- Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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Stances and Epistemology: Values, Pragmatics, and Rationality.Sandy Boucher - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):521-547.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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What is (In)coherence?Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:184-206.details
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Über die Frage, ob wir uns dazu entscheiden können, etwas zu glauben. Wider eines idealisierten Verständnisses des doxastischen Voluntarismus.Alexander Max Bauer & Malte Meyerhuber - 2016 - Forsch! 2 (2):10-21.details
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Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?Simon Walgenbach - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):583-592.details
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Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.details
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(1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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(2 other versions)Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):147-198.details
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What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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Judging and the scope of mental agency.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-71.details
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Self-Knowledge in “Deciding to Believe”.Laurie Pieper - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):493-510.details
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(1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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Believe what you want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.details
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Bridging Belief and Social Practice: Connecting the Participatory Dimension of Religious Belief to an Account of Socially Extended Mind.Liam Luckett - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Exeterdetails
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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Permission to believe: Descriptive and prescriptive beliefs in the Clifford/James debate.Christopher Paul Lawrence - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Cape Towndetails
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Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself.Jennifer M. Morton - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):728-746.details
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From Impossibility to Evidentialism?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):384-406.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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A New Problem for Internalism.Chad Carmichael - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13187-13199.details
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Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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Seeing to it that an agent forms a belief.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 10:185.details
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Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.details
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(2 other versions)Attitudes, agency and first-personality.Robert Dunn - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):295-319.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth.Eric Funkhouser - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):179-195.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument.Chris Provis - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (1):95-112.details
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Is believing at will 'conceptually impossible'?Nikolaj Nottelman - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.details
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Natural language and virtual belief.Keith Frankish - 1998 - In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 248.details
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“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness.Claudio Cormick & Valeria Edelszten - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (2):1-39.details
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Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.details
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On an argument for irrationalism.Alan Weir - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):95-114.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge.Barnaby Walker - forthcoming - Philosophy.details
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Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.details
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Free belief.Josefa Toribio - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):327-36.details
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