- Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts.Chandra Sripada - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):781-815.details
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(1 other version)The problem of action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 157-62.details
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(1 other version)The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373-381.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Carl Ginet - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (2):312.details
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(1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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Book Review: Unprincipled Virtue by Nomy Arpaly. [REVIEW]Manuel Vargas - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.details
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Control, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence Dynamics.Marius Usher - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.details
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Causal-explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions.Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognitive Psychology 61 (4):303-332.details
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Reasons-responsiveness and degrees of responsibility.D. Justin Coates & Philip Swenson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):629-645.details
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What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.details
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Control variables and mental causation.John Campbell - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):15-30.details
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Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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(1 other version)Defending hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Humean compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.details
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Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (3):283-294.details
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(1 other version)Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (1):96-99.details
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Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems.Adina L. Roskies - 2016 - Neuroethics 11 (3):245-257.details
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The Intentionality of Human Action.John Martin Fischer & George M. Wilson - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):483.details
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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
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Responsibility and manipulation.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):145-177.details
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(2 other versions)Reflection, planning, and temporally extended agency.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.details
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(1 other version)Intention,--Plans,--and--Practical--Reason.Michael E. Bratman - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):632-634.details
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A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.details
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Luck and Manipulation Cases: A Response to Professor Haji.Neil Levy - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (4):633-646.details
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Constitutive Luck.Andrew Latus - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (4):460-475.details
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Sensitive and insensitive causation.James Woodward - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):1-50.details
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Deviant causal chains and the irreducibility of teleological explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):195–213.details
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Goal-directed processes in biology.Ernest Nagel - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (5):261-279.details
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Review Essay: The Metaphysics of ControlThe Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.David Shatz & John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):955.details
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(1 other version)Defending Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.details
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Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. [REVIEW]J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.details
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Freedom within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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(1 other version)A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism.A. R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.details
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Semicompatibilism and Its Rivals.John Martin Fischer - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):117-143.details
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(1 other version)Free will.G. E. Moore - 1912 - In Ethics. New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.details
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Global control and freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):169-192.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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(3 other versions)Living without Free Will.A. R. Mele - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):375-378.details
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(1 other version)Responsibility and Control. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):93-100.details
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(1 other version)A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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