- What Is Wrong With Agnostic Belief?Yuval Avnur - 2020 - In Agnosticism: Explorations in Philosophy and Religious Thought. pp. Ch 2.details
|
|
Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
|
|
Probabilistic semantics for epistemic modals: Normality assumptions, conditional epistemic spaces and the strength of must and might.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (4):985-1026.details
|
|
Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
|
|
Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
|
|
The restrictor view, without covert modals.Ivano Ciardelli - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (2):293-320.details
|
|
Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.details
|
|
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
|
|
Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
|
|
The Belief Norm of Academic Publishing.Wesley Buckwalter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
Embedded Attitudes.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406.details
|
|
Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
|
|
Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. [REVIEW]Bob Beddor - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):394-398.details
|
|
Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.details
|
|
Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
|
|
Unicorn agnosticism.Yuval Avnur - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):818-829.details
|
|
Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.details
|
|
The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
|
|
On Believing and Being Convinced.Paul Silva Jr - unknown - Cambridge University Press | Under Contract.details
|
|
Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
|
|
Valuable Ignorance: Delayed Epistemic Gratification.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):363–84.details
|
|
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
|
|
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
|
|
Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).details
|
|
Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
|
|
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
|
|
What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
|
|
Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
|
|
The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
|
|
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
|
|
Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
|
|
Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
|
|
P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
|
|
Symbolic belief in social cognition.Evan Westra - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):388-408.details
|
|
In the Space of Reasonable Doubt.Marion Vorms & Ulrike Hahn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3609-3633.details
|
|
Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
|
|
Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
|
|
The existential/uniqueness presupposition of wh-complements projects from the answers.Wataru Uegaki - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (4):911-951.details
|
|
Strengthened, and weakened, by belief.Tue Trinh - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47 (1):37-76.details
|
|
Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):51-61.details
|
|
The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs.Corina Strössner - 2019 - Theoria 85 (6):435-458.details
|
|
Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
|
|
Good guesses as accuracy-specificity tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2025-2050.details
|
|
What’s your Opinion? Negation and ‘Weak’ Attitude Verbs.Henry Ian Schiller - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1141-1161.details
|
|
Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
|
|
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
|
|