- Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
|
|
The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
|
|
The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
|
|
Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.details
|
|
(1 other version)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
|
|
The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
|
|
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.details
|
|
A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
|
|
Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
|
|
No Justificatory Closure without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.details
|
|
Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
|
|
Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
|
|
The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
|
|
(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.details
|
|
Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
No Match Point for the Permissibility Account.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.details
|
|
(1 other version)Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
|
|
Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
|
|
A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
|
|
(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
|
|
What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
|
|
This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
|
|
The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
|
|
The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
|
|
Relevance: a fallacy?John P. Burgess - 1981 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (2):97-104.details
|
|
The preface paradox.Sharon Ryan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):293-307.details
|
|
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.details
|
|
A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
|
|
Believing conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.details
|
|
Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
|
|