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  1. How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (319):196-200.
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  • (2 other versions)The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - The Monist 1:284.
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  • After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.John Casey - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132):296-300.
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  • (2 other versions)The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1891 - International Journal of Ethics 1 (2):143-169.
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  • Conscious thought is for facilitating social and cultural interactions: How mental simulations serve the animal–culture interface.Roy F. Baumeister & E. J. Masicampo - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (3):945-971.
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  • Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us (...)
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  • The Phenomenological Mind.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2008 - New York, NY: Routledge. Edited by Dan Zahavi.
    _The Phenomenological Mind_ is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised (...)
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  • (1 other version)Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.Charles Taylor - 1989 - Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
    'Most of us are still groping for answers about what makes life worth living, or what confers meaning on individual lives', writes Charles Taylor in Sources of the Self. 'This is an essentially modern predicament.' Charles Taylor's latest book sets out to define the modern identity by tracing its genesis, analysing the writings of such thinkers as Augustine, Descartes, Montaigne, Luther, and many others. This then serves as a starting point for a renewed understanding of modernity. Taylor argues that modern (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
    Editorial preface to the fourth edition and modified translation -- The text of the Philosophische Untersuchungen -- Philosophische untersuchungen = Philosophical investigations -- Philosophie der psychologie, ein fragment = Philosophy of psychology, a fragment.
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  • How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions (...)
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  • (1 other version)After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
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  • The Bounds of Sense.P. F. Strawson - 1966 - Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.
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  • Reductionism and the first person.John McDowell - 1997 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Oxford, [England] ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 230--50.
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  • (2 other versions)Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value.John Martin Fischer - 2012 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    Fischer here defends the contention that moral responsibility is associated with "deep control", which is "in-between" two untenable extreme positions: "superficial control" and "total control". He defends this "middle way" against the proponents of more--and less--robust notions of the freedom required for moral responsibility. Fischer offers a new solution to the Luck Problem, as well as providing a defense of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.
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  • Corporeal selfhood, self-interpretation, and narrative selfhood.Diana Tietjens Meyers - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):141-153.
    Ever since Freud pioneered the “talking cure,” psychologists of various stripes have explored how autobiographical narrative bears on self-understanding and psychic wellbeing. Recently, there has been a wave of philosophical speculation as to whether autobiographical narrative plays an essential or important role in the constitution of agentic selves. However, embodiment has received little attention from philosophers who defend some version of the narrative self. Catriona Mackenzie is an important exception to this pattern of neglect, and this paper explores Mackenzie’s work (...)
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  • The comparator account on thought insertion, alien voices and inner speech: some open questions.Agustin Vicente - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
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  • The Ego Tunnel: The Science of Mind and the Myth of the Self.Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Basic Books.
    Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...
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  • Is minimal self preserved in schizophrenia? A subcomponents view☆.Aaron L. Mishara - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.
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  • The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns.Glenn Carruthers - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
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  • Body image and body schema in a deafferented subject.Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Cole - 1995 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4):369-390.
    In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic (...)
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  • The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather (...)
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  • (1 other version)Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity.Charles Taylor - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Discusses contemporary notions of the self, and examines their origins, development, and effects.
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  • Embodied narratives.Richard Menary - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.
    Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from (...)
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  • Thoughts, motor actions, and the self.Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.
    The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the (...)
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  • Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self.Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas - 2003 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.
    In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin (...)
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  • Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception.Nikos K. Logothetis & Jeffrey D. Schall - 1989 - Science 245:761-63.
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  • (1 other version)Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recognition and recall.Antonio R. Damasio - 1989 - Cognition 3 (1-2):25-62.
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  • Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  • Metzinger's matrix: Living the virtual life with a real body.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, (...)
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  • Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  • Personhood and personal identity.Marya Schechtman - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.
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  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  • Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  • The Bounds of sense. An essay on Kant's critique of pure reason.Walter H. Capps - 1969 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):470-471.
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  • Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - New York: Routledge.
    _Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
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  • The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Routledge.
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight (...)
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  • Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
    There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able (...)
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  • The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These (...)
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  • (1 other version)Conscious experience and delusional belief.Max Coltheart - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
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  • (1 other version)Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion.Andy Clark - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):181-202.
    We seem, or so it seems to some theorists, to experience a rich stream of highly detailed information concerning an extensive part of our current visual surroundings. But this appearance, it has been suggested, is in some way illusory. Our brains do not command richly detailed internal models of the current scene. Our seeings, it seems, are not all that they seem. This, then, is the Grand Illusion. We think we see much more than we actually do. In this paper (...)
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  • Self and World.Quassim Cassam - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Quassim Cassam challenges the widespread and influential view that we cannot be introspectively aware of ourselves as objects in the world. In opposition to the views of many empiricist and idealistic philosophers, including Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, he argues that the self is not systematically elusive from the perspective of self-consciousness, and that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences requires a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, located, (...)
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  • Towards a constitutive account of implicit narrativity.Fleur Jongepier - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):51-66.
    The standard reply to the critique that narrative theories of the self are either chauvinistic or trivial is to “go implicit”. Implicit narratives, it is argued, are necessary for diachronically structured self-experience, but do not require that such narratives should be wholly articulable life stories. In this paper I argue that the standard approach, which puts forward a phenomenological conception of implicit narratives, is ultimately unable to get out of the clutches of the dilemma. In its place, I offer an (...)
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  • Being someone.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
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  • Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  • Toward a theory of visual consciousness.Semir Zeki & Andreas Bartels - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):225-59.
    The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously. Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given (...)
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  • The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
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  • (1 other version)Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: A systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition.Antonio R. Damasio - 1989 - Cognition 33 (1-2):25-62.
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  • When Selfconsciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):128-131.
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