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Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.details
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Hedonism Reconsidered.Roger Crisp - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619-645.details
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On the currency of egalitarian justice.G. A. Cohen - 1989 - Ethics 99 (4):906-944.details
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Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.details
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Conservatism in epistemology.David Christensen - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):69-89.details
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Normative Uncertainty without Theories.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):747-762.details
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Moral uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.details
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Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):794-799.details
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No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.Krister Bykvist - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):1-30.details
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Expressivism and moral certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):202-215.details
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Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.details
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Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Fairness.John Broome - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:87 - 101.details
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Quasi-realism and normative certitude.Stina Björkholm, Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7861-7869.details
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Defending transitivity against zeno’s paradox.Ken Binmore & Alex Voorhoeve - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):272–279.details
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Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.details
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On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.Nicholas Beckstead - unknowndetails
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Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.details
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Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets.Christian Barry & Patrick Tomlin - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):1-26.details
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Moral Uncertainty and the Criminal Law.Christian Barry & Patrick Tomlin - 2019 - In Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law. Springer Verlag. pp. 445-467.details
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One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary.Ron Aboodi - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):223-237.details
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Moral Uncertainty and the Principle of Equity among Moral Theories1.Andrew Sepielli - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):580-589.details
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Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The virtues of epistemic conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):185–200.details
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Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison.Amelia Hicks - 2018 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 13. pp. 161-183.details
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The Fragmentation of Value.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Is Biodiversity Intrinsically Valuable? (And What Might That Mean?).Katie McShane - 2017 - In Justin Garson, Anya Plutynski & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Biodiversity. New York: Routledge. pp. 155-167.details
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In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.details
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Die Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung: Eine Logische Untersuchung.Johannes von Kries - 1886 - Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr: Freiburg.details
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Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics. II.Edwin T. Jaynes - 1957 - Physical Review 108 (2):171.details
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Moral Uncertainty About Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves & Toby Ord - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):135-167.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.details
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Moral Uncertainty.William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord - 2020 - Oxford University Press.details
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Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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Monkeys, typewriters, and objective consequentialism.Eric Wiland - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):352–360.details
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Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality.Tim Willenken - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):545-561.details
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Expected utility and risk.Paul Weirich - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):419-442.details
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Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.details
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Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity.Alex Voorhoeve - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425.details
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