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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries.John Turri & Ori Friedman - forthcoming - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.details
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Belief and Probability: A General Theory of Probability Cores.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Horacio Arlo-Costa - 2012 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (3).details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Assertibility and Sensitivity.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.details
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Futher reflections on semantic minimalism: Reply to Wedgwood.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Springer. pp. 437-474..details
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Probabilistic Inference and Probabilistic Reasoning. Kyburg - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):107-116.details
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The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability.Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2475-2494.details
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There Is More to a Paradox Than Credence.George Darby & Jürgen Landes - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):99-109.details
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Truthlikeness and the Lottery Paradox via the Preface Paradox.Simon D'Alfonso - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):391-397.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-dependent Values.Horacio Arló Costa - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7-48.details
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Non-adjunctive inference and classical modalities.Horacio Arló Costa - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):581 - 605.details
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Hypothetical revision and matter-of-fact supposition.Horacio Arló Costa - 2001 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1-2):203-229.details
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First order extensions of classical systems of modal logic; the role of the Barcan schemas.Horacio Arló Costa - 2002 - Studia Logica 71 (1):87-118.details
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What lottery problem for reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.details
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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Minimalism and the generalisation problem: on Horwich’s second solution.Cezary Cieśliński - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1077-1101.details
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Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Resolving conflicting information.John Cantwell - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):191-220.details
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String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Peter Vickers: Understanding Inconsistent Science. [REVIEW]Bryson Brown - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (2):413-418.details
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Improving judgment by reconciling incoherence.R. V. Brown & D. V. Lindley - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):113-132.details
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Deference and description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):29-41.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Indicative Conditionals: Probabilities and Relevance.Franz Berto & Aybüke Özgün - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (11):3697-3730.details
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The rational dimension of understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-16.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2):415-428.details
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DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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