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Knowledge and non-traditional factors: prospects for doxastic accounts.Alexander Dinges - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8267-8288.details
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Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Epistemic norms of assertion and action.Mikkel Gerken & Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Artūrs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Against the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases.Jie Gao - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):92-107.details
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Knowledge, intuition and implicature.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2821-2843.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):76-93.details
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Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41-61.details
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Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions.Patrick Rysiew - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):477–514.details
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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective.Vincent Conitzer - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):3-31.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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The emperor's new 'knows'.Kent Bach - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 51--89.details
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You always have a reason to check! A new take on the bank cases.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1007-1018.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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Knowledge and availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.details
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No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 129-153.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.Pascal Engel - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Hawthorne on knowledge and practical reasoning.T. M. Crisp - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):138-140.details
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Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.details
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Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics.Paul Dimmock & Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3239-3269.details
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Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.details
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Assertion: An introduction and overview.Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.details
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The emperor's new 'knows'.Kent Bach - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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