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Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):489-511.details
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Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.details
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Risk, Rights, and Restitution.M. J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):285-311.details
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On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577-597.details
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Evaluatively incomplete states of affairs.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):211 - 224.details
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Building narrative identity: Episodic value and its identity-forming structure within personal and social contexts.Huiyuhl Yi - 2020 - Human Affairs 30 (2):281-292.details
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Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):225-254.details
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Perceiving Potentiality: A Metaphysics for Affordances.Barbara Vetter - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1177-1191.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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Desert, responsibility, and justification: a reply to Doris, McGeer, and Robinson.Manuel R. Vargas - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2659-2678.details
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Rightness and Goodness in Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Liezl Van Zyl - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:103-114.details
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The Dialectic Role of the Flickers of Freedom.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):337-368.details
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Irrealism and error in ethics.Mark Timmons - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):373-406.details
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A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.details
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Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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On Michael Smith's internalisms.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):345-373.details
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Blackburn’s Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.details
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Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants.Scott Soames - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1681-1696.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
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Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.details
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What ability can do.Ben Schwan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):703-723.details
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Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.details
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Towards an account of basic final value.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Can an incompatibilist outfox a compatibilist hedgehog?Michael Otsuka - 2014 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (4):456-469.details
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Revisiting the tropic of value: Reply to Rabinowicz and rønnow-Rasmussen.Jonas Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.details
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Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.details
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G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.details
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Criticisms of the Ethical Principles for Psychologists and Code of Conduct.William O’Donohue - 2020 - Ethics and Behavior 30 (4):275-293.details
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Platonic know‐how and successful action.Tamer Nawar - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):944-962.details
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Thrasymachus’ Unerring Skill and the Arguments of Republic 1.Tamer Nawar - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (4):359-391.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Thomas Reid on moral liberty and common sense.Douglas McDermid - 1999 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (2):275 – 303.details
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The Agentive Modalities.John Maier - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):113-134.details
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Unconscious Motives and Actions – Agency, Freedom and Responsibility.Christoph Lumer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:428144.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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A Defense of Organic Unities.Noah Lemos - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):125-141.details
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On the notion of free will in the Free Will Theorem.Klaas Landsman - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57:98-103.details
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Moral judgment as a natural kind.Victor Kumar - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.details
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What Kind of Perspectivism?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):415-443.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Ethics of Social Consequences as a Hybrid Form of Ethical Theory?Ján Kalajtzidis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):705-722.details
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Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?Jeff Jordan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):403 - 417.details
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Impossible Obligations are not Necessarily Deliberatively Pointless.Christopher Jay - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):381-389.details
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Norm-reasons and evidentialism.Frank Hofmann & Christian Piller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):202-206.details
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