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Thing Causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Representation in action.Alec Hinshelwood - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Graded Abilities and Action Fragility.David Storrs-Fox - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 361-386.details
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Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.details
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The Force of Habit.William Hornett - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):1-30.details
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Acts and Embodiment.Kit Fine - 2022 - Metaphysics 5 (1):14–28.details
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How to perform a nonbasic action.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1).details
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Freedom in Uncertainty.Filippos Stamatiou - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Copenhagendetails
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Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14975-14991.details
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The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary and the Moralization of Psychology.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1591-1620.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Agential capacities: a capacity to guide.Denis Buehler - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):21-47.details
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Are basic actors brainbound agents? Narrowing down solutions to the problem of probabilistic content for predictive perceivers.George Britten-Neish - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):435-459.details
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Self-ownership and the importance of the human body.Ian Carter - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):94-115.details
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(1 other version)New powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Synthese 199:2671-2700.details
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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Reasoning to action.Constantine Sandis - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):180-186.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.details
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Agents in movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.details
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Knowing how, basic actions, and ways of doing things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Action, knowledge and embodiment in Berkeley and Locke.Tom Stoneham - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (1):41-59.details
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The generality problem for intellectualism.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):242-262.details
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The spontaneousness of skill and the impulsivity of habit.Christos Douskos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4305-4328.details
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Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.details
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One-particularism in the theory of action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2677-2694.details
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Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.details
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Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependence.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2017 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-how: Interrogatives and Free Relatives.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):183-201.details
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The Argument from Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-29.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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The logical form of negative action sentences.Jonathan D. Payton - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):855-876.details
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Causation, Time, and God’s Omniscience.Richard Swinburne - 2017 - Topoi 36 (4):675-684.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.details
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Storia e teorie dell'intenzionalità.Simone Gozzano - 1997details
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Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.details
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):841-855.details
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(1 other version)Intention and Intentional Action.Alfred Mele - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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