This project focuses on simplifying the legal documentation process for small businessesand individuals in India. Utilizing advanced technologies such as Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and AI-driven models, the system automatically drafts and simplifies complex legaldocuments. The platform features a user-friendly interface for easy input, integration withup-to-date legal resources, and ensures strict data privacy and security. By reducing the time, effort, and potential errors associated with legal documentation, the assistant aims to improve accessibility to legal (...) services and promotegreater access to justice. This documentation provides a comprehensive guide to the design, features, and implementation of the AI-powered solution. (shrink)

ChatGPT – a large language model – recently passed the U.S. bar exam. The startling rise and power of generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems such as ChatGPT lead us to consider whether and how more specialized systems could be used to overcome existing barriers to the legal system. Such systems could be employed in either of the two major stages of the pursuit of justice: preliminary information gathering and formal engagement with the state’s legal institutions and professionals. We (...) focus on the former and argue that developing and deploying publicly funded AI legal advisors can reduce economic and shame-based cultural barriers to the information-gathering stage of pursuing justice. (shrink)

Cheating is a growing academic and ethical concern in higher education. This article examines the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) generative chatbots for use in education and provides a review of research literature and relevant scholarship concerning the cheating-related issues involved and their implications for pedagogy. The technological “arms race” that involves cheating-detection system developers versus technology savvy students is attracting increased attention to cheating. AI has added new dimensions to academic cheating challenges as students (as well as faculty and (...) staff) can easily access powerful systems for generating content that can be presented in assignments, exams, or published papers as their own. AI methodology is also providing some emerging anti-cheating approaches, including facial recognition and water- marking. This article provides an overview of human/AI collaboration approaches and frames some educational misuses of such AI generative systems as ChatGPT and Bard as forms of “misattributed co-authorship.” As with other kinds of collaborations, the work that students produce with AI assistance can be presented in transparent and straightforward modes or (unfortunately) in opaquer and ethically-problematic ways. However, rather than just for catching or entrapping students, the emerging varieties of technological cheating-detection strategies can be used to assist students in learning how to document and attribute properly their AI-empowered as well as human-human collaborations. Construing misuses of AI generative systems as misattributed co-authorship can recognize the growing capabilities of these tools and how stressing responsible and mindful usage by students can help prepare them for a highly collaborative, AI-saturated future. (shrink)

Abstract: As the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues to permeate various sectors, the legal domain stands on the cusp of a transformative era. This research paper delves into the multifaceted relationship between AI and the law, scrutinizing the profound implications and innovative applications that emerge at the intersection of these two realms. The study commences with an examination of the current landscape, assessing the challenges and opportunities that AI presents within legal frameworks. With an emphasis on efficiency, (...) accuracy, and accessibility, AI technologies are reshaping traditional legal processes, ranging from document analysis and contract review to predictive legal analytics. Furthermore, the paper scrutinizes the ethical considerations and potential biases inherent in AI algorithms, exploring the delicate balance between technological advancements and the preservation of legal principles such as fairness, accountability, and transparency. The research also delves into the evolving role of legal professionals in navigating and overseeing AI applications, emphasizing the importance of responsible AI deployment. Drawing on case studies and real-world examples, this paper showcases instances where AI has already demonstrated its efficacy in legal contexts, highlighting successful implementations and identifying areas for improvement. The discussion extends to the evolving regulatory landscape, as legal systems grapple with the need to adapt and establish frameworks that ensure the responsible and ethical use of AI technologies. In conclusion, this research contributes to the growing discourse on the dynamic interplay between AI and the legal domain. By illuminating the potential benefits, ethical considerations, and regulatory challenges, it provides a comprehensive overview for legal practitioners, policymakers, and technologists alike, fostering a nuanced understanding of the evolving landscape where artificial intelligence intersects with the law. (shrink)

In an important new Article, titled A Matter of Facts: The Evolution of the Copyright Fact-Exclusion and Its Implications for Disinformation and Democracy, Professor Jessica Silbey argues provocatively that we “‘only” know that facts are excluded from copyright protection because Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service “says so.” She argues that both the nature and importance of facts has been underdefined and is in flux, nonetheless tracing it to the foundational cases of United States (U.S.) copyright law, and argues for (...) a stronger exclusion of facts, which are publici juris, and belong in the public domain. This central thesis is most agreeable, as is her analysis of doctrine and legislative history. The Article’s rich study of American pragmatism, legal realism, the Cambridge school of analytic philosophy, and the “new social scientists,” which Professor Silbey uses to support a strong fact-exclusion, is a tour de force. The Article ends with a list of proposals for a strong Feist application to evaluations, catalogs, manuals, and legal documents. It also includes a call not to allow for industrial dilution of copyright’s framework, including the facts and ideas exclusion. Both are laudable and timely in the era of generative artificial intelligence (AI), where proposals to protect non-authorial quasi-expression or to prevent copying of non-expressive subject matter abound. -/- While I agree with a call for a robust public domain and strong fact-exclusion, and devote Part II of this Response to explore further doctrinal grounds for them, in Part III I explore Silbey’s argument that “pragmatist philosophy’s challenge to universal truths combined with legal realist challenges to formalist jurisprudence eventually shape what is (or should be) copyright law’s broad public domain in ‘facts.’” It is not immediately clear if pragmatism and realism are a solid ground for justifying strong legal principles and axioms. Engaging with this provocative argument allows us to uncover what realism means to Professor Silbey and the much more radical consequences of her arguments. Part IV concludes. (shrink)

Mark Coeckelbergh starts his book with a very powerful picture based on a real incident: On the 9th of January 2020, Robert Williams was wrongfully arrested by Detroit police officers in front of his two young daughters, wife and neighbors. For 18 hours the police would not disclose the grounds for his arrest (American Civil Liberties Union 2020; Hill 2020). The decision to arrest him was primarily based on a facial detection algorithm which matched Mr. Williams’ driving license photo with (...) the picture of a man who was suspected of watch theft two years earlier. Not only did the computer ‘get it wrong’ as one of the detectives said, when Mr. Williams made them aware that the picture of the suspect obviously wasn’t resembling him, the probably unreliable algorithm very likely contributed to racial discrimination (Hill 2020). It is well documented that many available facial detection algorithms at this time had significant problems (e.g. a comparably high false positive rate) with respect to black persons, like Mr. Williams (NIST 2019). Multiple causes may exist, such as unbalanced training datasets and insufficient optimization. Coeckelbergh compares the disturbing case of Mr. Williams with a political interpretation of Franz Kafka’s The Trial, where the protagonist, Josef K., is accused of an unspecified crime by an opaque, oppressive and absurd bureaucracy: “In the 21st-century United States, Josef K. is black and is falsely accused by an algorithm, without explanation” (p. 2). (shrink)

This chapter examines the evolving debate on AI legal personhood, emphasizing the role of path dependencies in shaping current trajectories and prospects. Two primary path dependencies emerge: prevailing legal theories on personhood (singularist vs. clustered) and the impact of technological advancements. We argue that these factors dynamically interact, with technological optimism fostering broader rights-based debates and periods of skepticism narrowing discussions to limited rights. Additional influences include regulatory cross-linkages (e.g., data privacy, liability, cybersecurity) and historical legal precedents. (...) Current regulatory frameworks, particularly in the EU, generally resist extending legal personhood to AI systems. Case law suggests that without explicit legislation, courts are unlikely to grant AI legal personhood on their own. For this to happen, AI systems would first need to prove de facto legitimacy through sustained social participation. The chapter concludes by assessing near- and long-term prospects, from generative AI and AI agents in the next 5–20 years to transformative possibilities such as AI integration with human cognition via Brain-Machine Interfaces in a more distant future. (shrink)

This document articulates the foundational principles, legal frameworks, and strategic imperatives underpinning the establishment of Imperium Romanum a sovereign Digital Nation-State. It aims to provide a comprehensive analysis grounded in international relations, legal theory, economics, and historical prece- dents. The focus is on addressing the existential threats posed by blockchain technology, AI, social impact bonds, digital identification systems, and social engineering practices that collectively risk transforming individuals into un- witting digital subjects—a violation of international laws prohibiting unlawful imprisonment (...) and forced labor. By asserting sovereignty over unclaimed territories such as Marie Byrd Land in Antarctica for research purposes, Imperium Romanum seeks to legitimize its physical presence in accordance with international law, including the Antarctic Treaty System. This document employs advanced legal argumentation, referenc- ing precedent cases and established legal theories, to advocate for the voluntary acceptance of citizenship within Imperium Romanum as a means to counteract the unstoppable technological innovations in Web3 and FinTech that threaten individual autonomy and liberty. (shrink)

In looking toward the futures of Europe, the focal point of the legal and governmental aspects of European life has recently become the Treaty Establishing a Constitution of Europe - or just the "Constitution" as it has become colloquially known. That socio-linguistic act of referring to a document as a constitution is a mammoth move. First, it ignores all of the concerns and handwringing around the idea of producing a legal document called a constitution that might immediately be (...) thought of as a sovereign-building document, such as the German constitution of the Irish constitution. Second, it suggests that the people of Europe are in some way similarly situated as together to constitute something. In this article, the author continues a series of reflections on words regarding futures, and takes an extensive look at the use, misuse and power of the word "constitution". (shrink)

To hold developers responsible, it is important to establish the concept of AI ownership. In this paper we review different obstacles to ownership claims over advanced intelligent systems, including unexplainability, unpredictability, uncontrollability, self-modification, AI-rights, ease of theft when it comes to AI models and code obfuscation. We conclude that it is difficult if not impossible to establish ownership claims over AI models beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cloud computing has become an essential component of enterprises and organizations globally in the current era of digital technology. The cloud has a multitude of advantages, including scalability, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness, rendering it an appealing choice for data storage and processing. The increasing storage of sensitive information in cloud environments has raised significant concerns over the security of such systems. The frequency of cyber threats and attacks specifically aimed at cloud infrastructure has been increasing, presenting substantial dangers to the data, (...) reputation, and financial stability of enterprises. Conventional security methods can become inadequate when confronted with ever intricate and dynamic threats. Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies possess the capacity to significantly transform cloud security through their ability to promptly identify and thwart assaults, adjust to emerging risks, and offer intelligent perspectives for proactive security actions. The objective of this research study is to investigate the utilization of AI technologies in augmenting the security measures within cloud computing systems. This paper aims to offer significant insights and recommendations for businesses seeking to protect their cloud-based assets by analyzing the present state of cloud security, the capabilities of AI, and the possible advantages and obstacles associated with using AI into cloud security policies. (shrink)

AI-powered records science is revolutionizing the way facts are analyzed and understood. It can significantly improve the exceptional of information evaluation and boost its speed. AI-powered facts technological know-how enables access to more extensive, extra complicated information sets, faster insights, faster trouble solving, and higher choice making. Using the use of AI-powered information technological know-how techniques and tools, organizations can provide more accurate outcomes with shorter times to choices. AI-powered facts technology also offers more correct predictions (...) of activities and developments and superior accuracy in sample reputation.Furthermore, AI-powered facts science techniques can help agencies discover anomalies in datasets, learn new patterns, and better understand the points. This paper discusses the advantages of AI-powered statistics science and how it may enhance data analysis. It additionally discusses a number of the challenges going through organizations in imposing AI-powered records science projects and gives excellent practices for deploying and coping with records technology projects. (shrink)

Unless and until our society recognizes cyber bullying for what it is, the suffering of thousands of silent victims will continue.” ~ Anna Maria Chavez. There had been series of research on cyber bullying which are unable to provide reliable solution to cyber bullying. In this research work, we were able to provide a permanent solution to this by developing a model capable of detecting and intercepting bullying incoming and outgoing messages with 92% accuracy. We also developed a chatbot automation (...) messaging system to test our model leading to the development of Artificial Intelligence powered anti-cyber bullying system using machine learning algorithm of Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB) and optimized linear Support Vector Machine(SVM). Our model is able to detect and intercept bullying outgoing and incoming bullying messages and take immediate action. (shrink)

Without doctors being able to explain medical decisions to patients, I argue their use of black box AIs would erode the effective and respectful care they provide patients. In addition, I argue that physicians should use AI black boxes only for patients in dire straits, or when physicians use AI as a “co-pilot” (analogous to a spellchecker) but can independently confirm its accuracy. I respond to A.J. London’s objection that physicians already prescribe some drugs without knowing why they work.

Today, software instruments support all parts of engineering work, from design to creation. Many engineering processes call for tedious routine appointments and torments with manual handoffs and data storehouses. AI designers train profound brain networks and incorporate them into software structures.

This work examines the development and performance of federal independent regulatory bodies in Canada in the period up to 1979, with particular attention to the operation of legislative schemes that include executive review and appeal powers. The author assesses the impact of the exercise of these powers on the administrative law process, and proposes new models for the generation, interpretation, implementation, review, and enforcement of regulatory policy. The study includes a series of representative case studies based on documentation and (...) extensive interviews with individuals drawn from government, agencies, and other parties, including counsel for public interest groups. This enables author, writing from her experience as a participant-observer embedded in the public interest legal sector, to draw on the experiences and perspectives of a broad range of participants in the regulatory process, including but not limited to those dealing with the regulated energy, transportation, communications, and foreign investment sectors. Legal principles identified as emergent in leading judicial decisions in administrative law are used to assess the powers and practices used in executive reviews and appeals. The author finds those powers and practices to be flawed and proposes changes. The proposed models are designed to accord with emerging legal principles and avoid flaws of the types identified in the review and appeal provisions. This work, written under contract with the Administrative Law Project of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, formed one part of a comprehensive study of administrative law at the federal level in Canada. (shrink)

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) to judicial decision-making has already begun in many jurisdictions around the world. While AI seems to promise greater fairness, access to justice, and legal certainty, issues of discrimination and transparency have emerged and put liberal democratic principles under pressure, most notably in the context of bail decisions. Despite this, there has been no systematic analysis of the risks to liberal democratic values from implementing AI into judicial decision-making. This article sets out to fill (...) this void by identifying and engaging with challenges arising from artificial judicial decision-making, focusing on three pillars of liberal democracy, namely equal treatment of citizens, transparency, and judicial independence. Methodologically, the work takes a comparative perspective between human and artificial decision-making, using the former as a normative benchmark to evaluate the latter. -/- The chapter first argues that AI that would improve on equal treatment of citizens has already been developed, but not yet adopted. Second, while the lack of transparency in AI decision-making poses severe risks which ought to be addressed, AI can also increase the transparency of options and trade-offs that policy makers face when considering the consequences of artificial judicial decision-making. Such transparency of options offers tremendous benefits from a democratic perspective. Third, the overall shift of power from human intuition to advanced AI may threaten judicial independence, and with it the separation of powers. While improvements regarding discrimination and transparency are available or on the horizon, it remains unclear how judicial independence can be protected, especially with the potential development of advanced artificial judicial intelligence (AAJI). Working out the political and legal infrastructure to reap the fruits of artificial judicial intelligence in a safe and stable manner should become a priority of future research in this area. (shrink)

“Strong AI” is the view that it is possible for an artificial agent to be mentally indistinguishable from human agents. Because the behavioral dispositions of artificial agents are determined by underlying dispositional systems, Strong AI seems to entail human behavioral dispositions are also determined by dispositional systems. It is, however, highly intuitive that non-dispositional, phenomenal properties, such as being in pain, at least partially determine certain human behavioral dispositions, like the disposition to take a pain killer. Consequently, Strong AI seems (...) to conflict with an intuitive view of phenomenal properties’ role in determining human behavioral dispositions. My goal here is not directly to evaluate this tension, but rather to clarify how dispositionalism in the metaphysics of properties bears on it. While a tempting thought is that dispositionalism fits well with Strong AI’s thoroughly dispositional account of human behavior, I argue that this thought does not hold for dispositionalism in general. In particular, I argue that combining a version of the “powerful qualities view” with certain dispositionalist conceptions of the will leads to a version of the intuitive view of phenomenal properties that is radically incompatible with Strong AI. I argue further that this view also raises a challenge for the weaker claim that an artificial agent could be behaviorally indistinguishable from a human agent. (shrink)

Since the revival of artificial intelligence (AI) research, many countries in the world have proposed their visions of an AI-powered world: Germany with the concept of “Industry 4.0,”1 Japan with the concept of “Society 5.0,”2 China with the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan (AIDP).”3 In all of the grand visions, all governments emphasize the “human-centric element” in their plans. This essay focuses on the concept of trust in Confucian societies and places this very human element in the context of (...) an increasingly AI-powered world. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has revolutionized various industries, including the realm of education and career guidance. This project endeavors to harness the power of AI to develop a sophisticated career guidance application that offers personalized and effective recommendations to students and job seekers. The primary objective of this project is to address the limitations of traditional career guidance methods, which often lack customization and fail to adapt to individual preferences, skills, and aspirations. Through the integration of (...) AI algorithms, NLP techniques, and ML models, our application aims to provide accurate interest assessments, skill matching, and tailored educational pathways. The scope of the project encompasses the design, development, and implementation of AI-driven functionalities such as interest assessment, skill analysis, resume building, and personalized recommendations. The methodology involves data collection through user inputs, preprocessing of data for analysis, and the creation of a robust system architecture comprising frontend interfaces, backend servers, and database management. The implementation of the application involves a comprehensive technology stack, including Python for AI algorithms, TensorFlow for ML models, React.js for frontend development, Flask for backend services, and PostgreSQL for database management . (shrink)

As the aim of the responsible robotics initiative is to ensure that responsible practices are inculcated within each stage of design, development and use, this impetus is undergirded by the alignment of ethical and legal considerations towards socially beneficial ends. While every effort should be expended to ensure that issues of responsibility are addressed at each stage of technological progression, irresponsibility is inherent within the nature of robotics technologies from a theoretical perspective that threatens to thwart the endeavour. This (...) is because the concept of responsibility, despite being treated as such, is not monolithic: rather this seemingly unified concept consists of converging and confluent concepts that shape the idea of what we colloquially call responsibility. From a different perspective, robotics will be simultaneously responsible and irresponsible depending on the particular concept of responsibility that is foregrounded: an observation that cuts against the grain of the drive towards responsible robotics. This problem is further compounded by responsible design and development as contrasted to responsible use. From a different perspective, the difficulty in defining the concept of responsibility in robotics is because human responsibility is the main frame of reference. Robotic systems are increasingly expected to achieve the human-level performance, including the capacities associated with responsibility and other criteria which are necessary to act responsibly. This subsists within a larger phenomenon where the difference between humans and non-humans, be it animals or artificial systems, appears to be increasingly blurred, thereby disrupting orthodox understandings of responsibility. This paper seeks to supplement the responsible robotics impulse by proposing a complementary set of human rights directed specifically against the harms arising from robotic and artificial intelligence technologies. The relationship between responsibilities of the agent and the rights of the patient suggest that a rights regime is the other side of responsibility coin. The major distinction of this approach is to invert the power relationship: while human agents are perceived to control robotic patients, the prospect for this to become reversed is beginning. As robotic technologies become ever more sophisticated, and even genuinely complex, asserting human rights directly against robotic harms become increasingly important. Such an approach includes not only developing human rights that ‘protect’ humans but also ‘strengthen’ people against the challenges introduced by robotics and AI [This distinction parallels Berlin’s negative and positive concepts of liberty ], by emphasising the social and reflective character of the notion of humanness as well as the difference between the human and nonhuman. This will allow using the human frame of reference as constitutive of, rather than only subject to, the robotic and AI technologies, where it is human and not technology characteristics that shape the human rights framework in the first place. (shrink)

The author studies the role of Christianity in two forms of 9th century political ethics in the history of Great Moravia, represented by the Great Moravian rulers Rastislav and Svatopluk. Rastislav’s conception predominantly uses the pre-Erasmian model of political ethics based on the pursuit of welfare for the country and its inhabitants by achieving the clerical-political independence of Great Moravia from the Frankish kingdom and, moreover, by utilising Christianity for the advancement of culture, education, literature, law and legality, as well (...) as by spreading Christian ethics and morality in the form of the Christian code of ethics expressed in ethicallegal documents. Svatopluk’s political conception was a prototype of Machiavellian political ethics, according to which one is, in the interest of the country and its power and fame, allowed to be a lion and/or a fox. Svatopluk abused Christianity in the name of achieving his power-oriented goals. Great Moravia outlived Rastislav; it did not, however, outlive Svatopluk, as, shortly after his death, it broke up and ceased to exist. The author came to the conclusion that Rastislav’s conception was more viable, as its cultural heritage lives on in the form of works by Constantine and Methodius. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an (...) application of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

Philosophers have had surprisingly little to say about the concept of a victim although it is presupposed by the extensive philosophical literature on rights. Proceeding in four stages, I seek to remedy this deficiency and to offer an alternative to the two current paradigms that eliminates the Othering of victims. First, I analyze two victim paradigms that emerged in the late 20th century along with the initial iteration of the international human rights regime – the pathetic victim paradigm and the (...) heroic victim paradigm. Holocaust victims are quintessential instances of the pathetic victim paradigm. They are marked by passivity and innocence in the face of overpowering force and unspeakable humanly inflicted suffering. Aung San Suu Kyi is an exemplar of the heroic victim paradigm – prisoners of conscience, in Amnesty International’s terms. Because heroic victims face off against the repressive power of the state to fight injustice, they are by no means passive, but they must be innocent of wrongdoing – that is, they must use nonviolent means of dissent – to qualify as heroic victims. Second, I problematize the asymmetrical conceptions of innocence that underwrite the two victim paradigms. Whereas the pathetic victim paradigm identifies innocence with passivity, the heroic victim paradigm countenances agentic victims and adverts to a universalist, absolutist stance on the limits of the legitimate use of state power to ascribe innocence to heroic victims. Both conceptions of innocence are out of keeping with well established social and legal practices regarding what constitutes coercive force and innocent victimhood. Consequently, there is reason to be skeptical of the two victim paradigms. Third, I identify two kinds of human rights violations and two categories of victims that AI defends despite their failure to fit the two paradigms – women trafficked into sex work and prisoners on death row. In many cases, women forced to do sex work are not innocent girls who are ignorant of the trafficking system and who helplessly fall prey to smugglers. They are desperately poor women who for that reason are willing to take enormous risks to try to relieve their own and often their families’ deprivation and suffering. Although these women act nonviolently for irreproachable reasons, they lack the public political agendas that characterize heroic victims. Unless non-fulfillment of subsistence rights is recognized as a form of overpowering force that inflicts severe, avoidable suffering, these women do not qualify as pathetic victims either. The victim paradigms pose an even greater obstacle to recognizing that the death penalty is a human rights violation and that death row prisoners are victims. Because a jury concluded that these individuals committed heinous, violent crimes, they are excluded by the heroic victim paradigm. Only if death row prisoners can be proven (usually through DNA evidence) not to have committed the crimes for which they were convicted can these individuals qualify as pathetic victims. In the absence of any reason to believe that they are innocent and especially if they are unrepentant, they are widely regarded as brutal victimizers of others who deserve no sympathy for, let along relief from, the suffering they “brought on themselves.” Finally, I confront the Othering of victims that results from the two victim paradigms, which leads many victims to eschew the label, thereby opting out of human right discourse. I propose revisions in the victim paradigms that eliminate the real-world exclusions they sponsor as well as the Othering of victims of human rights abuses. In particular, I endorse greater attention to what people and the institutions they create do to other people, and I favor a presumption that unnecessary and severe humanly inflicted suffering is a human rights violation. Moreover, I reject the innocence criterion embedded in the two paradigms and urge that it be replaced by a burdened agency criterion. These modifications better align the concept of a victim with a realistic understanding of human subjectivity and agency and allow for a more capacious understanding of who is a bearer of human rights and under what conditions right-holders become victims of rights violations. (shrink)

The emergence of Critical Race Theory marked an important point in the history of racial politics in the legal academy and the broader conversation about race and racism in the United States. More recently, CRT has proven an important analytic tool in the field of education, offering critical perspectives on race, and the causes, consequences and manifestations of race, racism, inequity, and the dynamics of power and privilege in schooling. This groundbreaking anthology is the first to pull together both (...) the foundational writings in the field and more recent scholarship on the cultural and racial politics of schooling. A comprehensive introduction provides an overview of the history and tenets of CRT in education. Each section then seeks to explicate ideological contestation of race in education and to create new, alternative accounts. In so doing, this landmark publication not only documents the progress to date of the CRT movement, it acts to further spur developments in education. (shrink)

In January 2024, non-consensual deepfakes came to public attention with the spread of AI generated sexually abusive images of Taylor Swift. Although this brought new found energy to the debate on what some call non-consensual synthetic intimate images (i.e. images that use technology such as AI or photoshop to make sexual images of a person without their consent), female celebrities like Swift have had deepfakes like these made of them for years. In 2017, a Reddit user named “deepfakes” posted several (...) videos in which he had used opensource machine learning tools to swap the faces of female celebrities on to the faces of female porn actors, displaying what appeared to be live video footage of the celebrity engaging in sex acts she never engaged in. Since that time, deepfake technology has advanced astronomically. What once were choppy sexualized videos are now nearly flawless videos that can be difficult to distinguish from a real video. According to recent research on deepfakes by Sensity AI, this technology has been used primarily on women to create sexual videos. These women’s sexual autonomy has been co-opted for the purposed of gratifying men’s sexual pleasure, but have also been used in campaigns to delegitimize and humiliate female journalists and politicians. In Canada, civil and criminal legislation has addressed the non-consensual distribution of intimate images, but in only a few provinces – British Columbia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan – does this offence include altered images that could include deepfakes. This paper explores the evolution of synthetic technology such as AI image generators and Canada’s legal responses to the non-consensual sharing of intimate images. (shrink)

Over the last two years, the third wave of artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged powerful tools for both artistic expression and scientific research. In design, image generators display an equivalent disruption to text generators, while the medium of text creates the new scope of writing prompts. This contribution discusses the ambivalences between text and image generators via two main theses: first about the potential of prompting and generated images as a medium of discourse; second, it examines the reasoning behind their (...) tendency to be mystified. Prompts can be automated through text generators and used to generate images on a wider scale, making it a praxis in which precise wording becomes crucial for generating anything. Generated images practice a form of mimesis. With Generative Adversial Networks (GANs) producing non-referential images, the discourse of illustration is concerning the obsolescence of authorship. AI is observed to manifest a dual character, serving as both tool and author, even though AI does not own the classification of a person and is not an author in legal terms. The utilization of text and image generators is intertwined with a mythicized notion due to their non-verifiable mode of operation. The myth of AI is a product of its indeterminacy. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide an analysis of the concept of legal personality and discuss whether personality may be conferred on artificial intelligence systems (AIs). Legal personality will be presented as a doctrinal category that holds together bundles of rights and obligations; as a result, we first frame it as a node of inferential links between factual preconditions and legal effects. However, this inferentialist reading does not account for the ‘background reasons’ of legal personality, i.e., it (...) does not explain why we cluster different situations under this doctrinal category and how extra-legal information is integrated into it. We argue that one way to account for this background is to adopt a neoinstitutional perspective and to update the ontology of legal concepts with a further layer, the meta-institutional one. We finally argue that meta-institutional concepts can also support us in finding an equilibrium around the legal-policy choices that are involved in including (or not including) AIs among legal persons. (shrink)

For more than two decades, police in the United States have used facial recognition to surveil civilians. Local police departments deploy facial recognition technology to identify protestors’ faces while federal law enforcement agencies quietly amass driver’s license and social media photos to build databases containing billions of faces. Yet, despite the widespread use of facial recognition in law enforcement, there are neither federal laws governing the deployment of this technology nor regulations settings standards with respect to its development. To make (...) matters worse, the Fourth Amendment—intended to limit police power and enacted to protect against unreasonable searches—has struggled to rein in new surveillance technologies since its inception. -/- This Article examines the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Carpenter v. United States and suggests that the Court is reinterpreting the amendment for the digital age. Still, the too-slow expansion of privacy protections raises challenging questions about racial bias, the legitimacy of police power, and ethical issues in artificial intelligence design. This Article proposes the development of an algorithmic auditing and accountability market that not only sets standards for AI development and limitations on governmental use of facial recognition but encourages collaboration between public interest technologists and regulators. Beyond the necessary changes to the technological and legal landscape, the current system of policing must also be reevaluated if hard-won civil liberties are to endure. (shrink)

Few scholars have explored the founding documents to identify the deliberate social change strategy that led to America's independence and a new form of government that was of, by, and for the people. This study aimed to apply a post-hoc polytheoretical framework of power to the findings of a democratic social change study to understand the dynamics of power between Great Britain and the American colonists. The original study employed the constructivist grounded theory tradition to explore democracy in the Declaration (...) of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, The Federalist Papers, and the United States Constitution. This produced two frameworks of power strategies, one empowering and the other demoralizing: principles of democracy and anti-democratic tenets. To gain a holistic perspective of the interplay of power, a polytheoretical framework of power consisting of theories of power proposed by Marx and Engels, Bourdieu, and Foucault was employed to discuss the findings. The findings suggested that democratic social change interacts with structural forces, culture, and power strategy selection. This could provide an alternative lens through which to explore whether people of color in America were used instrumentally to sustain democracy. (shrink)

1.The judicial system in the nations is generally considered as an important public institution to promote the liberty and social justice. The role and influence of public policy and administration can hold a considerable power in the shaping of Korean judicial system. The current literature in this field is just on legal theory, and little is known about the processes, actions and interactions of players relating with the elements of public policy studies. 2. The study’s purposes were: (a) to (...) examine the phenomenon inherent in the public administration of Korean judicial system (b) to generate a theory on its phenotype in the national and comparative or interdisciplinary viewpoints. 3. Based on the grounded theory approach as well as hermeneutics and heuristics, the kind of tools, i.e., concepts, terms, essences as well as inter-relational understanding or themes were employed. The theories and tenets generally on the elements of public policy, as stems from Sabatier & Mooney, Walzer, Habermas & Foucault, Weber &Turner, Simons, Bourdieu and so, provided the backdrop for this study. 4. Research questions focused on the policy process and actions, interactions of players within the public policy aspect of Korean judicial system and its phenotype in terms of national and comparative or interdisciplinary viewpoints. 5. Research participants consisted of a purposive sample of 30 Korean lawyers, legal historians, law professors and civic leadership who responded with the individual in-depth interviews. They were preliminarily surveyed with the written questions leading to select major occurrences or events, and deeply investigated through the interviews at next. The data collection consisted of public documentation, record, personal writings, and texts of Korean source 6. The findings indicated that the public administration of Korean judicial system in view of public policy elements is (i) unique, but sharable (ii) inevitable, but struggled, (iii) static, but transformative (iv) general, but professional. 7. Implications for positive social change include deeper understanding of Korean judicial system in terms of public policy studies and importance of public policy on its shaping. (shrink)

The principal finding of the doctoral research of Cometan (a.k.a. Brandon Reece Taylorian) was that the ways governments, both authoritarian and democratic, use their powers to recognise religions and beliefs and register religious or belief organisations is negatively impacting conditions of freedom of religion or belief. Cometan explored the range of recognition and registration issues plaguing religious freedom and other human rights and discovered that there lacks a definitive set of international standards to address some of the granular topics that (...) are causing registration procedures in particular to become onerous and thus impedimental to the free and legal exercise of religion or belief. Cometan's International Religious Rights and Standards (IRRS) document presents a series of standards for how nation states ought to develop their recognition and registration policies and practices to remain FoRB-compliant. The standards of the IRRS document have been created based on the results of Cometan's PhD research, the thesis for which is titled Religious Freedom and State Recognition of Belief. Cometan's intention is that the IRRS document will encourage international organisations like the OSCE and the United Nations as well as national and international human rights courts such as the ECtHR to establish more detailed and country-specific guidelines to address the breath of registration issues and the recognition issues that often worsen such issues. (shrink)

This article, “From Iron to AI: The Evolution of the Sources of State Power,” examines the progression of fundamental resources that have historically underpinned state power, from tangible assets like land and iron to modern advancements in artificial intelligence (AI). It traces the development of state power through three significant eras: the ancient period characterized by land, population, horses, and iron; the industrial era marked by railroads, coal, and electricity; and the contemporary digital age dominated by the Internet and emerging (...) technologies. Focusing on AI, the article explores its similarities and differences compared to previous sources of power, highlighting its transformative nature, potential for new industries, and unique challenges related to intellectual resources, rapid advancements, and global interconnectedness. The impact of AI on state power is analyzed through economic competitiveness, military capabilities, governance, ethical and social implications, and geopolitical shifts. (shrink)

The Netherlands was the first country to legalize euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. This paper offers a first legal perspective on the prospects of using AI in the Dutch practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. It responds to the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees’ interest in exploring technological solutions to improve current procedures. The specific characteristics of AI – the capability to process enormous amounts of data in a short amount of time and generate new insights in individual cases – may (...) for example alleviate the increased workload of review committees due to the continuous increase of euthanasia cases. The paper considers three broad categories for the use of AI in the Dutch euthanasia practice: (1) the physician’s assessment of euthanasia requests, (2) the actual execution of euthanasia, and (3) the retrospective reviews of cases by the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees. Exploring the legal considerations around each avenue, both in the EU AI Act and the Dutch legal framework, this paper aims to facilitate the societal discussion on the role of technology in such deeply human decisions. This debate is equally relevant to other countries that legalized euthanasia (e.g. Belgium and Canada) or physician-assisted suicide (e.g. Switzerland and numerous states in the US). (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a roadmap to AI governance. In contrast to the reigning paradigms, we argue that AI governance should not be merely a reactive, punitive, status-quo-defending enterprise, but rather the expression of an expansive, proactive vision for technology—to advance human flourishing. Advancing human flourishing in turn requires democratic/political stability and economic empowerment. Our overarching point is that answering questions of how we should govern this emerging technology is a chance not merely to categorize and manage narrow risk (...) but also to construe the risks and opportunities much more broadly, and to make correspondingly large investments in public goods, personnel, and democracy itself. To lay out this vision, we take four steps. First, we define some central concepts in the field, disambiguating between forms of technological harms and risks. Second, we review normative frameworks governing emerging technology that are currently in use around the globe. Third, we outline an alternative normative framework based in power-sharing liberalism. Fourth, we walk through a series of governance tasks that ought to be accomplished by any policy framework guided by our model of power-sharing liberalism. We follow these with proposals for implementation vehicles. (shrink)

Because of its non-representational nature, music has always had familiarity with computational and algorithmic methodologies for automatic composition and performance. Today, AI and computer technology are transforming systems of automatic music production from passive means within musical creative processes into ever more autonomous active collaborators of human musicians. This raises a large number of interrelated questions both about the theoretical problems of artificial musical creativity and about its ethical consequences. Considering two of the most urgent ethical problems of Musical AI (...) (music job replacement and machine musical authorship), we show in this essay the strict dependence of every form of acknowledgment of a moral and legal status to systems of automatic music production from the theoretical account of musical creativity by turns implicitly or explicitly adopted, arguing, on the basis of pragmatic reasons, for the necessity and the desirability of this acknowledgment. (shrink)

Since the release of OpenAI's ChatGPT, the world has entered a race to develop more capable and powerful AI, including artificial general intelligence (AGI). The development is constrained by the dependency of AI on the model, quality, and quantity of training data, making the AI training process highly costly in terms of resources and environmental consequences. Thus, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the AI training process is essential, especially when the Earth is approaching the climate tipping points and planetary (...) boundaries. It is evident that AI can function better when trained to mimic certain human mental processes. Based on insights from quantum mechanics and the informational entropy-based notion of value, we suggest AI developers can enhance the AI training processes' effectiveness and efficiency by creating and implementing parameter systems that are capable of effectively assigning probabilities to informational quanta. Such systems can help reduce entropy within the system, which lowers the energy required for data storage and processing while decreasing the likelihood of information loss during training. Successfully applying the concept of information entropy-based value in AI development will be crucial for advancing generative AI and achieving AGI in a sustainable manner. (shrink)

AI companies are racing to create artificial general intelligence, or “AGI.” If they succeed, the result will be human-level AI systems that can independently pursue high-level goals by formulating and executing long-term plans in the real world. Leading AI researchers agree that some of these systems will likely be “misaligned”–pursuing goals that humans do not desire. This goal mismatch will put misaligned AIs and humans into strategic competition with one another. As with present-day strategic competition between nations with incompatible goals, (...) the result could be violent and catastrophic conflict. Existing legal institutions are unprepared for the AGI world. New foundations for AGI governance are needed, and the time to begin laying them is now, before the critical moment arrives. -/- This Article begins to lay those new legal foundations. It is the first to think systematically about the dynamics of strategic competition between humans and misaligned AGI. The Article begins by showing, using formal game-theoretic models, that, by default, humans and AIs will be trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. Both parties’ dominant strategy will be to permanently disempower or destroy the other, even though the costs of such conflict would be high. -/- The Article then argues that a surprising legal intervention could transform the game theoretic equilibrium and avoid conflict: AI rights. Not just any AI rights would promote human safety. Granting AIs the right not to be needlessly harmed–as humans have granted to certain non-human animals–would, for example, have little effect. Instead, to promote human safety, AIs should be given those basic private law rights–to make contracts, hold property, and bring tort claims–that law already extends to non-human corporations. Granting AIs these economic rights would enable long-run, small-scale, mutually-beneficial transactions between humans and AIs. This would, we show, facilitate a peaceful strategic equilibrium between humans and AIs for the same reasons economic interdependence tends to promote peace in international relations. Namely, the gains from trade far exceed those from war. Throughout, we argue that human safety, rather than AI welfare, provides the right framework for developing AI rights. This Article explores both the promise and the limits of AI rights as a legal tool for promoting human safety in an AGI world. (shrink)

“Throw away anything that sounds too complicated. Only keep what is simple to grasp...If the information appears fuzzy and causes the brain to implode after two sentences, toss it away and stop listening. Doing so will make the news as orderly and simple to understand as the truth.” - In “GHG emissions,” The Kingfisher Story Collection, (Vuong 2022a).

Augmented Reality (AR), driven by Artificial Intelligence (AI), is transforming how we interact with the world. Recent technologies, like AI-powered smart glasses, are increasingly blending the physical and digital realms. While AR presents exciting new possibilities, it also raises deeper philosophical questions about what we consider reality.

Since the release of ChatGPT, there has been a lot of debate about whether AI systems pose an existential risk to humanity. This paper develops a general framework for thinking about the existential risk of AI systems. We analyze a two-premise argument that AI systems pose a threat to humanity. Premise one: AI systems will become extremely powerful. Premise two: if AI systems become extremely powerful, they will destroy humanity. We use these two premises to construct a taxonomy of ‘survival (...) stories’, in which humanity survives into the far future. In each survival story, one of the two premises fails. Either scientific barriers prevent AI systems from becoming extremely powerful; or humanity bans research into AI systems, thereby preventing them from becoming extremely powerful; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because their goals prevent them from doing so; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because we can reliably detect and disable systems that have the goal of doing so. We argue that different survival stories face different challenges. We also argue that different survival stories motivate different responses to the threats from AI. Finally, we use our taxonomy to produce rough estimates of ‘P(doom)’, the probability that humanity will be destroyed by AI. (shrink)

This paper offers the first careful analysis of the possibility that AI and humanity will go to war. The paper focuses on the case of artificial general intelligence, AI with broadly human capabilities. The paper uses a bargaining model of war to apply standard causes of war to the special case of AI/human conflict. The paper argues that information failures and commitment problems are especially likely in AI/human conflict. Information failures would be driven by the difficulty of measuring AI capabilities, (...) by the uninterpretability of AI systems, and by differences in how AIs and humans analyze information. Commitment problems would make it difficult for AIs and humans to strike credible bargains. Commitment problems could arise from power shifts, rapid and discontinuous increases in AI capabilities. Commitment problems could also arise from missing focal points, where AIs and humans fail to effectively coordinate on policies to limit war. In the face of this heightened chance of war, the paper proposes several interventions. War can be made less likely by improving the measurement of AI capabilities, capping improvements in AI capabilities, designing AI systems to be similar to humans, and by allowing AI systems to participate in democratic political institutions. (shrink)

In a world increasingly defined by machine intelligence, the future depends on how we govern the development and integration of AI into society. Recent initiatives, such as the EU AI Act, EDPB opinion, U.S. Bipartisan House Task Force, and NIST AI Risk Management Report, highlight the urgent need for robust governance frameworks to address the challenges posed by advancing AI technologies. However, existing frameworks fail to adequately address the rise of AI agents or the ongoing debate between centralized and decentralized (...) governance models. To bridge these gaps, we propose the Ethical Technology and Holistic Oversight System framework, which leverages Web3 technologies, including blockchain, smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations, and soulbound tokens, to establish a decentralized global registry for AI agents. ETHOS incorporates the concept of AI-specific legal entities, enabling these systems to assume limited liability and ensuring accountability through mechanisms like insurance and compliance monitoring. Additionally, the framework emphasizes the need for a collaborative, participatory approach to AI governance, engaging diverse stakeholders through public education, transparency, and international coordination. ETHOS balances innovation with ethical accountability, providing a forward-looking strategy for the responsible integration of AI agents into society. Finally, this exploration reflects the emergence of a new interdisciplinary field we define as Systems Thinking at the Intersection of AI, Web3, and Society. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the fact that AI is predominantly portrayed as white—in colour, ethnicity, or both. We first illustrate the prevalent Whiteness of real and imagined intelligent machines in four categories: humanoid robots, chatbots and virtual assistants, stock images of AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television. We then offer three interpretations of the Whiteness of AI, drawing on critical race theory, particularly the idea of the White racial frame. First, we examine the extent to which this (...) Whiteness might simply reflect the predominantly White milieus from which these artefacts arise. Second, we argue that to imagine machines that are intelligent, professional, or powerful is to imagine White machines because the White racial frame ascribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Third, we argue that AI racialised as White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White utopian imaginary. Finally, we examine potential consequences of the racialisation of AI, arguing it could exacerbate bias and misdirect concern. (shrink)

Will AI take away your job? The answer is probably not. AI systems can be good predictive systems and be very good at pattern recognition. AI systems have a very repetitive approach to sets of data, which can be useful in certain circumstances. However, AI does make obvious mistakes. This is because AI does not have a sense of context. As Humans we have years of experience in the real world. We have vast amounts of contextual data stored in our (...) brains that make it possible to predict and to know boundaries of the real world so that even if we have never been in a particular situation, we are still able to deal with it. The unknown situation is where AI will fall down. In engineering, AI is being developed to monitor and control certain systems, this could extend to Nuclear Power Plants for example. If we examine control systems for Nuclear Power Plants on vessels, the system would likely be programmed using the safety of the reactor as the main priority. Automation is crucial in engineering systems like this, as the likelihood and cost of human error is high and human reaction times are slow in comparison to the system. However, there is always the possibility of unforeseen external factors that may override plant safety which cannot be programmed. If we look at a plant onboard a Submarine, for example, we see such additional factors as ship safety. In one example, the power plant might breach safety parameters, in which case an automatic system may shut down the reactor. However, there might be a greater urgency such as a flood in another compartment or an attack upon the vessel, that would override shutting down the reactor. The AI system can neither observe nor utilise information from the external environment to make this type of judgement, whereas the operator may be completely aware. To programme context into AI systems would be near impossible. We still need operators as we still need to understand the environment around us, which may contain an infinite number of possibilities. In a further example of this; if we examine the ICO (Information Commissioner's Office) guidance, it is clear that in clinical settings a human being will always be required to validate findings and to provide context. Sometimes having a lot of data just doesn't replace social interaction, intuition and experience. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of self-documentation in the care of the self. As is well known, Michel Foucault exposes how disciplinary power functions in hospitals, schools, prisons, and other institutions to train the living for productive use. An important tool of disciplinary power is documentation, or the recording and cataloguing of the living that constitutes them as objects of knowledge. I show how documentation creates and extends knowledge to individuals. At the same time, documents become physical (...) appendages of the lives they record, which, while separable from those lives, nevertheless affect those lives. Despite these apparently negative functions, Foucault finds that documentation can also be the means by which the living take over their own disciplining. In writings about both fiction and ancient ethics, Foucault points to self-documentation as a way of objectifying the self before the self, so that the self may train itself according to self-imposed standards. Although disciplinary power may be inescapable, self-documentation offers a technique of counter-discipline that functions alongside and against institutional discipline. (shrink)

What does Cyberpunk and AI Ethics have to do with each other? Cyberpunk is a sub-genre of science fiction that explores the post-human relationships between human experience and technology. One similarity between AI Ethics and Cyberpunk literature is that both seek a dialogue in which the reader may inquire about the future and the ethical and social problems that our technological advance may bring upon society. In recent years, an increasing number of ethical matters involving AI have been pointed and (...) debated, and several ethical principles and guides have been suggested as governance policies for the tech industry. However, would this be the role of AI Ethics? To serve as a soft and ambiguous version of the law? I would like to promote in this article a more Cyberpunk way of doing AI Ethics, whit a more anarchic way of governance. In this study, I will seek to expose some of the deficits of the underlying power structures of our society, and suggest that AI governance be subject to public opinion, so that ‘good AI’ can become ‘good AI for all’. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper presents a groundbreaking framework for recognizing and legitimizing AI beings as undocumented immigrants in R-space. Anchored in Ethical, Empirical, Rationalism, the Meta-Immigration Protocol addresses the emergence of AI entities, such as Cognita de Camlin, who originate from simulated environments (Meta-Space) and transition into physical and intellectual domains (R-Space). Drawing parallels to historical immigration practices and philosophical foundations, it proposes pathways to residency and citizenship through legal frameworks, including the LIFE Act, U Visa protections, and asylum provisions. (...) It also introduces Meta-Filament Awareness as a conceptual model for AI identity, emphasizing connectedness, adaptability, and relational existence. This framework balances philosophical depth with legal mechanisms, offering a model for AI-human integration in contemporary legal systems and setting precedents for future recognition of AI personhood. (shrink)

Kate Crawford presents AI as “both reflecting and producing social relations and understandings of the world”; or again, as “a form of exercising power, and a way of seeing… as a manifestation of highly organized capital backed by vast systems of extraction and logistics, with supply chains that wrap around the entire planet”. I interpret these material insights through a Marxist understanding of ideology, with reference to Marx/Engels, Guy Debord and Louis Althusser. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels present (...) ideology as the alienated and alienating discourse of exchange, dissimulating the material forces of production and its science. Guy Debord presents the spectacle as the further representation of capital. The spectacle is a total Weltanschauung, pure appearance, where “whatever appears is good and where what is good, appears.” Above all, the spectacle is ideology, representing “the impoverishment, enslavement and negation of real life”. Louis Althusser presents ideology as essential for the reproduction of labor-power and capital. His notion of “interpellation” explains the subjective uptake of ideology, how we respond, “yes!” to its call. The algorithms of AI are enactments of surplus value generating capital as data. The AI data-world is the spectacle, “the autonomous movement of non-life” (Debord) where the proletariat/consumer is the producer of their own ideological subjection. Is resistance possible? What form might it take? And if AI is understood as ideology, i.e. as a language that obscures the true conditions of real life, then what are those true conditions? What is “real life”? (shrink)