Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Nothing matters too much, or Wright is wrong.Robert Black - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):229-237.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • On Logical Relativity.Achille C. Varzi - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):197-219.
    One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and settle (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The Nuisance Principle in Infinite Settings.Sean C. Ebels-Duggan - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):263-268.
    Neo-Fregeans have been troubled by the Nuisance Principle, an abstraction principle that is consistent but not jointly satisfiable with the favored abstraction principle HP. We show that logically this situation persists if one looks at joint consistency rather than satisfiability: under a modest assumption about infinite concepts, NP is also inconsistent with HP.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Pluralism in Mathematics: A New Position in Philosophy of Mathematics.Michèle Friend - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    The pluralist sheds the more traditional ideas of truth and ontology. This is dangerous, because it threatens instability of the theory. To lend stability to his philosophy, the pluralist trades truth and ontology for rigour and other ‘fixtures’. Fixtures are the steady goal posts. They are the parts of a theory that stay fixed across a pair of theories, and allow us to make translations and comparisons. They can ultimately be moved, but we tend to keep them fixed temporarily. Apart (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Construction of Logical Space.Agustín Rayo - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. Agustn Rayo argues that this is shaped by acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: e.g. 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O'. He offers a novel conception of metaphysical possibility, and a new trivialist philosophy of mathematics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  • Conservativeness, Stability, and Abstraction.Roy T. Cook - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):673-696.
    One of the main problems plaguing neo-logicism is the Bad Company challenge: the need for a well-motivated account of which abstraction principles provide legitimate definitions of mathematical concepts. In this article a solution to the Bad Company challenge is provided, based on the idea that definitions ought to be conservative. Although the standard formulation of conservativeness is not sufficient for acceptability, since there are conservative but pairwise incompatible abstraction principles, a stronger conservativeness condition is sufficient: that the class of acceptable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Existence (and Non-existence) of Abstract Objects.Richard Heck - 2011 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Frege's theorem. New York: Clarendon Press.
    This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • (4 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1402 citations  
  • The reason's proper study: essays towards a neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 2001 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Crispin Wright.
    Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   273 citations  
  • New V, ZF and Abstraction.Stewart Shapiro & Alan Weir - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):293-321.
    We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   474 citations  
  • Bad company tamed.Øystein Linnebo - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):371 - 391.
    The neo-Fregean project of basing mathematics on abstraction principles faces “the bad company problem,” namely that a great variety of unacceptable abstraction principles are mixed in among the acceptable ones. In this paper I propose a new solution to the problem, based on the idea that individuation must take the form of a well-founded process. A surprising aspect of this solution is that every form of abstraction on concepts is permissible and that paradox is instead avoided by restricting what concepts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Abstraction and identity.Roy T. Cook & Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):121–139.
    A co-authored article with Roy T. Cook forthcoming in a special edition on the Caesar Problem of the journal Dialectica. We argue against the appeal to equivalence classes in resolving the Caesar Problem.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   590 citations  
  • Non-uniqueness as a non-problem.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  • Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University. pp. 325-346.
    Understandably absorbed in technical details, discussion of the semantic paradoxes risks losing sight of broad methodological principles. This chapter sketches a general approach to the comparison of rival logics, and applies it to argue that revision of classical propositional logic has much higher costs than its proponents typically recognize.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
    This volume consists of the first of the John Dewey Lectures delivered under the auspices of Columbia University's Philosophy Department as well as other essays by the author. Intended to clarify the meaning of the philosophical doctrines propounded by Professor Quine in 'Word and Objects', the essays included herein both support and expand those doctrines.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   744 citations  
  • (1 other version)Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):186.
    Introduction to this special issue of The Australasian Journal of Logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Full-blooded anti-exceptionalism about logic.Newton Da Costa & Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):362-380.
    Problems of logical theory choice are current being widely dis- cussed in the context of anti-exceptionalist views on logic. According to those views, logic is not a special science among others, so, in particular, the methodology for theory choice should be the same in logic as for other scientific disciplines. Richard Routley advanced one such methodology which meshes well with anti-exceptionalism, and argued that it leads one to choosing one single logic, which is a kind of ultralogic. We argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic.Stephen Read - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):298.
    Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the doctrine that logic does not require its own epistemology, for its methods are continuous with those of science. Although most recently urged by Williamson, the idea goes back at least to Lakatos, who wanted to adapt Popper's falsicationism and extend it not only to mathematics but to logic as well. But one needs to be careful here to distinguish the empirical from the a posteriori. Lakatos coined the term 'quasi-empirical' `for the counterinstances to putative mathematical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Neo-Fregeanism: An Embarrassment of Riches.Alan Weir - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):13-48.
    Neo-Fregeans argue that substantial mathematics can be derived from a priori abstraction principles, Hume's Principle connecting numerical identities with one:one correspondences being a prominent example. The embarrassment of riches objection is that there is a plurality of consistent but pairwise inconsistent abstraction principles, thus not all consistent abstractions can be true. This paper considers and criticizes various further criteria on acceptable abstractions proposed by Wright settling on another one—stability—as the best bet for neo-Fregeans. However, an analogue of the embarrassment of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • (1 other version)Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Philosophy 68 (265):405-411.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  • (1 other version)Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction.Richard G. Heck - 1999 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 7 (1):56-73.
    A brief, non-technical introduction to technical and philosophical aspects of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic. The exposition focuses on Frege's Theorem, which states that the axioms of arithmetic are provable, in second-order logic, from a single non-logical axiom, "Hume's Principle", which itself is: The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if, and only if, the Fs and Gs are in one-one correspondence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • (1 other version)Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic.Gillian Russell - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):793-803.
    Take a correct sequent of formal logic, perhaps a simple logical truth, like the law of excluded middle, or something with premises, like disjunctive syllogism, but basically a claim of the form \.Γ can be empty. If you don’t like my examples, feel free to choose your own, everything I have to say should apply to those as well. Such a sequent attributes the properties of logical truth or logical consequence to a schematic sentence or argument. This paper aims to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • A Naturalistic Look at Logic.Penelope Maddy - 2002 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 76 (2):61 - 90.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • The Company Kept by Cut Abstraction (and its Relatives).S. Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (2):107-138.
    This article concerns the ongoing neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics. The enterprise began life, in something close to its present form, with Crispin Wright’s seminal [1983]. It was bolstered when Bob Hale [1987] joined the fray on Wright’s behalf and it continues through many extensions, objections, and replies to objections . The overall plan is to develop branches of established mathematics using abstraction principles in the form: Formula where a and b are variables of a given type , (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Neo-Fregean Foundations for Real Analysis: Some Reflections on Frege's Constraint.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (4):317--334.
    We now know of a number of ways of developing real analysis on a basis of abstraction principles and second-order logic. One, outlined by Shapiro in his contribution to this volume, mimics Dedekind in identifying the reals with cuts in the series of rationals under their natural order. The result is an essentially structuralist conception of the reals. An earlier approach, developed by Hale in his "Reals byion" program differs by placing additional emphasis upon what I here term Frege's Constraint, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • On the philosophical significance of Frege's theorem.Crispin Wright - 1997 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, thought, and logic: essays in honour of Michael Dummett. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • What Does It Mean to Say That Logic is Formal?John MacFarlane - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What does it mean, then, to say (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   302 citations  
  • How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralism.Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Finitude and Hume’s Principle.Richard G. Heck - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (6):589-617.
    The paper formulates and proves a strengthening of ‘Frege’s Theorem’, which states that axioms for second-order arithmetic are derivable in second-order logic from Hume’s Principle, which itself says that the number of Fs is the same as the number ofGs just in case the Fs and Gs are equinumerous. The improvement consists in restricting this claim to finite concepts, so that nothing is claimed about the circumstances under which infinite concepts have the same number. ‘Finite Hume’s Principle’ also suffices for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Response to Michael Dummett.Crispin Wright - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today: Papers From a Conference Held in Munich From June 28 to July 4,1993. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Is Hume's principle analytic?Crispin Wright - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):307-333.
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Which abstraction principles are acceptable? Some limitative results.Øystein Linnebo & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):239-252.
    Neo-Fregean logicism attempts to base mathematics on abstraction principles. Since not all abstraction principles are acceptable, the neo-Fregeans need an account of which ones are. One of the most promising accounts is in terms of the notion of stability; roughly, that an abstraction principle is acceptable just in case it is satisfiable in all domains of sufficiently large cardinality. We present two counterexamples to stability as a sufficient condition for acceptability and argue that these counterexamples can be avoided only by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • (1 other version)Focus restored: Comments on John MacFarlane.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):457 - 482.
    In “Double Vision Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme”, John MacFarlane’s raises two main questions: (1) Why is it so important to neo-Fregeans to treat expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’ as a species of singular term? What would be lost, if anything, if they were analysed instead as a type of quantifier-phrase, as on Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions? and (2) Granting—at least for the sake of argument—that Hume’s Principle may be used as a means of implicitly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Mathematical Pluralism and Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (2):379-398.
    PurposeThis paper aims to establish that a certain sort of mathematical pluralism is true. MethodsThe paper proceeds by arguing that that the best versions of mathematical Platonism and anti-Platonism both entail the relevant sort of mathematical pluralism. Result and ConclusionThis argument gives us the result that mathematical pluralism is true, and it also gives us the perhaps surprising result that mathematical Platonism and mathematical pluralism are perfectly compatible with one another.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):516-518.
    This book does three main things. First, it defends mathematical platonism against the main objections to that view (most notably, the epistemological objection and the multiple-reductions objection). Second, it defends anti-platonism (in particular, fictionalism) against the main objections to that view (most notably, the Quine-Putnam indispensability objection and the objection from objectivity). Third, it argues that there is no fact of the matter whether abstract mathematical objects exist and, hence, no fact of the matter whether platonism or anti-platonism is true.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   225 citations  
  • Abstraction Reconceived.J. P. Studd - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):579-615.
    Neologicists have sought to ground mathematical knowledge in abstraction. One especially obstinate problem for this account is the bad company problem. The leading neologicist strategy for resolving this problem is to attempt to sift the good abstraction principles from the bad. This response faces a dilemma: the system of ‘good’ abstraction principles either falls foul of the Scylla of inconsistency or the Charybdis of being unable to recover a modest portion of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with its intended generality. This article (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Abstraction and Infinity.Paolo Mancosu - 2016 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Paolo Mancosu provides an original investigation of historical and systematic aspects of the notions of abstraction and infinity and their interaction. A familiar way of introducing concepts in mathematics rests on so-called definitions by abstraction. An example of this is Hume's Principle, which introduces the concept of number by stating that two concepts have the same number if and only if the objects falling under each one of them can be put in one-one correspondence. This principle is at the core (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The Reason's Proper Study: Essays toward a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):291-294.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • On finite hume.Fraser Macbride - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):150-159.
    Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical reflection upon Hume's principle. Heck argues that Hume's principle doesn't inform ordinary arithmetical reasoning and so knowledge derived from it cannot be genuinely arithmetical. To suppose otherwise, Heck claims, is to fail to comprehend the magnitude of Cantor's conceptual contribution to mathematics. Heck recommends that finite Hume's principle be employed instead to generate arithmetical knowledge. But a better understanding of Cantor's contribution is achieved if it is supposed that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   343 citations  
  • Bad company generalized.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):331 - 347.
    The paper is concerned with the bad company problem as an instance of a more general difficulty in the philosophy of mathematics. The paper focuses on the prospects of stability as a necessary condition on acceptability. However, the conclusion of the paper is largely negative. As a solution to the bad company problem, stability would undermine the prospects of a neo-Fregean foundation for set theory, and, as a solution to the more general difficulty, it would impose an unreasonable constraint on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Full-Blooded Reference.Gabriel Rabin - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3):357-365.
    In ‘Just what is full-blooded platonism?’ Greg Restall outlines several objections to Mark Balaguer's theory of full-blooded platonism. I reply to these objections by explicating the semantic framework for the reference of mathematical terms that full-blooded platonism requires. Expanding upon these replies, I then explain how the full-blooded platonist, in light of the explicated semantic framework, should treat mathematical terms and statements in order to avoid certain pitfalls.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   374 citations  
  • Some Criteria for Acceptable Abstraction.Øystein Linnebo - 2011 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):331-338.
    Which abstraction principles are acceptable? A variety of criteria have been proposed, in particular irenicity, stability, conservativeness, and unboundedness. This note charts their logical relations. This answers some open questions and corrects some old answers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations