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Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Knowledge and the state of nature: an essay in conceptual synthesis.Edward Craig - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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Wondering about what you know.Avery Archer - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):anx162.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Pragmatic competence: The case of hedging.Bruce Fraser - 2010 - In Gunther Kaltenböck, Wiltrud Mihatsch & Stefan Schneider (eds.), New approaches to hedging. Bingley, UK: Emerald. pp. 15--34.details
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One Kind of Asking.Dennis Whitcomb - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266).details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3):227-32.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Question‐directed attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The semantics of evidentials.Sarah E. Murray - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
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Self-Knowledge and Resentment.Akeel Bilgrami - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Cynthia Macdonald & Barry C. Smith (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.details
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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.details
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Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 471–490.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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A scalar implicature-based approach to neg-raising.Jacopo Romoli - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (4):291-353.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.details
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I—Alan Millar: Why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.details
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I—why Knowledge Matters.Alan Millar - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.details
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Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.details
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What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.details
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The C account of assertion: a negative result.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):125-137.details
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Inquiry, knowledge and understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1583-1593.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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The Presidential Address: Questions of Context.Christopher Hookway - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):1 - 16.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Neg-raising and polarity.Jon Robert Gajewski - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):289-328.details
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Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
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Checking again.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):84-96.details
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Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Edward Craig - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Reliability in Pragmatics.Eric McCready - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig.Klemens Kappel - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion, norms, and games.Ishani Maitra - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 277--296.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.details
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