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  1. How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
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  • (1 other version)On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
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  • (2 other versions)Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.
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  • (2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):787-791.
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  • (1 other version)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the (...)
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  • (1 other version)On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.
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  • (1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.
    the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..
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  • Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
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  • Vague representation.Agustín Rayo - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):329-373.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of content for vague language. My proposal is based on the following three theses: (1) language-mastery is not rulebased— it involves a certain kind of decision-making; (2) a theory of content is to be thought of instrumentally—it is a tool for making sense of our linguistic practice; and (3) linguistic contents are only locally defined—they are only defined relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  • (1 other version)Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.
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  • (1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
    the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..
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  • (1 other version)Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
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