- Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness: Through the Looking Glass.Michael Tye - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.details
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Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness.Keith Frankish - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):11-39.details
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The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
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Qualia, Properties, Modality.Brian Loar - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):113-129.details
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A History of Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):5-12.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature.Scott Sturgeon - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Mind and the World-order. By G. W. Cunningham. [REVIEW]C. I. Lewis - 1929 - International Journal of Ethics 40:550.details
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The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):19-44.details
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(1 other version)Color for philosophers: A précis.C. L. Hardin - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):19-26.details
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Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.details
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(3 other versions)What experience teaches.David Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 29--57.details
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Armchair metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.details
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Sensational sentences switched.Georges Rey - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289 - 319.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.John Haugeland - 1985 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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(1 other version)The content of perceptual experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.details
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The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.details
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Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.details
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Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.details
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Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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(1 other version)The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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(1 other version)Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.details
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Being realistic - why physicalism may entail panexperientialism.Sam Coleman - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.details
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(1 other version)Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.) - 2006 - MIT Press.details
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Rigid designators and mind-brain identity.Grover Maxwell - 1979 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:9.details
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Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.details
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