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  1. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  • (2 other versions)Proof of an external world.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
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  • Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Nozick analyzes fundamental issues, such as the identity of the self, knowledge and skepticism, free will, the foundations of ethics, and the meaning of life.
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  • Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
    In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is (...)
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  • Unnatural doubts: epistemological realism and the basis of scepticism.Michael Williams - 1991 - Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.
    In Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived.
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  • On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
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  • (1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.
    What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouement of our reflections, finally, will be to (...)
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  • Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:57-89.
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  • (1 other version)Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
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  • (3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
    David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, "modal realism." He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers.
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
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  • (1 other version)Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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  • How to be a fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
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  • The structure of the skeptical argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.
    Much has been written about epistemological skepticism in the last ten or so years, but there remain some unanswered questions concerning the structure of what has become the canonical Cartesian skeptical argument. In this paper, I would like to take a closer look at this structure in order to determine just which epistemic principles are required by the argument.
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  • A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification.David B. Annis - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
    David Annis is professor of philosophy at Ball State University. In this essay, Annis offers an alternative to the foundationalist-coherent controversy: "contextualism." This theory rejects both the idea of intrinsically basic beliefs in the foundational sense and the thesis that coherence is sufficient for justification. he argues that justification is relative to the varying norms of social practices.
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  • (1 other version)Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
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  • Philosophical relativity.Peter K. Unger - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an (...)
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  • The Cone Model of Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):125-178.
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  • (1 other version)A defense of skepticism.Peter Unger - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (2):198-219.
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  • Knowledge and context.Stewart Cohen - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (10):574-583.
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  • Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery.Stewart Cohen - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306.
    (1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411.
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  • Meta-Epistemological Constraints on Anti-Sceptical Theories.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Facta Philosophica 3 (1):101-26.
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  • Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193-197.
    In “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” I argue that advocates of the “Relevant Alternatives” theory of knowledge fall into certain mistakes result if they tie the content of a knowledge attribution, on a given occasion of use, too tightly to what the range of relevant alternatives is on that occasion, and I sketch an alternative approach to the issues involved that avoids such mistakes. In “The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions,” Anthony Brueckner charges that my own account of these matters falls (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is Contextualism Statable?Michael J. Williams - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):80-85.
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  • Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
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  • Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument.Stewart Cohen - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.
    This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...)
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  • The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):123-126.
    In "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," Keith DeRose defends a contextualist theory of knowledge.' He claims that his theory is superior to some earlier "relevant alternatives" theories in respect of its proper handling of issues concerning the meaning of knowledge attributions. I think that some of DeRose's key claims on this score are mistaken.
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  • Skepticism and Contextualism.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.
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  • (1 other version)Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure.G. C. Stine - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
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  • The epistemic efficacy of stupidity.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):297 - 311.
    I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, (...)
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  • Scepticism and dreaming.Duncan Pritchard - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):373-390.
    In a recent, and influential, article, Crispin Wright maintains that a familiar form of scepticismwhich finds its core expression in Descartes’ dreaming argumentcan be defused (or, to use Wright’s own parlance, “imploded”), by showing how it employs self-defeating reasoning. I offer two fundamental reasons for rejecting Wright’s ‘implosion’ of scepticism. On the one hand, I argue that, even by Wright’s own lights, it is unclear whether there is a sceptical argument to implode in the first place. On the other, I (...)
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  • Relevant alternatives and closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
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  • (1 other version)Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for Another.Robert J. Fogelin - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):43-57.
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  • (1 other version)Contextualism and skepticism.Richard Feldman - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:91-114.
    In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain argued that our reasons for believing propositions in that domain were not good enough to give us knowledge; opponents of skepticism argued that they were. The different conclusions drawn by skeptics and non-skeptics could come either from differences in their views about the standards or conditions (...)
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  • Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding The Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205.
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  • Contextualism and Skepticism.Stewart Cohen - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):94-107.
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  • Skepticism.Hilary Putnam - 1998 - In Marcelo Stamm (ed.), Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht. pp. 239--68.
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  • Dretske and His Critics.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  • The pragmatic dimension of knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
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  • McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - Synthese 130 (2):279-302.
    A great deal of discussion in the recent literature has been devoted to the so-called 'McKinsey' paradox which purports to show that semantic externalism is incompatible with the sort of authoritative knowledge that we take ourselves to have of our own thought contents. In this paper I examine one influential epistemological response to this paradox which is due to Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. I argue that it fails to meet the challenge posed by McKinsey but that, if it is (...)
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  • Epistemological contextualism: Its past, present, and prospects.Andrew P. Norman - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):383-418.
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  • (1 other version)Closure and context.Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):275 – 280.
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  • XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):317-334.
    Stephen Schiffer; XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 96, Issue 1, 1 June 1996, Pages 317–334, https://.
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  • (1 other version)The proper role for contextualism in an anti-luck epistemology.Mark Heller - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:115-129.
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  • Resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
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  • Truth & use.Hans Seigfried - 2001 - Synthese 128 (1-2):1 - 13.
    I show why the standard textbook argument against thepragmatist reconstruction of truth should be dismissedas a fallacy. It only works if one inadvertentlysubstitutes for the pragmatist concept of knowledge anunreconstructed one that predates the experimentalrevolution in philosophy (likened to the Copernicanrevolution in astronomy) started by Kant and completedby Dewey. I argue (as did Dewey against Russell) thatthe concept of propositions as mental reconstructionsof what is the case converts a function in inquiryinto an independent structure, which is anotherfallacy.
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  • Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):87-116.
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  • Skepticism, relevance, and relativity.Stewart Cohen - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 17--37.
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  • Understanding Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - SATS 1 (2):107-123.
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  • (1 other version)Is Contextualism Statable?Michael J. Williams - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):80-85.
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