- Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy.André Gombay - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (244):191 - 210.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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The logic of conditionals: an application of probability to deductive logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co..details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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The Logic of Conditionals.[author unknown] - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-158.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.details
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Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.details
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Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir.Norman Malcolm - 1958 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & Ludwig Wittgenstein.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Paradoxes of knowledge.Elizabeth Hankins Wolgast - 1977 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Unnatural Access.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):435-38.details
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Putting extrospection to rest.Aaron Zimmerman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):658-661.details
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Remarks on the philosophy of psychology.Ludwig Wittgenstein (ed.) - 1980 - Oxford: Blackwell.details
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Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):225-254.details
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Wittgensteinian accounts of Moorean absurdity.John N. Williams - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):283-306.details
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The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.details
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The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.details
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The Surprise Exam Paradox.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:67-94.details
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The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore’s paradox in belief: a reply to Chan.John N. Williams - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.details
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Prof. Black on Saying and Disbelieving.Richard Willis - 1953 - Analysis 14 (1):24 - 25.details
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Moore's Paradox: One or Two?J. N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141 - 142.details
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Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.details
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Moore's Paradox - One or Two?John N. Williams - 1979 - Analysis 39 (3):141-142.details
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Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.details
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Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.details
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Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.details
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Moore’s Paradoxes and Iterated Belief.John N. Williams - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.details
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Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.details
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Moore’s paradox in belief and desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.details
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Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief.John N. Williams - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.details
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Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion.John N. Williams - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166.details
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Justifying circumstances and Moore-paradoxical beliefs: A response to Brueckner.John N. Williams - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):490-496.details
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In defence of an argument for Evans's principle: A rejoinder to Vahid.John N. Williams - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):167–170.details
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More on Moore.Michael Welbourne - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):237 - 241.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.details
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Radical interpretation and Moore's paradox.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Theoria 74 (2):146-163.details
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Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: a reply to Williams.H. Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337-341.details
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