 1981 - Philosophy 57 (222):560-562.
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  • Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
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  • When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
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  • Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Peter Klein & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his account of inferential justification.
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  • An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem.Rosalind S. Simson - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):179-208.
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  • Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.
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  • On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright & Denis Paul - 1972 - Mind 81 (323):453-457.
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  • Internalism Defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
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  • Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):297-325.
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  • Epistemic perspectivism.Frederick Schmitt - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Blackwell. pp. 180--206.
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  • Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
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  • Infinitism is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 140--149.
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  • Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  • Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress Problem.Carl Ginet - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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