- Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):370-386.details
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I-Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered.Paul Snowdon - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1-29.details
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(1 other version)Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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(1 other version)Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.details
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(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations.Neil Levy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).details
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How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge.Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.) - 2011 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.details
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(1 other version)Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Oxford,: Blackwell.details
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Choking and The Yips.David Papineau - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):295-308.details
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Regarding a Regress.Yuri Cath - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):358-388.details
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Ryle’s regress defended.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.details
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Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.details
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Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.details
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The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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(1 other version)Understanding demonstratives.Gareth Evans - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 280--304.details
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Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions.Berent Enç - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 48â93.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
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Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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(1 other version)A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge.Michael Kremer - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).details
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Intentions and Motor Representations: the Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.details
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(1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.details
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(1 other version)Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible.David Löwenstein - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 365-371.details
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some Remarks On Intention In Action.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.details
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Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action.Michael Brownstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.details
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Knowing‐how: Problems and Considerations.Ellen Fridland - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):703-727.details
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Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.details
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Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self.Marc Jeannerod - 2006 - Oxford University Press.details
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Singular thought and the extent of 'inner space'.John McDowell - 1986 - In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context. NY: Clarendon Press.details
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(1 other version)Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.details
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Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore & D. Wolpert - 2000 - Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.details
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Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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