- Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41-61.details
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Knowledge, Pragmatics, and Error.Dirk Kindermann - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):429-57.details
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The Puzzle of Plausible Deniability.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Unger's Argument from Absolute Terms.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (3):443-461.details
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WAMs: Why Worry?Peter Baumann - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.details
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Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism.Ángel Pinillos - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 349–358.details
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Projective Adaptivism.Leonid Tarasov - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):379-402.details
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In Our Shoes or the Protagonist’s? Knowledge, Justification, and Projection.Chad Gonnerman, Lee Poag, Logan Redden, Jacob Robbins & Stephen Crowley - 2020 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 189-212.details
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Wahrheit.Dirk Kindermann - 2015 - In Nikola Kompa (ed.), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 91-99.details
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Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.details
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Just Kidding? Two Roles for the Concept of Joking in Political Speech.Zoe Walker - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.details
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Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):153-168.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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Inquiry and trust: An epistemic balancing act.Heather Rabenberg - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2-3):583-601.details
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Unassertability And The Appearance Of Ignorance.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):125-143.details
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Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology.Nestor Ángel Pinillos - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.details
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Denying knowledge.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):36-55.details
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Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.details
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Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk.Lilith Newton - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.details
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
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Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.details
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Contextualism in Epistemology.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):489-503.details
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Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.Neri Marsili & Alex Wiegmann - 2021 - Cognition 212 (C):104657.details
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Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology.Simon Langford - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3245-3259.details
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How Not to Be a Fallibilist.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):423-440.details
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Model-based Reasoning in Science and Technology: Theoretical and Cognitive Issues.Matthijs Kouw - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):105-108.details
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Knowledge embedded.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Synthese (5):4035-4055.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Knowledge in the face of conspiracy conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):661-688.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.details
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Skepticism about Meta-skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):213-231.details
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Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard.Jumbly Grindrod - 2020 - Episteme (3):1-15.details
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Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism.Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow & Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind and Language (2):1-25.details
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Knowledge in and out of Contrast.Mikkel Gerken & James R. Beebe - 2014 - Noûs 50 (1):133-164.details
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Advances in Experimental Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jie Gao - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):101-105.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Philosophical intuitions , heuristics , and metaphors.Eugen Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):569-606.details
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Intuitions' Linguistic Sources: Stereotypes, Intuitions and Illusions.Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):67-103.details
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An empirical investigation of intuitions about uptake.Sarah A. Fisher, Kathryn B. Francis & Leo Townsend - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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No hope for the Irrelevance Claim.Miguel Egler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3351-3371.details
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