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A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1253-1261.details
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Roger white’s argument against imprecise credences.Dylan Dodd - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.details
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The Concept of Testimony.Nicola Mößner - 2007 - In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 207-209.details
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Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2022 - Episteme 20 (3):647-666.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.details
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Suspending judgment the correct way.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2001-2023.details
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Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 107-130.details
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The dispositional account of credence.Anna Mahtani - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):727-745.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions.Agustín Rayo - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (16):473-495.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Unsharp Best System Chances.Luke Fenton-Glynn - unknowndetails
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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Committed Neutrality in the Rational Mind.Jane Friedman - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):754-765.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.details
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The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement.Lee Elkin - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2717-2726.details
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