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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility.Susan Wolf - 1987 - In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 46-62.details
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A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will.Robert Kane - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.details
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Metaphysics.Richard Taylor - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
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Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral responsibility.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 1986 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.details
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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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.Peter van Inwagen - 1988details
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A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will.Robert Kane - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):185-186.details
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Explaining Actions with Habits.Bill Pollard - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):57 - 69.details
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Epistemic deontology, doxastic voluntarism, and the principle of alternate possibilities.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - In Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (ed.), Knowledge and Belief. ÖBV. pp. 217-227.details
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