In their 2013 study of traumatic flashback formation, Bourne, Mackay and Holmes raise the question of whether the propensity of a traumatic experience to produce flashbacks is determined by the emotions that are felt at the time of that experience. They suggest that it is not, but the grounds on which they make this suggestion are flawed. Further research is required. That research will need to overcome a significant methodological difficulty — one which is hard to avoid when fMRI data (...) and introspective reports are combined in a single causal inference. (shrink)

The semantic issues that Saul Kripke addressed in Naming and Necessity overlap substantially with those that were addressed by Michel Foucault in “What Is an Author?”. The present essay examines their area of overlap, with a view to showing that each of these works affords a perspective on the other, from which facets that are usually obscure can be brought into view. It shows that Foucault needs to take some assumptions from Kripke’s theory of naming in order to secure one (...) of his arguments for treating authorial names as special. It then shows that, once it has been placed on these Kripkean foundations, Foucault’s position avoids the metaphysically peculiar commitments that are sometimes thought to be essential... (shrink)

Background: Although inclusive education is widely discussed, its implementation has not, arguably, been far-reaching. There remains a lack of specific, targeted approaches towards fully including learners with physical and mental impairments in the educational space. Objectives: This study investigated the extent of the inclusion of learners with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in three schools in Johannesburg. Method: A qualitative interpretivist design was adopted. Teachers who work with learners with ASD were interviewed using open-ended questions. The sampled data were analysed using (...) thematic analysis, making use of both a priori codes and emergent codes that arose from the open-ended questions. Results: The findings reveal numerous pedagogic strategies such as differentiation, scaffolding, use of visual cues, group work and collaboration that can include learners with ASD in the classroom space. Conclusion: Teacher collaboration and teacher training are vital in ensuring that learners with ASD are fully included in the classroom space. (shrink)

This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention (...) is defective. Instead it reconstrues the explanatory relationship between attention and the processes that constitute it, in a way that is illustrated here by considering the relationship between attention and the processes that are identified by the biased competition theory. After considering some of the ways in which an adverbialist approach might be developed, the article concludes by suggesting some possible solutions to a problem concerning distraction, by which prominent adverbialist theories of attention have been dogged. (shrink)

Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.

A response to Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya's 'Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes'.

Clare Batty has recently argued that the content of human olfactory experience is 'a very weak kind of abstract, or existentially quantified content', and so that 'there is no way things smell'. Her arguments are based on two claims. Firstly, that there is no intuitive distinction between olfactory hallucination and olfactory illusion. Secondly, that olfaction 'does not present smell at particular locations', and 'seems disengaged from any particular object'. The present article shows both of these claims to be false. It (...) shows that naïve subjects find it quite natural to draw a distinction between olfactory hallucination and olfactory illusion. And it argues that the phenomenology of normal olfactory experience is of particular objects as having smells. Two confusions are responsible for Batty thinking otherwise: (1) Batty's examples are cases of extreme pungency, and she mistakes a peculiarity of intense perceptions for a property of olfaction more generally; (2) Batty focuses on very short time slices and so confuses limitations on the information carried by a single sniff for a limitation on the logical form of all olfactory content. (shrink)

There is a long‐standing project in psychology the goal of which is to explain our ability to perceive speech. The project is motivated by evidence that seems to indicate that the cognitive processing to which speech sounds are subjected is somehow different from the normal processing employed in hearing. The Motor Theory of speech perception was proposed in the 1960s as an attempt to explain this specialness. The first part of this essay is concerned with the Motor Theory's explanandum. It (...) shows that it is rather hard to give a precise account of what the Motor Theory is a theory of. The second part of the essay identifies problems with the theory's explanans: There are difficulties in finding a plausible account of what the content of the Motor Theory is supposed to be. (shrink)

It often seems incorrect to say that psychiatric conditions are diseases, and equally incorrect to say that they are not. This results in what would seem to be an unsatisfactory stalemate. The present essay examines the considerations that have brought us to such a stalemate in our discussions of autism. It argues that the stalemate in this particular case is a reflection of the fact that we need to find the logical space for a position that rejects both positive and (...) negative answers. It then suggests one way in which we might find such space, by applying Michael Dummett’s notion of semantic disharmony. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch held that states of mind and character are of the first moral importance, and that attention to one's states of mind and character are a widespread source of moral failure. Maintaining both of these claims can lead to problems in the account of how one could become good. This paper explains the way in which Murdoch negotiated those problems, focusing, in particular on /The Sovereignty of Good/ and /The Nice and The Good/.

The position that Stokes’s Thinking and Perceiving aims to overthrow is committed to the idea that the facts about one’s propositional attitudes and the facts about one’s perceptual experiences are alike grounded in facts about representations (in various formats) that are being held in a short or long term memory store, so that computations can be performed upon them. Claims about modularity are claims about the distinctness of these memory stores, and of these representations. One way in which to reject (...) these claims is to deny only that distinctness. A more radical way would be to reject the underlying idea that facts about perception and facts about propositional attitudes are alike grounded in facts about stored representations. Although the more radical approach might seem to face a problem concerning causal efficacy, I suggest that the way is open for Stokes to take it. (shrink)

The use of brain scanning now dominates the cognitive sciences, but important questions remain to be answered about what, exactly, scanning can tell us. One corner of cognitive science that has been transformed by the use of neuroimaging, and that a scanning enthusiast might point to as proof of scanning's importance, is the study of face perception. Against this view, we argue that the use of scanning has, in fact, told us rather little about the information processing underlying face perception (...) and that it is not likely to tell us much more. (shrink)

Once we have distinguished between beauty and aesthetic value, we are faced with the question of whether beauty is a thing of value in itself. A number of theorists have suggested that the answer might be no. They have thought that the pursuit of beauty is just the indulgence of one particular taste: a taste that has, for contingent historical reasons, been privileged. This paper attempts to resist a line of thought that leads to that conclusion. It does so by (...) arguing that there really are objective facts about beauty. To do this, the paper draws distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity, and between realism and anti-realism. It argues that, regarding attributions of beauty, we should be realists and objectivists. This is shown to be compatible with taking the semantic content of such attributions to vary between contexts. This form of context sensitivity is able to account of those features of beauty-attributions that have been taken as evidence for its subjectivity. (shrink)

Following the precedent set by Dorthe Berntsen’s 2009 book, Involuntary Autobiographical Memory, this paper asks whether the mechanisms responsible for involuntarily recollected memories are distinct from those that are responsible for voluntarily recollected ones. Berntsen conjectures that these mechanisms are largely the same. Recent work has been thought to show that this is mistaken, but the argument from the recent results to the rejection of Berntsen’s position is problematic, partly because it depends on a philosophically contentious view of voluntariness. Berntsen (...) herself shares this contentious view, but the defenders of her position can easily give it up. This paper explains how and why they should. (shrink)

This article examines one way in which a fiction can carry ontological commitments. The ontological commitments that the article examines arise in cases where there are norms governing discourse about items in a fiction that cannot be accounted for by reference to the contents of the sentences that constitute a canonical telling of that fiction. In such cases, a fiction may depend for its contents on the real-world properties of real-world items, and the fiction may, in that sense, be ontologically (...) committed. Having outlined a way of gauging the ontological commitments of a fiction, the article concludes by illustrating the way in which these considerations can be put to work in assessing the prospects of using fictionalism as a tactic for understanding the metaphysics of modality without incurring a commitment to the real existence of merely possible worlds. (shrink)

It is unfashionable to suggest that enactive processes - including some that involve the mirror neuron system - might contribute to the comprehension of sign language. The present essay formulates and defends a version of that unfashionable suggestion, as it applies to certain forms of syntactic processing. There is evidence that has been thought to weigh against any such suggestion, coming from neuroimaging experiments and from the study of Deaf aphasics. In both cases it is shown to be unpersuasive.

This article attempts to explain the value that we assign to the presence of friends at the time when life is ending. It first shows that Aristotle’s treatment of friendship does not provide a clear account of such value. It then uses J. L. Austin’s notion of performativity to supplement one recent theory of friendship – given by Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett – in such a way that that theory can then account for friendship’s special value at our time (...) of death. (shrink)

A critical notice of Alexander Nehamas's Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art.

Nineteen fifty-eight was an extraordinary year for cultural innovation, especially in English literature. It was also a year in which several boldly revisionary positions were first articulated in analytic philosophy. And it was a crucial year for the establishment of structural linguistics, of structuralist anthropology, and of cognitive psychology. Taken together these developments had a radical effect on our conceptions of individual creativity and of the inheritance of tradition. The present essay attempts to illuminate the relationships among these developments, and (...) to explain the foundational role played by mathematical, logical and information theory in all of them. (shrink)

Brief review of Mark Solms' "The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness".

Is attention a cognitive process? I reconstruct and critically assess an argument first proposed by Christopher Mole that it cannot be so. Mole’s argument is influential because it creates theoretical space for a unifying analysis of attention at the subject level (though it does not entail it). Prominent philosophers working on attention such as Wayne Wu and Philipp Koralus explicitly endorse it, while Sebastian Watzl endorses a related version, this despite their differing theoretical commitments. I show that Mole’s argument is (...) invalid, amend it to secure its validity, but argue that it still fails. I consider the extent to which the failure of Mole’s argument spreads to the versions offered by Wu, Koralus and Watlz. Mole’s argument fails because it equivocates between the set of conditions that suffice for constituting attention and the subset of those conditions which are salient, but insufficient, for constituting it. Reflection on this distinction has consequences for the individuation not just of attentional processes but all cognitive processes. (shrink)

Zhuangzi chooses a butterfly as a metaphor for transformation, a sighted creature whose inherent nature contains, and symbolizes, the potential for transformation from a less valued state to a more valued state. If transformation is not to be valued; if, according to a recent article by Jung Lee, 'there is no implication that it is either possible or desirable for the living to awake from their dream', why not tell a story of a mole awakening from a dream? This would (...) be a more perfect story. There would be no point of a mole awakening since (setting aside tactile, olfactory, auditory and taste sensations for the purpose of the example), there is no way to distinguish between the world of the mole's imagination and the real world that is forever unavailable to a mole. In addition, Zhuangzi relates the story of the coming of a great sage in which it is clearly stated that 'Only at the ultimate awakening shall we know that this is the ultimate dream'. Such textual evidence both from the choice of metaphors and evidential passages indicates that the message of the Zhuangzi is not epistemological relativity, but one of transformation from a state of intellectual blindness to a state of true understanding. (shrink)

This is a forward for the reissue of Moles's book, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology. I first summarize the main arguments in the book and then explain why contemporary readers should be very interested in engaging with this book.

According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...) implications regarding the prospects of using attention research to inform us about consciousness. The present essay shows that these lines of research are not successful, and that the commonsense picture of the relationship between attention and consciousness can be. (shrink)

Can one pay attention to objects without being conscious of them? Some years ago there was evidence that had been taken to show that the answer is 'yes'. That evidence was inconclusive, but there is recent work that makes the case more compellingly: it now seems that it is indeed possible to pay attention to objects of which one is not conscious. This is bad news for theories in which the connection between attention and consciousness is taken to be an (...) essential one. It is good news for theories (including mine) in which the connection between attention and agency is taken to be essential. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s later works are full of questions about the timing and duration of mental phenomena. These questions are often awkward ones, and Wittgenstein seems to take their awkwardness to be philosophically revealing, but if we ask what it is that these questions reveal then different interpretations are possible. This paper suggests that there are at least six different ways in which the timing of mental phenomena can be awkward. By identifying these we can give sense to some of Wittgenstein’s more (...) cryptic remarks, and doing this enables us to clarify some obscure elements in his picture of the mind, including the distinction between sensations and feelings, and his account of the rational status of those processes out of which rule-following is built. (shrink)

J. L. Austin showed that performative speech acts can fail in various ways, and that the ways in which they fail can often be revealing, but he was not concerned with understanding performative failures that occur in the context of poetry. Geoffrey Hill suggests, in both his poetry and his prose writings, that these failures are more interesting than Austin realized. This article corrects Maximilian de Gaynesford’s misunderstanding of Hill’s treatment of this point. It then explains the way in which (...) Hill’s understanding of the performative restrictions on poetry relate to his conception of poetry’s role, analogous to that of the Saturnalian misruler, in establishing the authority of ordinary language. (shrink)

The nature of attention has been the topic of a lively research programme in psychology for over a century. But there is widespread agreement that none of the theories on offer manage to fully capture the nature of attention. Recently, philosophers have become interested in the debate again after a prolonged period of neglect. This paper contributes to the project of explaining the nature of attention. It starts off by critically examining Christopher Mole’s prominent “adverbial” account of attention, which traces (...) the failure of extant psychological theories to their assumption that attending is a kind of process. It then defends an alternative, process-based view of the metaphysics of attention, on which attention is understood as an activity and not, as psychologists seem to implicitly assume, an accomplishment. The entrenched distinction between accomplishments and activities is shown to shed new light on the metaphysics of attention. It also provides a novel diagnosis of the empirical state of play. (shrink)

Modern philosophy can often appear to be mere cryptomnesia, redressed and resuited to fit the particular mouth from which it is espoused. This notion is but a sorrowful chimera binding the 21st-century mind to the confines of an eternal shadow, an eternal prison of doubt in the face of limitless potential. As a species, we are rapidly approaching the precipice of Yahweh's original position as instantiators of consciousness, as the I AM in relation to our artificial progeny. Could one fabricate (...) a candidate more fitting for a contra-analysis of our current situation than Hegel? One could not. (shrink)

GERENCIAMENTO DA REPRODUÇÃO: ETAPAS E TÉCNICAS PARA REALIZAÇÃO DA INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Técnico em Agropecuária – Normalista e Acadêmico em Zootecnia Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 1. INTRODUÇÃO -/- O método mais comumente usado para realizar inseminação artificial (IA) em bovinos é a técnica retovaginal. O conhecimento essencial para realizar esta técnica pode ser obtido com cerca de 3 dias de prática, sob a supervisão e instrução de um profissional. Com (...) tempo e prática, você pode ganhar mais competência e mais confiança. Independentemente de o inseminador ser canhoto ou destro, é recomendável que a mão esquerda seja usada no reto para manipular o trato reprodutivo e a mão direita seja usada para manusear a pistola de inseminação. Isso ocorre porque o rúmen ou o estômago da vaca estão no lado esquerdo da cavidade abdominal e deslocam o trato reprodutivo levemente para a direita. Portanto, pode ser mais fácil encontrar e manipular o trato com a mão esquerda. -/- 2. BENEFÍCIOS DA REPRODUÇÃO POR INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/-  Maiores melhorias genéticas  Melhores conquistas na reprodução  Nenhuma despesa oculta  Capacidade de controlar a propagação de doenças  Facilidade de travessia  Bezerros mais uniformes  Sem chance de ter touros perigosos 3. ETAPAS E TÉCNICAS DA INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/- Etapa 1 : Imobilize o animal a ser inseminado. Há muitos detalhes que devem ser considerados ao escolher um local para inseminação animal. Por exemplo, a segurança do animal e do inseminador, a facilidade de uso do local e a proteção contra intempéries. Pode ser útil dar tapinhas no animal ou falar suavemente quando o inseminador se aproxima para evitar que a vaca fique alarmada ou surpreendida. -/- Etapa 2 : levante a cauda com a mão direita e massageie suavemente o reto com a luva lubrificada na mão esquerda. Coloque a cauda na parte de trás do antebraço esquerdo para que não interfira no processo de inseminação. Coloque a mão esquerda com os dedos juntos em uma forma pontiaguda e insira-a no reto até o pulso. -/- Etapa 3 : limpe a vulva cuidadosamente usando uma toalha de papel para remover todo o excesso de esterco e outros detritos. Cuidado para não aplicar muita pressão, o que pode manchar a vulva e a vagina com estrume. Faça um punho com a mão esquerda e pressione a parte superior da vulva. Isso abrirá os lábios da vulva e permitirá acesso gratuito por várias polegadas à ponta da pistola antes de fazer contato com as paredes vaginais. Etapa 4 : insira a pistola em um ângulo de 30 ° para evitar penetrar na abertura uretral e na bexiga, as quais estão no chão da vagina. Com 6 ou 8 polegadas da arma dentro da vagina, levante a parte traseira da vagina, coloque-a em uma posição nivelada e deslize-a para frente. -/- Para obter uma inseminação bem-sucedida, é muito importante sempre saber onde está localizada a ponta da pistola de inseminação. As paredes vaginais consistem em finas camadas musculares e tecido conjuntivo mole. A pistola pode ser facilmente sentida com a mão esquerda no reto. Ao inserir a pistola na vagina, mantenha a mão enluvada nivelada com a ponta da pistola (Figura 1). A presença de esterco no reto muitas vezes impede o inseminador de sentir o colo do útero e a ponta da arma. No entanto, raramente é necessário remover todo o estrume do intestino. Em vez disso, mantenha a mão aberta com a palma da mão no chão do reto, para permitir que o estrume passe sobre a mão e o braço (Figura 2). Com a mão no reto, o inseminador pode notar estreitamento ou "anéis" do cólon tentando forçar o braço esquerdo para fora da vaca. Para relaxar esses anéis, coloque dois dedos no centro de um anel e massageie para frente e para trás. O anel finalmente relaxará, passará sobre a mão e o braço e o inseminador poderá continuar o processo de palpação (figura 3). -/- Como o trato reprodutivo se move livremente, as vacas que respondem com fortes contrações no reto e no abdômen quando se sentem palpadas podem eventualmente colocar seu trato reprodutivo dentro da cavidade pélvica. Isso pode causar muitas dobras na vagina. Nesses casos, a pistola pode atolar nessas dobras e há muito pouco a ser feito até serem removidas. Se você encontrar o colo do útero, agarre-o e empurre-o suavemente para frente. Isso fará com que a vagina se endireite e a pistola passe com segurança para o colo do útero (Figura 4). O inseminador notará uma sensação peculiar de cartilagem na arma ao tocar o colo do útero. -/- O colo uterino (Figura 5) consiste em tecido conjuntivo denso e músculo e é o principal ponto de referência para inseminar animais. Diz-se frequentemente o tamanho e a consistência de um pescoço de peru. No entanto, o tamanho pode variar com o intervalo pós-parto e com a idade do animal. O colo do útero geralmente tem de três a quatro anéis ou dobras anulares. A abertura do colo uterino se projeta para dentro da vagina. -/- Na maioria das vacas, o colo do útero está localizado no chão da cavidade pélvica, próximo ao lado anterior (frontal) da pelve. Em vacas mais velhas, o colo do útero pode ser posicionado ligeiramente acima do osso pélvico e para dentro da cavidade abdominal. Etapa 5 :Depois que a pistola toca a superfície externa do colo do útero, o inseminador está pronto para começar a passar o colo pelo final da pistola. Coloque o colo do útero sobre a arma; Observe que não é a arma que passa pelo pescoço. Movimento excessivo ou sondagem com a pistola durante esta etapa raramente são produtivos. A chave para dominar esta etapa do processo de inseminação é saber como entender e manipular o colo do útero, bem como a concentração para fazer o trabalho com a mão dentro da vaca e não com a arma. Quando a pistola toca pela primeira vez no colo do útero, o inseminador geralmente notará que a ponta está na área do fornix diretamente acima do topo da abertura cervical. Se isso acontecer, Segure a abertura externa do colo do útero com o polegar acima e os outros dedos abaixo (Figura 6). Isso faz com que as partes inferior e superior do fornix se fechem. Também é importante que você ainda saiba a localização da ponta da arma. Para fazer isso, toque a pistola com a palma da mão e com os dedos médio e anelar da mão que está em seu reto. Use a palma da mão e esses dois dedos para apontar a arma para a abertura no colo do útero entre o polegar e o indicador. Com uma sonda macia, a abertura do colo do útero deve estar localizada. O inseminador sentirá a arma deslizar para a frente até tocar o segundo anel do colo do útero. Também é importante que você ainda saiba a localização da ponta da arma. Para fazer isso, toque a pistola com a palma da mão e com os dedos médio e anelar da mão que está em seu reto. Use a palma da mão e esses dois dedos para apontar a arma para a abertura no colo do útero entre o polegar e o indicador. Com uma sonda macia, a abertura do colo do útero deve estar localizada. O inseminador sentirá a arma deslizar para a frente até tocar o segundo anel do colo do útero. Também é importante que você ainda saiba a localização da ponta da arma. Para fazer isso, toque a pistola com a palma da mão e com os dedos médio e anelar da mão que está em seu reto. Use a palma da mão e esses dois dedos para apontar a arma para a abertura no colo do útero entre o polegar e o indicador. Com uma sonda macia, a abertura do colo do útero deve estar localizada. O inseminador sentirá a arma deslizar para a frente até tocar o segundo anel do colo do útero. -/- Etapa 6 :Mantenha uma pressão suave, mas constante, na pistola, deslize o polegar e o indicador logo à frente da ponta da pistola e segure o colo do útero novamente. Como o colo do útero é composto de tecido conjuntivo e músculo densos, é difícil distinguir claramente a ponta da pistola quando ela está dentro da estrutura. No entanto, o inseminador pode determinar a localização aproximada dobrando o colo do útero. Aproveitando a flexibilidade do pulso, torça e dobre o colo do útero até que o segundo anel deslize sobre a ponta da pistola (figura 7). Repita o processo até que todos os anéis tenham passado pela ponta da pistola. Lembre-se de que é o colo do útero que é colocado sobre a pistola e que não é a arma que passa pelo colo do útero. O que é mais necessário é uma pressão suave para a frente, enquanto o movimento da pistola deve ser mínimo. Uma vez que todos os anéis foram liberados do colo do útero, a pistola deve deslizar para a frente sem dificuldade. Como as paredes do útero são muito finas, o inseminador poderá sentir a ponta da arma novamente. -/- Passo 7 : Chegou a hora de verificar a localização da arma e depositar o sêmen. Gire a mão com a luva até ficar acima do colo do útero. Usando o dedo indicador dessa mão, localize a outra extremidade do colo do útero (Figura 8). Puxe a pistola para trás até que a ponta esteja diretamente sob o dedo indicador, perto da abertura interna do colo do útero. Levante o dedo e deposite lentamente o sêmen (figura 9). Empurre lentamente o êmbolo para que gotas de sêmen caiam diretamente no corpo do útero. -/- Com a técnica de inseminação artificial e a colocação apropriada da arma, o sêmen será depositado no corpo do útero. Posteriormente, as contrações do útero transportam o esperma para os tubos e ovidutos, com uma boa distribuição dos dois lados (Figura 10). Se a pistola penetrar mais de uma polegada após o colo do útero, todo o sêmen será depositado em um dos tubos (figura 11). Certifique-se de levantar o dedo indicador após verificar o posicionamento da pistola. Não fazer isso pode entupir um dos tubos, causando uma distribuição desigual do sêmen. Ao verificar o posicionamento da ponta da pistola, tome cuidado para não aplicar pressão excessiva. As delicadas paredes do útero são facilmente danificadas, o que pode causar infecções e reduzir a fertilidade. Certifique-se de empurrar com o êmbolo e não puxe a pistola para trás. Puxar a arma para trás pode resultar em grande parte da dose de sêmen sendo depositada no colo do útero e na vagina, e não no corpo do útero. Embora o local recomendado para depositar o sêmen seja o corpo do útero, as pesquisas sugerem que, se houver dúvida quanto ao posicionamento exato da ponta da arma, depositar o sêmen em um dos tubos uterinos tem menos possibilidades de comprometer a fertilidade do que quando depositada no colo do útero. No entanto, se o muco cervical de uma vaca que já foi inseminada parecer grosso e pegajoso na arma, isso pode ser uma indicação de que a vaca está grávida. Nestes casos, deposite o sêmen mais ou menos pela metade dentro do colo do útero. Etapa 8 : depois de depositar o sêmen com sucesso, remova lentamente a pistola do trato reprodutivo. Retire a luva do reto. Examine a ponta da arma em busca de vestígios de sangue, infecção ou sêmen vazando do coldre da arma. Faça anotações para consultas futuras e para o veterinário local. Retire o coldre da pistola e segure-o com a mão enluvada. Verifique novamente para ver qual animal foi usado. Remova a luva começando do topo do braço e virando-a do avesso para que resíduos de adubo, cobertura e sujeira fiquem dentro. Descarte a luva e seu conteúdo em um recipiente apropriado. Lave e seque a pistola e retorne-a para onde está armazenada. A seguir, algumas das coisas mais importantes a serem lembradas ao inseminar vacas: • Faça com cuidado (não aplique muita força) • A inseminação é basicamente um processo de duas etapas: levar a arma para o colo do útero e, em seguida, colocar o colo sobre a arma • Deposite o sêmen logo após o colo do útero e no corpo do útero • Não tenha pressa • Relaxe A inseminação correta resultará em uma reprodução mais eficiente. Após isso, mais atenção pode ser direcionada aos aspectos econômicos, como a produção de leite, que permitirá um maior retorno do dinheiro gasto no sêmen. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – DZ da UFRPE. Recife, 2020. -/- Apoio -/- Realização -/- . (shrink)

Open theists argue that God's relationship to time, as conceived in classical theism, is erroneous. They explain that it is contradictory for an atemporal being to act in a temporal universe, including experiencing its temporal successions. Contrary to the atemporalists, redemptive history has shown that God interacts with humans in time. This relational nature of God nullifies the classical notion of God as timelessly eternal. Therefore, it lacks a philosophical and theological basis. Because God is in time, He does not (...) know all future contingencies and, therefore, changes. This study examines open theism's appropriation of the A and B theories of time to the divine-human relationship. The study argues that divine temporality does not solve the tension of divine-human relationships, especially in relation to the future. Further, historical divine temporality does not negate the fact of divine atemporality. It mainly stems from God's choice to create temporal creatures and His relationship with them. Furthermore, if it is not logically and metaphysically contradictory for an omnipresent being to act in space, then it follows that an atemporal being can act in time. Whether time is understood from the metric or psychological point of view, it does not transcend God, and therefore, the limitation it places on human creatures with respect to the future does not apply to God. Lastly, although a few philosophers reject the notion of eternity as timelessly eternal, the doctrine has a philosophical and theological basis in the Scripture. (shrink)

Internet, a revolutionary invention, is always transforming into some new kind of hardware and software making it unpreventable for anyone. The type of communication that we see today is either human-to-human or human-to-device, but the Internet of Things (IoT) promises a great future for the internet where the type of communication is machine-to-machine (M2M). The Internet of Things (IoT) is defined as a paradigm in which objects provide with sensors, actuators, and processors communicate with each other to serve a meaningful (...) purpose. In this paper we discussed IoT and its architecture. Further we explained different applications of IoT for users, IoT advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

I have read the article "Retract or be damned: a dangerous moment for science and the public" by Kamran Abbasi. The article discusses the growing problem of retractions in scientific literature, and argues that this is a threat to the integrity of science and the public's trust in science.

This paper explores the relationship between eugenics, disability, and dehumanization, with a focus on forms of eugenics beyond Nazi eugenics.

In mathematics, the deductive method reigns. Without proof, a claim remains unsolved, a mere conjecture, not something that can be simply assumed; when a proof is found, the problem is solved, it turns into a “result,” something that can be relied on. So mathematicians think. But is there more to mathematical justification than proof? -/- The answer is an emphatic yes, as I explain in this article. I argue that non-deductive justification is in fact pervasive in mathematics, and that it (...) is in good epistemic standing. (shrink)

As a member of the so-demarcated 'Generation Z,' I have been blessed/damned with a front-row seat to the technological evolution kicked off by the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020, and have succeeded to varying degrees in recognizing its effects and responding to them with the efficiency and care that my neurological soul deserves. Jean-Paul Sartre's conception of bad faith provides an excellent scalpel for the dissection of such a quasi-biological progression, and in this paper, I analyze the third dimension of bad (...) faith that has become possible in the 21st century, that of the digital realm. I wish whoever has read this far immense luck in their personal voyage across the 70,000 fathoms of the internet, an electrical space organized for the mechanized transfusion of suffering into profit. Delete Instagram if you are not using it to proliferate wealth yourself. Go outside and lay in the grass. -/- "Remember being happy in our silence." -Warning, Bridges. (shrink)

There is a type of metaphysical picture that surfaces in a range of philosophical discussions, is of intrinsic interest, and yet remains ill-understood. According to this picture, the world contains a range of standpoints relative to which different facts obtain. Any true representation of the world cannot but adopt a particular standpoint. The aim of this paper is to propose a regimentation of a metaphysics that underwrites this picture. Key components are a factive notion of metaphysical relativity, a deflationary notion (...) of adopting standpoints, and two kinds of valid inference, one that allows one to abandon standpoints and one that does not. To better understand how theories formulated in terms of this framework are situated in dialectical space, I sketch a theory in the philosophy of time that admits both temporal and atemporal standpoints. (shrink)

The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the scientific study of magic. Despite being only a few years old, this “new wave” has already resulted in a host of interesting studies, often using methods that are both powerful and original. These developments have largely borne out our earlier hopes (Kuhn et al., 2008) that new opportunities were available for scientific studies based on the use of magic. And it would seem that much more can still be (...) done along these lines. -/- But in addition to this, we also suggested that it might be time to consider developing an outright science of magic—a distinct area of study concerned with the experience of wonder that results from encountering an apparently impossible event1. To this end, we proposed a framework as to how this might be achieved (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). A science can be viewed as a systematic method of investigation involving three sets of issues: (i) the entities considered relevant, (ii) the kinds of questions that can be asked about them, and (iii) the kinds of answers that are legitimate (Kuhn, 1970). In the case of magic, we suggested that this could be done at three different levels, each focusing on a distinct set of issues concerned with the nature of magic itself: (i) the nature of magical experience, (ii) how individual magic tricks create this experience, and (iii) organizing knowledge of the set of known tricks in a more comprehensive way (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). Our framework also included a base level focused on how the methods of magic could be used as tools to investigate issues in existing fields of study. -/- Lamont (2010) and Lamont et al. (2010) raised a number of concerns about the possibility of such a science, which we have addressed (Rensink and Kuhn, 2015). More recently, Lamont (2015) raised a new objection, arguing that although base-level work (i.e., applications of magic methods) might be useful, there is too little structure in magic tricks for them to be studied in a systematic way at the other levels, ruling out a science of magic. We argue here, however, that although this concern raises some interesting challenges for this science, it does not negate the possibility that it could exist, and could contribute to the study of the mind. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that emotional feelings (“state emotions”) can by themselves perceptually represent significant organism-environment relations. I object to this view mainly on the grounds that (1) it does not rule out the at least equally plausible view that emotional feelings are non-representational sensory registrations rather than perceptions, as Tyler Burge (2010) draws the distinction, and (2) perception of a relation requires perception of at least one of the relation’s relata, but an emotional feeling by itself perceives neither the (...) subject’s environment, nor in many cases the relevant subject itself. I then explore two ways in which emotional feelings as non-perceptual sensory registrations might still contribute to significant relation representation when associated with representations of the subject and/or its environment. After briefly discussing some difficulties presented by a multimodal, sensory-perceptual view of such representation, I argue in favor of a “cognitive recognition theory” that holds that significant relation instances are represented during emotion occurrences via applications of emotion-type concepts to "incoming" emotional feelings and their associated mental states. (shrink)

A hypergroup, as a generalization of the notion of a group, was introduced by F. Marty in 1934. The first book in hypergroup theory was published by Corsini. Nowadays, hypergroups have found applications to many subjects of pure and applied mathematics, for example, in geometry, topology, cryptography and coding theory, graphs and hypergraphs, probability theory, binary relations, theory of fuzzy and rough sets and automata theory, physics, and also in biological inheritance.

Sample chapter from H. Asgeirsson, The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2020), in which I present and partially defend a version of what has come to be called the communicative-content theory of law. Book abstract: Lawmaking is – paradigmatically – a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague (...) and, even when it is clear, the content itself is sometimes vague. The monograph examines the nature and consequences of these two linguistic sources of indeterminacy in the law with the aim of providing plausible answers to three related questions: In virtue of what is the law vague? What might be good about vague law? How should courts resolve cases of vagueness? (shrink)