- (1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
|
|
Consciousness and the brain: deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts.Stanislas Dehaene - 2014 - New York, New York: Viking Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar & Stephen Mumford - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):674-677.details
|
|
(1 other version)Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.details
|
|
(1 other version)Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
|
|
(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
|
|
(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Powerful Particulars:Review Essay on John Heils From an Ontological Point of View. [REVIEW]E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):466-479.details
|
|
The identity of the categorical and the dispositional.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):271-282.details
|
|
Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.details
|
|
The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism.Torin Alter - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):794-815.details
|
|
The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
|
|
The Possibility of Physicalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):557-592.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Kati Balog - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 219.details
|
|
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
|
|
The Mind in Nature.C. B. Martin - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
|
|
Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers.Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2011 - The Monist 94 (1):81-102.details
|
|
A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.details
|
|
The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2006 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.details
|
|
(2 other versions)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
|
|
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and cognitive access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.details
|
|
The ontological turn.C. B. Martin & John Heil - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):34–60.details
|
|
The regress of pure powers?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.details
|
|
"How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation.Robert C. Cummins - 2000 - In Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation. MIT Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
|
|
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.details
|
|
Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
|
|
Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
|
|
Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
|
|
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
The Universe as We Find It.John Heil - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)In defense of the phenomenal concepts strategy.Katalin Balog - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
|
|
Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability.Alexander Carruth - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):25–46.details
|
|
Physicalism and our knowledge of intrinsic properties.Alyssa Ney - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60.details
|
|
(2 other versions)In defense of the phenomenal concepts strategy.Katalin Balog - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.details
|
|
Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?E. Diaz-Leon - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):1-16.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
|
|
The Russellian monist’s problems with mental causation.Robert Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39.details
|
|
Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.details
|
|
In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.details
|
|