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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.details
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A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.details
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On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.details
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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter.Kadri Vihvelin - 2013 - New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa.details
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Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Karsten R. Stueber - 2006 - Bradford.details
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On Clear and Confused Ideas.R. Millikan - 2001 - Cambridge Studies in Philosophy.details
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(3 other versions)What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 29--57.details
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Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
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(1 other version)The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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(1 other version)Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.details
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(2 other versions)Ethics.G. E. Moore - 1965 - New York,: Oxford University Press.details
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The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.details
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Understanding Human Agency.Erasmus Mayr - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Dispositions and habituals.Michael Fara - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):43–82.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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How competence matters in epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):465-475.details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Richard E. Aquila - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):159-170.details
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(1 other version)Ifs and cans.J. L. Austin - 1956 - In Austin J. L. (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 42. pp. 109-132.details
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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The Agentive Modalities.John Maier - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):113-134.details
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Multi‐track dispositions.Barbara Vetter - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):330-352.details
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Actions.J. Hornsby - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):147-149.details
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Dispositional Abilities.Ann Whittle - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Ethics.George Edward Moore - 1912 - Oxford Up.details
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Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):893-904.details
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Cans without Ifs.Keith Lehrer - 1968 - Analysis 29 (1):29 - 32.details
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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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(1 other version)The incompatibility of freewill and determinism.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Affordances explained.Andrea Scarantino - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961.details
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(1 other version)Agency and mental action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:231-249.details
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(3 other versions)What experience teaches.David Lewis - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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(2 other versions)Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performances.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):5-15.details
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Concepts, Brains, and Behaviour.Anthony Kenny - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):105-113.details
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(1 other version)Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):231-249.details
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(2 other versions)Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performances.Ernest Sosa - 2015 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5):81--94.details
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(1 other version)The road to Larissa.John Hyman - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):393-414.details
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(2 other versions)Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performances.Ernest Sosa - 2015 - Disputatio 4 (5).details
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