- On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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(1 other version)The Extent of Dilation of Sets of Probabilities and the Asymptotics of Robust Bayesian Inference.Timothy Herron, Teddy Seidenfeld & Larry Wasserman - 1994 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (1):250-259.details
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Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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Unspecific Evidence and Normative Theories of Decision.Rhys Borchert - forthcoming - Episteme:1-23.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Pascal’s Wager and Decision-making with Imprecise Probabilities.André Neiva - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (3):1479-1508.details
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Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):613-637.details
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Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.details
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Learning by Ignoring the Most Wrong.Seamus Bradley - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):9-31.details
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Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Consequences of Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):70-98.details
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Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction.Leah Henderson - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):513-529.details
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Un problème interne à la Théorie de la justice : comment concilier les différents arguments de Rawls pour le principe de différence?Philippe Mongin - 2020 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 135 (4):29-41.details
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Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (16):473-495.details
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Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus.Leah Henderson - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (3):359-382.details
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Reliabilism and imprecise credences.Weng Hong Tang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1463-1480.details
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Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
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No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 107-130.details
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The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):617-634.details
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Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.details
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Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
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Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
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Impossible worlds and partial belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.details
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The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Ordering and Independence.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):298-308.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Coherent choice functions under uncertainty.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):157-176.details
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Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision.Richard Bradley, Casey Helgeson & Brian Hill - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):500–522.details
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Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
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Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.details
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Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.details
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Choosing and Describing: Sen and the Irrelevance of Independence Alternatives. [REVIEW]Michael Neumann - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (1):79-94.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Types of Uncertainty.Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1225-1248.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Chance without Credence.John T. Roberts - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):33-59.details
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