- On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.details
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Evidential support and its presuppositions.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Hinge Epistemology and Religious Belief.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Replies to Fitelson and Konek.Julia Staffel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3155-3167.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Probability of Guilt.Mario Günther - manuscriptdetails
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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When statistical evidence is not specific enough.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12251-12269.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Suspending judgment the correct way.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2001-2023.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Statistics and suspension.Wolfgang Freitag & Alexandra Zinke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2877-2880.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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Against zetetic encroachment.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-23.details
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Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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Reasoning Without the Conjunction Closure.Alicja Kowalewska - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):50-63.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?Marc Lange - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Bilateralism and Probabilism.Mariela Rubin - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):5-29.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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