- Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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Evidence and the openness of knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.details
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Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):395-416.details
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The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
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Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
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Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3):281-301.details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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(2 other versions)Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?Susanna Siegel - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 240.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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Stake-invariant belief.Brad Armendt - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.details
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Aristotelian indeterminacy and the open future.Robert Williams - manuscriptdetails
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Language use in a branching universe.David Wallace - unknowndetails
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Propositional justification, evidence, and the cost of error.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.details
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Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði [English title: "From Belief to Credence and Back Again: An Overview of Bayesian Epistemology"].Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hugur 28:146-162.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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On an Epistemic Cornerstone of Skeptical Theism: in Defense of CORNEA.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):533-555.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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Fragmentation and logical omniscience.Adam Elga & Agustín Rayo - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):716-741.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Distention for Sets of Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):604-620.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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The Case for Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):414-453.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Two Forms of Inconsistency in Quantum Foundations.Jer Steeger & Nicholas Teh - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1083-1110.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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