Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme-content dualism. He argues that such dualism is untenable since: not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence but also the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the related notion of a (...) theory ”fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non-intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability : if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ”there is no ground for speaking of two.’. (shrink)

This lively introduction to mathematical logic, easily accessible to non-mathematicians, offers an historical survey, coverage of predicate calculus, model theory, Godel’s theorems, computability and recursivefunctions, consistency and independence in axiomatic set theory, and much more. Suggestions for Further Reading. Diagrams.

This book is intended to be used as a textbook by students of mathematics, and also within limitations as a reference work.

This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori,contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically,just as ...

Proofs and Refutations is essential reading for all those interested in the methodology, the philosophy and the history of mathematics. Much of the book takes the form of a discussion between a teacher and his students. They propose various solutions to some mathematical problems and investigate the strengths and weaknesses of these solutions. Their discussion (which mirrors certain real developments in the history of mathematics) raises some philosophical problems and some problems about the nature of mathematical discovery or creativity. Imre (...) Lakatos is concerned throughout to combat the classical picture of mathematical development as a steady accumulation of established truths. He shows that mathematics grows instead through a richer, more dramatic process of the successive improvement of creative hypotheses by attempts to 'prove' them and by criticism of these attempts: the logic of proofs and refutations. (shrink)

This lucid and comprehensive essay by a distinguished philosopher surveys the views of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant on the nature of mathematics. It examines the propositions and theories of the schools these philosophers inspired, and it concludes by discussing the relationship between mathematical theories, empirical data, and philosophical presuppositions. 1968 edition.

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method (...) of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge. (shrink)

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method (...) of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the philosophical problem of accounting for the relationship between mathematics and non-mathematical reality. The first section, devoted to the importance of the problem, suggests that many of the reasons for engaging in philosophy at all make an account of the relationship between mathematics and reality a priority, not only in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science, but also in general epistemology/metaphysics. This is followed by a (rather brief) survey of the major, traditional philosophies (...) of mathematics indicating how each is prepared to deal with the present problem. It is shown that (the standard formulations of) some views seem to deny outright that there is a relationship between mathematics and any non-mathematical reality; such philosophies are clearly unacceptable. Other views leave the relationship rather mysterious and, thus, are incomplete at best. The final, more speculative section provides the direction of a positive account. A structuralist philosophy of mathematics is outlined and it is proposed that mathematics applies to reality though the discovery of mathematical structures underlying the non-mathematical universe. (shrink)

Though my title speaks of Kant’s mathematical realism, I want in this essay to explore Kant’s relation to a famous mathematical anti-realist. Specifically, I want to discuss Kant’s influence on L. E. J. Brouwer, the 20th-century Dutch mathematician who built a contemporary philosophy of mathematics on constructivist themes which were quite explicitly Kantian. Brouwer’s theory is perhaps most notable for its belief that constructivism requires us to abandon the traditional logic of mathematical reasoning in favor of different canon of reasoning, (...) called intuitionistic logic. Brouwer thought that classical logic is intrinsically bound up with a nonconstructive view of mathematics. This means that, according to Brouwer, when we do mathematics we must give up bivalence, we must no longer use such familiar logical laws as excluded middle, and we must sometimes forebear from the classic method of reductio ad absurdum. All of these are intuitionistically invalid classical principles. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume 2 presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues.

The material contained in the following translation was given in substance by Professor Hilbertas a course of lectures on euclidean geometry at the University of G]ottingen during the wintersemester of 1898-1899. The results of his investigation were re-arranged and put into the formin which they appear here as a memorial address published in connection with the celebration atthe unveiling of the Gauss-Weber monument at G]ottingen, in June, 1899. In the French edition, which appeared soon after, Professor Hilbert made some additions, (...) particularly in the concludingremarks, where he gave an account of the results of a recent investigation made by Dr. Dehn.These additions have been incorporated in the following translation.Geometry, like arithmetic, requires for its logical development only a small number ofsimple, fundamental principles. These fundamental principles are called the axioms ofgeometry. The choice of the axioms and the investigation of their relations to one anotheris a problem which, since the time of Euclid, has been discussed in numerous excellentmemoirs to be found in the mathematical literature.1 This problem is tantamount to thelogical analysis of our intuition of space. (shrink)

Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

Among the aims of this book are: - The discussion of some important philosophical issues using the precision of mathematics. - The development of formal systems that contain both classical and constructive components. This allows the study of constructivity in otherwise classical contexts and represents the formalization of important intensional aspects of mathematical practice. - The direct formalization of intensional concepts (such as computability) in a mixed constructive/classical context.