- Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
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A Second Look at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems).Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):365-385.details
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Why Do Certain States of Affairs Call Out for Explanation? A Critique of Two Horwichian Accounts.Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1405-1419.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism: In Defense of Belief in the Natural World.Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - New York: Routledge.details
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Fine-tuning and multiple universes.Roger White - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):260–276.details
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On Popper's definitions of verisimilitude.Pavel Tichý - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):155-160.details
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Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the "this universe" objection.Neil A. Manson & Michael J. Thrush - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):67–83.details
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The Logic of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):577-604.details
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Information and Inaccuracy.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw025.details
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Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.details
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Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude.David Miller - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.details
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Confirmation, heuristics, and explanatory reasoning.Timothy McGrew - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):553-567.details
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Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the 'This Universe' Objection.Neil Manson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):67 - 83.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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Estimating Large Numbers.David Landy, Noah Silbert & Aleah Goldin - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (5):775-799.details
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Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):547.details
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A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know))).David Harker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.details
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A bayesian approach in the philosophy of inference. [REVIEW]I. J. Good - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):161-166.details
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The Sweep of Probability.George N. Schlesinger - 1991details
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Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):213-219.details
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Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 47 (4):687-688.details
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The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce.Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss - 1933 - International Journal of Ethics 43 (2):220-226.details
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Truthlikeness.G. Oddie - 2008 - In Martin P. Curd (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. pp. 478--488.details
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Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.details
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