- Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
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Justification Without Excuses: A Defense of Classical Deontologism.Blake McAllister - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):353-366.details
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The Duty to Edit the Human Germline.Parker Crutchfield - 2022 - Res Publica 29 (3):347-365.details
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Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism.Nathan Nobis - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochesterdetails
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The Sheriff in Our Minds: On the Morality of the Mental.Director Samuel - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (3):1-19.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.details
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The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.details
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Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 38-58.details
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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A Thoroughly Modern Wager.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):207-231.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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How to change it: modes of engagement, rationality, and stance voluntarism.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):7-17.details
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Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control.Andrea Kruse - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2811-2842.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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El problema de las razones inadecuadas.Miranda del Corral - 2014 - Factótum 11:103-111.details
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(1 other version)Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.details
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Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 130–145.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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(1 other version)Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Unzipping the Zetetic Turn.David Domínguez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-29.details
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Beyond belief: On disinformation and manipulation.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Compatibilism and Free Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Varieties of (Extended) Thought Manipulation.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Blitz & Christoph Bublitz (eds.), The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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(1 other version)Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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Opressões epistêmicas.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2018 - In José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo (ed.), Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group in Epistemology. pp. 201-226.details
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Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs.Jason Kawall - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129.details
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Harry Frankfurt peut-il sauver le blâme doxastique? Possibilités alternatives épistémiques et involontarisme doxastique.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2012 - Ithaque 10:137-157.details
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Is believing at will 'conceptually impossible'?Nikolaj Nottelman - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.details
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The debate on epistemic and ethical normativity.Dalibor Renić - 2010 - Disputatio Philosophica 12 (1):93-119.details
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The empirical stance vs. the critical attitude.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):200-223.details
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Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.details
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