- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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(1 other version)Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
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Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.details
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(1 other version)Virtue epistemology.Heather Battaly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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The epistemic significance of perceptual learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.details
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Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.details
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Friendship and epistemic norms.Jason Kawall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):349-370.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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(1 other version)Debunking Morality: Lessons from the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):208-226.details
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Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.details
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Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
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Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
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Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.details
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(2 other versions)Learning from words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.details
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):389-394.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.details
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Logical Akrasia.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Assertion and its constitutive norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.details
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(1 other version)Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution.Jonathan Matheson - 2018 - Topoi (5):1-13.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Edited by Jeanne Peijnenburg.details
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How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.details
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