- Wie fängt (man) eine Handlung an?Geert Keil - 2014 - In Anne-Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handung. Mentis. pp. 135-157.details
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Why Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument is Manipulative.Jay Spitzley - unknowndetails
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Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.details
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Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.details
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Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):193 - 201.details
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(1 other version)A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Frankfurt Cases and Alternate Deontic Categories.Samuel Kahn - 2023 - Dialogue 62 (3):539-552.details
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A New Role for Rollbacks: Showing How Objective Probabilities Undermine the Ability to Act Otherwise.Jan-Felix Müller - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):235-252.details
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A Problem for Frankfurt Examples.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):159-167.details
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Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
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Degrees of Freedom.Pieter Thyssen & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10207-10235.details
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Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):302-324.details
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Taking Responsibility for Ourselves: A Kierkegaardian Account of the Freedom-Relevant Conditions Necessary for the Cultivation of Character.Paul E. Carron - 2011 - Dissertation, Baylor Universitydetails
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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.details
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The Threat from Manipulation Arguments.Benjamin Matheson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):37-50.details
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On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate.Simkulet William - 2015 - Filosofiska Notiser 2 (3):107-120.details
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In defence of the Four-Case Argument.Benjamin Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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(1 other version)Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.details
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The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1011-1023.details
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The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.details
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Hard- and soft-line responses to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):19 - 35.details
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Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will.Bartlomiej Andrzej Lenart - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):385-407.details
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Against (modified) buffer cases.Justin A. Capes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):711-723.details
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Blameworthiness and Buffered Alternatives.Justin A. Capes - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):269-280.details
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Derivative culpability.Martin Montminy - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):689-709.details
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(1 other version)Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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(1 other version)Incompatibilism and prudential obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Defense of Derk Pereboom’s Containment Policy.Jeremy Scharoun & Neil Campbell - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1291-1307.details
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Double Defence Against Multiple Case Manipulation Arguments.Maria Sekatskaya - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1283-1295.details
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(1 other version)A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument 1.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument.Sofia Jeppsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1935-1951.details
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Libero arbitrio e neuroscienze. Alcuni spunti di riflessione.Mattia Ruoso - 2014 - Esercizi Filosofici 9 (2):126-144.details
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Self-control and mechanisms of behavior: Why self-control is not a natural mental kind.Marcela Herdova - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):731-762.details
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In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):797-811.details
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The Revisionist Turn: A Brief History of Recent Work on Free Will.Manuel Vargas - 2011 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
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On Alfred Mele's free will and luck.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.details
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Against an Argument for Objective Probabilities of Undetermined Choices.Daniele Conti - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):127–137.details
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