- The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
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The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.details
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Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):488-512.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness.Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.details
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Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.Masashi Kasaki - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98.details
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Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and epistemic agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.details
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Practical Certainty.Dustin Locke - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.details
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Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.details
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God knows (but does God believe?).Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):83-107.details
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Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):1-20.details
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Fencing out pragmatic encroachment1.Richard Fumerton - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):243-253.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.details
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Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):447-455.details
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(1 other version)Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.details
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The Case Against Purity. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):456-464.details
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Anti-intellectualism and the knowledge-action principle. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180–187.details
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Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
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(1 other version)Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Matthew Mcgrath Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.details
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