- Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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(1 other version)The science of belief: A progress report.Nicolas Porot & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science 1.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Faultless and Genuine Disagreement over Vague Predicates.Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2021 - Theoria 87 (1):152-166.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
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Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.details
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Embedded Attitudes.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Confidence Reports.Fabrizio Cariani, Paolo Santorio & Alexis Wellwood - manuscriptdetails
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Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.details
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Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):51-61.details
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Ignorance Implicatures and Non-doxastic Attitude Verbs.Kyle H. Blumberg - 2017 - Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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At the threshold of knowledge.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):449-460.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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Interrogating the Linguistic Argument for KK.Cal Fawell - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Morality Does Not Encroach.Zachary Goodsell & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen. Routledge.details
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Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge: A Human Interest Story.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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A Puzzle about Weak Belief.Joshua Edward Pearson - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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'Belief' and Belief.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Fictional Reality.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - manuscriptdetails
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On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.details
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Hip to Be Square: Moral Saints Revisited.Liam D. Ryan - 2023 - Ethics, Politics and Society 6 (2):1-25.details
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Kierkegaard on belief and credence.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):394-412.details
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The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing.Wesley Buckwalter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Symbolic belief in social cognition.Evan Westra - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):388-408.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Memory belief is weak.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):204-214.details
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Good guesses as accuracy-specificity tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2025-2050.details
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What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs.Henry Ian Schiller - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1141-1161.details
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Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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