- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
|
|
Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
|
|
Normativität und Bayesianismus.Stephan Hartmann & Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - In Bernward Gesang (ed.), Deskriptive oder normative Wissenschaftstheorie. ontos-Verlag. pp. 177-204.details
|
|
Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):409 - 428.details
|
|
On the laws of nature.Gerhard D. Wassermann - 1982 - Synthese 51 (3):381 - 396.details
|
|
Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate.Efraim Wallach - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):401-431.details
|
|
Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
|
|
The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.details
|
|
Counterfactuals for consequentialists.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.details
|
|
The bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses.Michael Strevens - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):515-537.details
|
|
Der Rabe und der Bayesianist.Mark Siebel - 2004 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):313-329.details
|
|
Probability and proximity in surprise.Tomoji Shogenji - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10939-10957.details
|
|
The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.details
|
|
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
|
|
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.details
|
|
Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements.Michael Schippers & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (2):299-329.details
|
|
Scientific innovation and the limits of social scientific prediction.Alex Rosenberg - 1993 - Synthese 97 (2):161 - 181.details
|
|
A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.details
|
|
A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.details
|
|
Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.details
|
|
What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
|
|
Epistemic values and the value of learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.details
|
|
Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.details
|
|
Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
|
|
The context of prediction (and the paradox of confirmation).Tony Lawson - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):393-407.details
|
|
Variety of Evidence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223.details
|
|
Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.details
|
|
The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):1-31.details
|
|
Variation and the accuracy of predictions.Michael Kruse - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):181-193.details
|
|
Measurement perspective, process, and the pandemic.Vadim Keyser & Hannah Howland - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.details
|
|
Experimental effects and causal representations.Vadim Keyser - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.details
|
|
Determining the Need for Explanation.Martin Jakobsen - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):230-241.details
|
|
On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
|
|
Theories of probability.Colin Howson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):1-32.details
|
|
Popper, prior probabilities, and inductive inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.details
|
|
Disposition and Occurrence.Hung Hin-Chung - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):123 - 135.details
|
|
A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know))).David Harker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.details
|
|
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
|
|
Non-bayesian foundations for statistical estimation, prediction, and the ravens example.Malcolm R. Forster - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (3):357 - 376.details
|
|
The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
|
|
Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.details
|
|
Explaining coincidences.Julio De Rizzo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14843-14864.details
|
|
New Axioms for Probability and Likelihood Ratio Measures.Vincenzo Crupi, Nick Chater & Katya Tentori - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):189-204.details
|
|
Regularity theories disconfirmed: a revamped argument and a wager.Patrick Cronin - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4913-4933.details
|
|
On Russell's principle of induction.Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):285-295.details
|
|
A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
|
|
Some problems for bayesian confirmation theory.Charles S. Chihara - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560.details
|
|
Randomness and the justification of induction.Scott Campbell & James Franklin - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):79 - 99.details
|
|
Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.details
|
|