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Substitution in a sense

Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098 (2018)

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  1. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.R. B. Braithwaite (ed.) - 1931 - Routledge Kegan & Paul.
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  • Pleonastic Explanations. [REVIEW]Mark Sainsbury - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):97-111.
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  • The Cambridge Companion to Frege.Michael Potter, Joan Weiner, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Sullivan, Alex Oliver & Thomas Ricketts (eds.) - 2010 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Offers a comprehensive and accessible exploration of the scope and importance of Gottlob Frege's work.
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  • The Prenective View of propositional content.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1799-1825.
    Beliefs have what I will call ‘propositional content’. A belief is always a belief that so-and-so: a belief that grass is green, or a belief that snow is white, or whatever. Other things have propositional content too, such as sentences, judgments and assertions. The Standard View amongst philosophers is that what it is to have a propositional content is to stand in an appropriate relation to a proposition. Moreover, on this view, propositions are objects, i.e. the kind of thing you (...)
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  • Wittgenstein's Tractatus: history and interpretation.Peter Sullivan & Michael Potter (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    These new studies of Wittgenstein's Tractatus represent a significant step beyond recent polemical debate.
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  • Neutralism within the Semantic Tradition.Robert Trueman - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):246-251.
    A neutralist framework is an account of the second-order quantifiers which does not by itself tell us what the ontological commitments of second-order quantification are, but which does tell us that those commitments cannot exceed those of predication. Recently, Wright has suggested that an inferentialist account of the second-order quantifiers is an adequate neutralist framework. I show that we do not have to become inferentialists in the pursuit of a neutralist framework: such a framework can be established within the semantic (...)
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  • Impure reference: A way around the concept horse paradox.Fraser MacBride - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):297-312.
    This paper provides a new solution to the concept horse paradox. Frege argued no name co-refers with a predicate because no name can be inter-substituted with a predicate. This led Frege to embrace the paradox of the concept horse. But Frege got it wrong because predicates are impurely referring expressions and we shouldn’t expect impurely referring expressions to be intersubstitutable even if they co-refer, because the contexts in which they occur are sensitive to the extra information they carry about their (...)
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  • Dolby substitution (where available).Robert Trueman - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):98-102.
    Alex Oliver has offered a variety of counterexamples to Crispin Wright's Reference Principle. I suggest that these counterexamples rely on too simple a notion of substitution to be compelling. However, this is not a satisfactory place to leave the discussion: we need some alternative account of substitution in English. In his recent paper, Dolby has attempted to give just such an account. I argue that Dolby's account is viciously circular. I then draw some morals from the discussion.
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  • On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
    Equality1 gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form a = (...)
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  • The reference principle: A defence.David Dolby - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):286-296.
    It is often maintained that co-referential terms can be substituted for one another whilst preserving truth-value in extensional contexts, and preserving grammaticality in all contexts. Crispin Wright calls this claim ‘The Reference Principle’ . Since Wright defines extensional contexts as those in which truth-value is determined only by reference, it is the assertion about substitution salva congruitate that is significant. Wright argues that RP is the key to understanding how Frege came to hold, paradoxically, that the concept horse is not (...)
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  • The reason's proper study: essays towards a neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 2001 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Crispin Wright.
    Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...)
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  • Semantics in generative grammar.Irene Heim & Angelika Kratzer - 1998 - Malden, MA: Blackwell. Edited by Angelika Kratzer.
    Written by two of the leading figures in the field, this is a lucid and systematic introduction to semantics as applied to transformational grammars of the ...
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  • Propositional attitudes without propositions.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.
    The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be (...)
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  • (1 other version)Universals.Frank P. Ramsey - 1925 - Mind 34 (136):401-417.
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  • On the sense and reference of a proper name.John McDowell - 1977 - Mind 86 (342):159-185.
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  • Compound thoughts.Gottlob Frege - 1963 - Mind 72 (285):1-17.
    [Translation of Frege's 'Gedankengefüge' (1923)].
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  • The semantics of belief ascriptions.Michael McKinsey - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
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  • Ramsey's Legacy.Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show how relevant it is to present-day concerns.Each (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Précis of The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):208-210.
    In The Things We Mean I argue that there exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and that they are what I call pleonastic propositions. The first two chapters offer an initial motivation and articulation of the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the meaning relation and compositional semantics; the (...)
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  • The Reference Principle.Alex Oliver - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):177-187.
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  • The last dogma of type confusions.Ofra Magidor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):1-29.
    In this paper I discuss a certain kind of 'type confusion' which involves use of expressions of the wrong grammatical category, as in the string 'runs eats'. It is (nearly) universally accepted that such strings are meaningless. My purpose in this paper is to question this widespread assumption (or as I call it, 'the last dogma'). I discuss a range of putative reasons for accepting the last dogma: in §II, semantic and metaphysical reasons; in §III, logical reasons; and in §IV, (...)
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  • ‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333.
    This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are (...)
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  • Do belief reports report beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):301-303.
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  • Knowledge of Meaning.Richard Larson & Gabriel Segal - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):960-964.
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  • Objects of Thought.Kit Fine - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (3):392.
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  • Ramsey on universals.Fraser MacBride - 2005 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 83-104.
    According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper “Universals”: (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The ‘first generation’ of Ramsey commentators dismissed “Universals” because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction after all. The ‘second generation’ of commentators dismissed “Universals because they held that the absence of (...)
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  • Objects of thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by P. T. Geach & Anthony Kenny.
    Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
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  • Ramsey's Legacy.Hallvard Lillehammer & David Hugh Mellor - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):669-669.
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  • Objects of Thought.A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach & A. J. P. Kenny - 1971 - Philosophy 47 (181):278-280.
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  • The concept horse with no name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  • The things we mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Schiffer presents a groundbreaking account of meaning and belief, and shows how it can illuminate a range of crucial problems regarding language, mind, knowledge, and ontology. He introduces the new doctrine of 'pleonastic propositions' to explain what the things we mean and believe are. He discusses the relation between semantic and psychological facts, on the one hand, and physical facts, on the other; vagueness and indeterminacy; moral truth; conditionals; and the role of propositional content in information acquisition and explanation. (...)
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  • Nominalizing quantifiers.Friederike Moltmann - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):445-481.
    Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing (...)
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  • Introduction.Michael Potter - 2010 - In Michael Potter, Joan Weiner, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Sullivan, Alex Oliver & Thomas Ricketts (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Two-dimensional semantics and propositional attitude content.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - In Stephen Schiffer (ed.), The things we mean. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • About the law of inertia.Gottlob Frege - 1961 - Synthese 13 (4):350 - 363.
    [Translation of Frege's 'Über das Trägheitsgesetz].
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  • (1 other version)Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy. [REVIEW]P. Cortois - 1988 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 50 (3):558-559.
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  • (1 other version)The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey, R. B. Braithwaite & G. E. Moore - 1931 - Mind 40 (160):476-482.
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  • Horse Sense.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
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  • (1 other version)Universals.F. P. Ramsey - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Objects of Thought. [REVIEW]Pierre Dubois - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 165 (1):85-86.
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